Vasiliki Skreta

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics

Professor

Austin, TX 78712

United States

http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

University College London

Professor

Gower Street

London, WC1E 6BT

United Kingdom

http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

27

DOWNLOADS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 22,263

in Total Papers Downloads

3,255

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 2,884

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 2,884

in Total Papers Citations

212

CROSSREF CITATIONS

248

Scholarly Papers (27)

1.
Downloads 466 ( 87,430)

Immunity

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31757
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 04 Oct 2012
Karthik Reddy, Moritz Schularick and Vasiliki Skreta
affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Bonn - Department of Economics and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 367 (114,233)

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accountability, corruption, immunity, interest groups

Immunity

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4445
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 02 Nov 2013
Karthik Reddy, Moritz Schularick and Vasiliki Skreta
affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Bonn - Department of Economics and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 99 (368,268)

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accountability, corruption, immunity, interest groups

Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 06 Nov 2008
Vasiliki Skreta and Laura Veldkamp
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics and Columbia University - Columbia Business School
Downloads 275 (155,367)
Citation 34

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Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation

NBER Working Paper No. w14761
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 26 Feb 2009 Last Revised: 02 May 2022
Vasiliki Skreta and Laura Veldkamp
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics and Columbia University - Columbia Business School
Downloads 65 (471,531)

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3.
Downloads 259 (165,891)
Citation 10

Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31761
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 15 Oct 2011 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2013
Princeton University - Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics, Yale UniversityYale University - Cowles Foundation and New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics
Downloads 107 (349,431)

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asymmetric information; cheap talk;, dynamic strategic communication;full information revelation

Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 04 Aug 2012 Last Revised: 03 Oct 2013
New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics and Yale UniversityYale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 84 (408,374)

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asymmetric information, cheap talk, dynamic strategic communication, full information revelation

Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1802
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 01 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 16 Jun 2011
Princeton University - Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics, Yale UniversityYale University - Cowles Foundation and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 68 (460,589)
Citation 11

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asymmetric information,cheap talk, dynamic strategic communication, full information revelation

4.

Sales Talk

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 13 Jul 2014
Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta
Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 251 (171,042)
Citation 4

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Informed seller; consumer heterogeneity; product information disclosure; mechanism design; value of information

5.
Downloads 249 (172,308)
Citation 3

Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good

Number of pages: 50 Posted: 07 May 2019 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2020
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 249 (171,726)
Citation 3

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mechanism design, limited commitment, intrapersonal equilibrium, information design, self-generation, posted price

Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13967
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 07 Oct 2019
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
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information design, intrapersonal equilibrium, Limited Commitment, mechanism design, posted price, self-generation

6.

Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 03 Dec 2018 Last Revised: 25 Aug 2020
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 228 (187,468)
Citation 11

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mechanism design, limited commitment, revelation principle, information design

7.

Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31787
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 13 Oct 2008 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2013
Vasiliki Skreta
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 219 (194,891)
Citation 12

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mechanism design, optimal auctions, limited commitment

8.

Reforms or Bankruptcy?

Kathimerini, June 26, 2011
Number of pages: 3 Posted: 30 Jun 2011
Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Macedonia, University of Bern - Department of Economics, New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Athens University of Economics and Business, Tufts University, Department of Finance, University of Luxembourg, Yale University, Concordia University, Quebec - John Molson School of Business, University of Crete - Department of Economics, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics, University of Guelph - Department of Economics, Athens Laboratory of Business Administration (ALBA), London School of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of Economics and Athens University of Economics and Business
Downloads 199 (212,833)

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Greece, reforms, bankruptcy, restructuring, privatization

9.
Downloads 187 (224,816)

Selling Through Referrals

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31774
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 06 May 2013
Daniele Condorelli, Andrea Galeotti and Vasiliki Skreta
University of Essex - Department of Economics, University of Essex and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 187 (224,797)

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asymmetric information, intermediation, agency, resale markets, referrals

Selling Through Referrals

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12048
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 22 May 2017
Daniele Condorelli, Andrea Galeotti and Vasiliki Skreta
University of Essex - Department of Economics, University of Essex and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
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asymmetric information, intermediaries, referrals, resale

10.
Downloads 130 (302,361)
Citation 5

Optimal Auctions with General Distribution

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26024
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 13 Oct 2008
Vasiliki Skreta
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 90 (391,388)
Citation 3

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mechanism design, optimal auctions, ironing, Dirac s delta functions

Optimal Auctions with General Distribution

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 15 Apr 2008
Vasiliki Skreta
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 40 (585,932)
Citation 3

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mechanism design, optimal auctions, ironing, Dirac's delta functions.

