Greg Hallman

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

Red McCombs School of Business

Austin, TX 78712

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

2

DOWNLOADS

355

TOTAL CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (2)

1.

Incentive Compensation and the Likelihood of Termination: Theory and Evidence from Real Estate Organizations

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 19 Apr 2008 Last Revised: 08 Feb 2010
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance, University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance and Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California
Downloads 226 (278,805)

Abstract:

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Executive Compensation, Agency Costs, Corporate Governance, REITs, RELPs

2.

Optimal Compensation Contracts with Pay-for-Performance and Termination Incentives

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-99-053
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 11 Nov 2008
Greg Hallman and Jay C. Hartzell
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance
Downloads 129 (454,169)

Abstract:

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