500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA California 95053
Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business
in Total Papers Citations
Career concern, Obsession, Overachievement, Signaling
agency, delegation, dynamic incentives, limited commitment
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: DP9929.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
Agency, Delegation, Dynamic Incentives, Limited Commitment
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $38.00 .
File name: jems.
File name: j-8586.
auditing, exit option, principal–agent, soft information
Auditing, Exit Option, Principal-Agent, Soft Information
File name: j-9442.
Upstream market power, vertical contracting, waste
File name: JEMS.
Agency, Loyalty, Output Distortion
Principal-Agent, Incentives, Management Styles
File name: ECIN.
oligopoly, price competition, signaling, voluntary quality disclosure
Informed Principal, Self discipline, Uncertainty
Informed Principal, Information Gathering Agent
Collusion, Limited transfer discrimination, Outcome equivalency
information acquisition, principal-agent, project management
Risk-neutral consumer, Rent extraction, Warranty
Collusion, Principal-Agent, Wage Compression
Principal-Agent, Accuracy and Frequency of Audits, Commitment
Contract, Exit option, Communication
Cookies are used by this site. To decline or learn more, visit our Cookies page.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.690 seconds