Yuliy Sannikov

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Assistant Professor

549 Evans Hall #3880

Berkeley, CA 94720-3880

United States

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS
Rank 9,408

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 9,408

in Total Papers Downloads

5,061

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 4,466

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 4,466

in Total Papers Citations

32

CROSSREF CITATIONS

211

Scholarly Papers (5)

1.
Downloads 3,398 ( 3,072)
Citation 63

Dynamic CEO Compensation

Journal of Finance 67(5), 1603-1647, October 2012
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 18 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 20 Dec 2013
Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik and Yuliy Sannikov
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 3,307 (3,156)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Loading...

Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, principal-agent problem, private saving, manipulation, vesting

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

NBER Working Paper No. w15324
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Sep 2009 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2009
Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik and Yuliy Sannikov
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 84 (308,023)

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7497
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 17 Nov 2009
Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik and Yuliy Sannikov
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 7 (647,638)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, manipulation, principal-agent problem, private saving, vesting

A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 30 Jun 2004
Peter M. DeMarzo and Yuliy Sannikov
Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 750 (33,099)

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal contracting, security design, capital structure, debt maturity, agency, moral hazard, principal agent, continuous time, incentives, cash flow diversion, asset substitution, default, credit line, compensating balance, debt, equity, dividend policy

A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure

NBER Working Paper No. w10615
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 28 Jul 2004 Last Revised: 05 Jul 2010
Peter M. DeMarzo and Yuliy Sannikov
Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 92 (290,774)

Abstract:

Loading...

3.

Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous-Time Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1624
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 27 Aug 2007
Eduardo Faingold and Yuliy Sannikov
Insper Institute of Education and Research and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 461 (63,409)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Repeated games, Reputation, Continuous time

Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-07-010
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 03 Nov 2008
Thomas Philippon and Yuliy Sannikov
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 129 (228,367)

Abstract:

Loading...

Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, Ipos, and Business Risk

NBER Working Paper No. w13584
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 05 Nov 2007 Last Revised: 15 Aug 2010
Thomas Philippon and Yuliy Sannikov
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 91 (292,781)

Abstract:

Loading...

5.

Impossibility of Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1887
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 28 May 2005
Andrzej Skrzypacz and Yuliy Sannikov
Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 140 (213,308)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Economic theory, microeconomics, dynamic games, collusion