Marion Ott

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

P.O. Box 10 34 43

L 7,1

D-68034 Mannheim, 68034

Germany

  • ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

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156

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Scholarly Papers (4)

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1.

Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 22-060
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 14 Dec 2022 Last Revised: 07 Feb 2023
Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Anselm Eicke, Lion Hirth, Fabian Ocker, Marion Ott, Ingmar Schlecht and Runxi Wang
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Hertie School, Neon Neue Energieökonomik GmbH, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology - Department of Economics and Management, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, University of Basel - Center for Economic Science and Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Downloads 49 (615,853)

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Energy market, Game theory, Auctions/bidding, Congestion management, Inc-dec gaming

2.

How the Auction Design Influences Procurement Prices: An Experiment

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 19-061
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 28 Jan 2020
Karl-Martin Ehrhart and Marion Ott
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 41 (660,866)

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procurement auction, experiment, WTP-WTA disparity, reference-dependence

3.

Competing Combinatorial Auctions

This is the author accepted manuscript of the article published in Information Systems Research, which is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2021.1018.
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 16 Sep 2021
Thomas Kittsteiner, Marion Ott and Richard Steinberg
RWTH Aachen University - School of Business and Economics, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and London School of Economics and Political Science
Downloads 35 (698,675)

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Competing auctioneers, combinatorial auction, electronic marketplace, VCG mechanism

4.

A Small Volume Reduction that Melts Down the Market: Auctions with Endogenous Rationing

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 20-014
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 09 Apr 2020
Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Ann-Katrin Hanke and Marion Ott
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), affiliation not provided to SSRN and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 31 (726,164)

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auction, participation, market design, optimal mechanism, renewable energy support