Purchase History and Product Personalization

Columbia Business School Research Paper Forthcoming
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 23 Mar 2021
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 116 (330,109)

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product-line design, price discrimination, dynamic mechanism design, information design, limited commitment

Purchase History and Product Personalization

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15969
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 31 Mar 2021
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (933,540)
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12.
Downloads 112 (336,597)
Citation 79

Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/30283
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 06 Dec 2010
Thomas Philippon and Vasiliki Skreta
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 76 (433,285)

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adverse selection, market collapse, mechanism design, mechanism-dependent participation

Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection

NBER Working Paper No. w15785
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 01 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 18 Feb 2022
Thomas Philippon and Vasiliki Skreta
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 31 (640,658)
Citation 3

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Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7737
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 17 Mar 2010
Thomas Philippon and Vasiliki Skreta
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 5 (876,474)
Citation 15
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adverse selection, bailout, financial crisis, information, mechanism design

13.
Downloads 107 (347,120)
Citation 1

The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26021
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 13 Oct 2008
Nicolás Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta
University of Chile and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 58 (499,410)

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Optimal Multi Unit Auctions, Type Dependent Outside Options, Externalities, Mechanism Design

The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 17 Apr 2008
Vasiliki Skreta and Nicolas Figueroa
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics
Downloads 49 (539,416)
Citation 1

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Optimal Multi Unit Auctions, Type Dependent Outside Options, Externalities, Mechanism Design, Type-Dependent Outside Options

14.
Downloads 95 (374,999)

What to Put on the Table

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 17 Apr 2008
Vasiliki Skreta and Nicolas Figueroa
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics
Downloads 55 (512,006)

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efficient mechanism design, multiple units, partnerships.

What to Put on the Table

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26020
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 13 Oct 2008 Last Revised: 27 Apr 2010
Nicolás Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta
University of Chile and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 40 (585,932)

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efficient mechanism design, multiple units, complements, substitutes, ownership structure, partnerships.

15.
Downloads 67 (458,218)
Citation 31

A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms

Number of pages: 10 Posted: 17 Apr 2008
Vasiliki Skreta and Nicolas Figueroa
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics
Downloads 43 (569,638)
Citation 5

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mechanism, design, optimal auctions, bunching

A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26022
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 13 Oct 2008
Nicolás Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta
University of Chile and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 24 (692,483)
Citation 10

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mechanism design, optimal auctions, bunching

16.

On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26019
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 13 Oct 2008
Vasiliki Skreta
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 62 (476,389)
Citation 2

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mechanism design, informed principal, information disclosure, correlated information, optimal auctions

17.

Guide to Immunity Coding

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31758
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 12 Apr 2013
Karthik Reddy, Moritz Schularick and Vasiliki Skreta
affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Bonn - Department of Economics and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 42 (563,299)

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accountability, corruption, immunity, interest groups

18.

Documentation of Immunity Coding: Criminal Immunity Provisions in 73 Democratic Countries

NYU Working Paper
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 12 Apr 2013
Karthik Reddy, Moritz Schularick and Vasiliki Skreta
affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Bonn - Department of Economics and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 41 (568,385)

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accountability, corruption, immunity, interest groups

19.

Documentation of Immunity Coding: Criminal Immunity Provisions in 73 Democratic Countries

NYU Working Paper
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 24 Apr 2013
Karthik Reddy, Moritz Schularick and Vasiliki Skreta
affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Bonn - Department of Economics and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 34 (606,435)

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accountability, corruption, immunity, interest groups

20.

Documentation of Immunity Coding

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31759
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 26 Jun 2013
Moritz Schularick and Vasiliki Skreta
University of Bonn - Department of Economics and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 31 (624,576)

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accountability, corruption, immunity, interest groups

21.

Immunity

International Economic Review, Vol. 61, Issue 2, pp. 531-564, 2020
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 30 Oct 2020
Karthik Reddy, Moritz Schularick and Vasiliki Skreta
affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Bonn - Department of Economics and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 11 (781,829)

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22.

Selling Through Referrals

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 27, Issue 4, pp. 669-685, 2018
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 29 Oct 2018
Daniele Condorelli, Andrea Galeotti and Vasiliki Skreta
University of Warwick - Department of Economics, University of Essex and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 8 (811,509)
Citation 1

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23.

Informed Information Design

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17028
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 29 Mar 2022
Frédéric Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta
The University of Texas at Austin and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (910,098)
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Bayesian persuasion, core mechanism, Disclosure games, informed prin- cipal, interim information design, neutral optimum, strong neologism proof- ness, Unraveling, verifiable types

24.

Information Design by an Informed Designer

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15709
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 11 Feb 2021
Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta
Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (910,098)
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25.

Incentive-Driven Inattention

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13619
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 01 Apr 2019
Central Bank of Brazil - Research Department, University College London - Department of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
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Contest, incentives, rational inattention, structural estimation, Survey Design

26.

Information Design Under Falsification

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12271
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 11 Sep 2017
Eduardo Perez-Richet and Vasiliki Skreta
Sciences Po and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (910,098)
Citation 2
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27.

Selling with Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12049
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 22 May 2017
Frédéric Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta
University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (910,098)
Citation 3
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Informed principal; consumer heterogeneity; interdependent valuations; product information disclosure; mechanism design; certification