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Winand Emons

University of Bern - Department of Economics

Professor of Economic Theory

Schanzeneckstrasse 1

Postfach 8573

CH-3001 Bern

Switzerland

http://staff.vwi.unibe.ch/emons

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fellow

77 Bastwick Street

London, EC1V 3PZ

United Kingdom

  • University of Bern - Department of Economics

    • Email
    • Tel: +41 31 631 3922
    • Fax: +41 31 631 3783
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

27

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Top 16,654

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2,375

CITATIONS
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Top 6,586

in Total Papers Citations

75

Scholarly Papers (27)

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1.

The Market for Used Cars: New Evidence of the Lemons Phenomenon

Downloads 381 ( 64,119)
Citation 8

The Market for Used Cars: New Evidence of the Lemons Phenomenon

University of Bern, Department of Economics Discussion Paper 02.02
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 29 Apr 2002 Last Revised: 18 Jul 2008
Winand Emons and George Sheldon
University of Bern - Department of Economics and University of Basel - Department of Applied Economic Research
Downloads 357 (68,576)
Citation 8

Abstract:

adverse selection, used car market, duration models

The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3360
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 11 Jun 2002
Winand Emons and George Sheldon
University of Bern - Department of Economics and University of Basel - Department of Applied Economic Research
Downloads 24 (444,179)
Citation 8
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Abstract:

Adverse selection, used car market, duration models

2.

Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 11 Jul 2000
Winand Emons and Robert D. Cooter
University of Bern - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 247 (99,442)
Citation 9

Abstract:

3.

The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees

Downloads 170 (148,902)
Citation 4

The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 16 May 2004
Winand Emons and Nuno M. Garoupa
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Texas A&M University School of Law
Downloads 150 (166,176)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Contingent fees, conditional fees, moral hazard, incentives

The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4473
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 10 Aug 2004
Winand Emons and Nuno M. Garoupa
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Texas A&M University School of Law
Downloads 20 (467,174)
Citation 4
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Abstract:

Contingent fees, conditional fees, moral hazard, incentives

4.

Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller

Downloads 150 (165,916)
Citation 1

Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller

Univ. of Bern Dept. of Economics Disc. Paper No. 98-07
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 28 Jan 1999
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 150 (166,176)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller

CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 2041
Posted: 13 Jan 1999
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics

Abstract:

5.

Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 26 Jun 2000
Robert D. Cooter and Winand Emons
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law and University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 130 (176,523)
Citation 8

Abstract:

6.

Conditional versus Contingent Fees

Downloads 122 (195,701)
Citation 5

Conditional versus Contingent Fees

University of Bern Discussion Paper No. 04.08
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 25 May 2004
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 111 (210,963)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Contingent fees, conditional fees, adverse selection, moral hazard, screening, pooling

Conditional versus Contingent Fees

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4532
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 23 Sep 2004
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 11 (519,638)
Citation 5
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Abstract:

Contingent fees, conditional fees, adverse selection, moral hazard, screening, pooling

Conditional Versus Contingent Fees

Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 59, Issue 1, pp. 89-101, 2007
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics

Abstract:

JEL classifications: D82, K1

7.

Perjury Versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity Or Quality Of Testimony

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 14 Sep 2001
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 114 (192,066)
Citation 2

Abstract:

litigation process, witness, truth-revelation, mechanism design, perjury rule

8.

Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians

Downloads 95 (234,008)

Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians

Forthcoming in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 20 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 14 Nov 2013
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 92 (240,659)

Abstract:

credence goods, expert services, incentives, medical doctors, demand inducement, insurance

Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7659
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 08 Feb 2010
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 3 (563,091)
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Abstract:

credence goods, demand inducement, expert services, incentives, insurance, medical doctors

9.

Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders

Downloads 94 (235,614)
Citation 5

Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders

, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 12 Nov 2003
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 81 (261,181)
Citation 5

Abstract:

crime and punishment, repeat offenders

Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4131
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 22 Dec 2003
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 13 (508,028)
Citation 5
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Abstract:

10.

Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality

Downloads 92 (238,889)
Citation 2

Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality

CIRANO - Scientific Publications 2011s-75
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 05 Feb 2012
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 52 (332,408)
Citation 2

Abstract:

quality, advertising, disclosure, signalling

Non-Comparative Versus Comparative Advertising of Quality

International Journal of Industrial Organization, Forthcoming, CIRPEE Working Paper No. 11-39
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 14 Dec 2011 Last Revised: 23 Jan 2012
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 40 (372,178)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Quality, advertising, disclosure, signalling

11.

Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders

Downloads 87 (247,562)
Citation 4

Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders

University of Bern Discussion Paper No. 02.11
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 30 Oct 2002
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 69 (287,151)
Citation 4

Abstract:

crime and punishment, repeat offenders, subgame perfection

Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3667
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 15 Jan 2003
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 18 (478,886)
Citation 4
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Abstract:

Crime and punishment, repeat offenders, subgame perfection

12.

A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders

Univ. of Bern Economics Discussion Paper No. 01.04
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 11 Dec 2001
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 86 (237,241)
Citation 11

Abstract:

crime and punishment, repeat offenders

13.

Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony

Downloads 78 (264,703)

Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 20 Jan 2010
Claude Fluet and Winand Emons
Université Laval and University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 53 (329,354)

Abstract:

evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial

Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Testimony

CIRPEE Working Paper No. 11-22
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 Aug 2011
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 23 (449,858)

Abstract:

Evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial

Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Testimony

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7476
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 17 Nov 2009
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 2 (571,451)
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Abstract:

adversarial, costly state falsification, evidence production, inquisitorial, procedure

14.

Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees

Downloads 72 (277,284)
Citation 6

Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 17 Dec 2004
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 58 (314,953)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Contingent fees,conditional fees, risk aversion, insurance, incentives

Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4841
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 03 May 2005
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 14 (502,300)
Citation 6
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Abstract:

Contingent fees, conditional fees, risk-aversion, insurance, incentives

Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees Versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees

American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 20-32, 2006
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics

Abstract:

15.

Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 02 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 19 Nov 2016
Marc Blatter, Winand Emons and Silvio Sticher
University of Bern, University of Bern - Department of Economics and University of Bern
Downloads 71 (237,241)

Abstract:

antitrust, cartels, deterrence, leniency, evidence

16.

Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 19 Jun 1997
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 71 (262,815)
Citation 4

Abstract:

17.

The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony

Downloads 64 (295,436)

The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony

CIRPEE Working Paper No. 05-20; University of Bern Economics Discussion Paper No. 05-06
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 20 Jun 2005
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 56 (320,501)

Abstract:

Evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial

The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5124
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 10 Aug 2005
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 8 (536,258)
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Abstract:

Evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial

18.

Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

Downloads 40 (364,674)

Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 08 Dec 2006 Last Revised: 19 Jan 2010
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 37 (383,518)

Abstract:

genetic tests, insurance, screening, pooling

Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6047
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 28 Jun 2007
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 3 (563,091)
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Abstract:

Genetic tests, insurance, pooling, screening

19.

Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures

Downloads 39 (368,230)
Citation 4

Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures

CIRPEE Working Paper No. 07-03
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 15 Feb 2007
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 38 (379,669)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial

Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence Under Different Procedures

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6150
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 May 2008
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 1 (583,098)
Citation 4
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Abstract:

Adversarial, costly state falsification, evidence production, inquisitorial, multi-sender game

Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence Under Different Procedures

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 25, Issue 1, pp. 134-156, 2009
Posted: 13 Apr 2009
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval

Abstract:

20.

Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence

Downloads 37 (375,293)

Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 24 Apr 2015
Lisa R. Anderson, Gregory J. DeAngelo, Winand Emons, Beth Freeborn and Hannes Lang
College of William and Mary - Department of Economics, West Virginia University - Department of Economics, University of Bern - Department of Economics, Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Downloads 37 (383,518)

Abstract:

repeat offenders, increasing penalties, experimental evidence

Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10576
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 05 May 2015
Lisa R. Anderson, Gregory J. DeAngelo, Winand Emons, Beth Freeborn and Hannes Lang
College of William and Mary - Department of Economics, West Virginia University - Department of Economics, University of Bern - Department of Economics, Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Downloads 0
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Abstract:

crime and punishment, deterrence, experimental evidence, repeat offenders

Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two‐Stage Model: Experimental Evidence

Economic Inquiry, Vol. 55, Issue 4, pp. 1833-1867, 2017
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 28 Aug 2017
Lisa R. Anderson, Gregory J. DeAngelo, Winand Emons, Beth Freeborn and Hannes Lang
College of William and Mary - Department of Economics, West Virginia University - Department of Economics, University of Bern - Department of Economics, Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
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Abstract:

21.

Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs

Downloads 27 (416,130)

Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 27 Jan 2016
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 27 (427,764)

Abstract:

disclosure, persuasion, active judging, adversarial, inquisitorial

Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11105
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 17 Feb 2016
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 0
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Abstract:

active judging, adversarial, disclosure, inquisitorial, persuasion

22.

Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

The B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Jan 2010
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics
Downloads 23 (425,885)

Abstract:

genetic tests, insurance, screening, pooling

23.

Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts

Downloads 12 (493,334)

Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 02 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 14 Apr 2016
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 12 (513,905)

Abstract:

litigation, contingent fees, fixed fees, expert services

Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9727
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 0
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Abstract:

contingent fees, expert services, fixed fees, litigation

24.

Non-Comparative Versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7109
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 18 Feb 2009
Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
University of Bern - Department of Economics and Université Laval
Downloads 3 (536,977)
Citation 2
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Abstract:

advertising, costly state falsification, signalling

25.

Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10106
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Marc Blatter, Winand Emons and Silvio Sticher
University of Bern, University of Bern - Department of Economics and University of Bern
Downloads 0 (568,467)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

antitrust, cartels, deterrence, evidence, leniency

26.

Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts

Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 28, No. 1
Posted: 02 Apr 1997
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics

Abstract:

27.

Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation

Center of Economic Policy Research, London, Discussion Paper No. 1487
Posted: 14 Nov 1996
Winand Emons
University of Bern - Department of Economics

Abstract:

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