R. Dr. Neto de Araujo 320 cj 1307
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro 22250-900
Brazil
Fundacao Getulio Vargas (FGV)
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
contract theory, adverse selection, moral hazard, mechanism design
Organizational Design, Incentive Provision, Common Agency
Trade Credit, Information, Credit Risk
Dividend policy, Non-monotone contracts, Signaling, Single-crossing property
voluntary contribution mechanism, incomplete information, communication, cheap talk, threshold equilibria, experiments, coordination games
Spence-Mirrlees condition, Global incentive compatibility, U-shaped condition, Discrete pooling
Robust Mechanism Design, Monopolistic Screening under Uncertainty
GED, job-market, noncognitive skills
Incentives, non-monotone contracts, single-crossing property
instrumental variables, weak identification, heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors, Anderson-Rubin, score, conditional likelihood ratio, Bayes' tests
Auctions, Pure strategy equilibria, Non-monotonic bidding functions, Tie-breaking rules, Necessary and suficient conditions for equilibrium, Multidimensional types
Information Sharing, Moral Hazard, Common Agency
