Yuliy Sannikov

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Assistant Professor

549 Evans Hall #3880

Berkeley, CA 94720-3880

United States

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

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Top 9,052

in Total Papers Downloads

5,002

CITATIONS
Rank 17,290

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 17,290

in Total Papers Citations

28

Scholarly Papers (5)

1.
Downloads 3,367 ( 2,929)
Citation 20

Dynamic CEO Compensation

Journal of Finance 67(5), 1603-1647, October 2012
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 18 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 20 Dec 2013
Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik and Yuliy Sannikov
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 3,278 (2,999)
Citation 65

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Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, principal-agent problem, private saving, manipulation, vesting

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

NBER Working Paper No. w15324
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Sep 2009 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2009
Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik and Yuliy Sannikov
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 82 (299,486)

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Dynamic Incentive Accounts

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7497
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 17 Nov 2009
Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik and Yuliy Sannikov
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 7 (618,512)
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Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, manipulation, principal-agent problem, private saving, vesting

A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 30 Jun 2004
Peter M. DeMarzo and Yuliy Sannikov
Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 737 (32,293)

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Optimal contracting, security design, capital structure, debt maturity, agency, moral hazard, principal agent, continuous time, incentives, cash flow diversion, asset substitution, default, credit line, compensating balance, debt, equity, dividend policy

A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure

NBER Working Paper No. w10615
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 28 Jul 2004 Last Revised: 05 Jul 2010
Peter M. DeMarzo and Yuliy Sannikov
Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 89 (284,385)
Citation 187

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3.

Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous-Time Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1624
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 27 Aug 2007
Eduardo Faingold and Yuliy Sannikov
Insper Institute of Education and Research and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 456 (61,292)
Citation 13

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Repeated games, Reputation, Continuous time

Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-07-010
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 03 Nov 2008
Thomas Philippon and Yuliy Sannikov
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 127 (221,247)

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Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, Ipos, and Business Risk

NBER Working Paper No. w13584
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 05 Nov 2007 Last Revised: 15 Aug 2010
Thomas Philippon and Yuliy Sannikov
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 90 (282,331)
Citation 2

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5.

Impossibility of Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1887
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 28 May 2005
Andrzej Skrzypacz and Yuliy Sannikov
Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 136 (208,864)
Citation 23

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Economic theory, microeconomics, dynamic games, collusion