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Michael Klausner

Stanford Law School

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305-8610

United States

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SCHOLARLY PAPERS

29

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218

Scholarly Papers (29)

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1.

What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting

BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP: LINKING GOVERNANCE WITH REGULATORY POLICY, Michael Whincop, ed., Ashgate, 2001
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 15 Aug 2001
Michael Klausner and Kate Litvak
Stanford Law School and Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law
Downloads 2,583 (3,034)
Citation 11

Abstract:

2.

Outside Director Liability

as published in Stanford Law Review, Vol. 58, pp. 1055-1159, 2006, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 68/2006, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 319, U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 76
Number of pages: 107 Posted: 04 Apr 2006 Last Revised: 03 Nov 2010
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Michael Klausner
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law and Stanford Law School
Downloads 2,291 (3,683)
Citation 57

Abstract:

outside directors, corporate law, securities law, indemnification, D&O insurance

3.

Outside Director Liability (Before Enron and WorldCom)

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 250
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 12 Dec 2003
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Michael Klausner
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law and Stanford Law School
Downloads 2,240 (4,280)
Citation 8

Abstract:

directors, corporate goverance, liability, securities law, corporate law

4.

Outside Directors, Liability Risk and Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis (English Version)

ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 48, U of Texas law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 31
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 09 Sep 2005
Brian R. Cheffins, Bernard S. Black and Michael Klausner
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and Stanford Law School
Downloads 1,937 (5,389)

Abstract:

outside directors, corporate governance, Germany, supervisory board, director liability, securities law, corporate law

5.

Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in Ipos

Downloads 1,830 ( 6,373)
Citation 65

Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in Ipos

New York University Center for Law and Business Working Paper No. 99-015; and Stanford Law School John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 184
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 24 Feb 2000
Robert Daines and Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 1,560 (8,228)
Citation 65

Abstract:

Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 17, pp. 83-120, 2001
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Nov 2005
Robert Daines and Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 270 (91,646)
Citation 65

Abstract:

6.

Liability Risk for Outside Directors: A Cross-Border Analysis

Downloads 1,305 ( 11,217)
Citation 13

Liability Risk for Outside Directors: A Cross-Border Analysis

European Financial Management Journal, Vol. 11, pp. 153-171, 2005
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 11 Mar 2005
Brian R. Cheffins, Bernard S. Black and Michael Klausner
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and Stanford Law School
Downloads 1,280 (11,357)
Citation 13

Abstract:

corporate governance, outside directors, legal liability, corporate law, securities law

Liability Risk for Outside Directors: A Cross-Border Analysis

European Financial Management, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 153-171, March 2005
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 28 Mar 2005
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Michael Klausner
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law and Stanford Law School
Downloads 25 (428,097)
Citation 13

Abstract:

7.

Outside Directors and Lawsuits: What are the Real Risks?

McKinsey Quarterly, 2004
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 15 Sep 2004
Brian R. Cheffins, Bernard S. Black and Michael Klausner
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and Stanford Law School
Downloads 1,038 (15,298)

Abstract:

corporate governance, director liability, fiduciary duty, securities law, securities class actions, law and finance, director duties

8.

Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 162, 2006, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 59/2006, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 319, U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 54
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 25 Jan 2006
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Michael Klausner
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law and Stanford Law School
Downloads 1,028 (15,110)
Citation 39

Abstract:

outside directors, liability, corporate governance

9.

The Limits of Corporate Law in Promoting Good Corporate Governance

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 300
Number of pages: 6 Posted: 17 Dec 2004
Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School
Downloads 963 (17,142)

Abstract:

governance, shareholder vote, shareholder suits, derivative suits

10.

Shareholder Suits and Outside Director Liability: The Case of Korea

Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 11, pp. 325-362, 2011, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. #, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 47/2005
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 17 Jan 2005 Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
Brian R. Cheffins, Bernard S. Black and Michael Klausner
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and Stanford Law School
Downloads 937 (17,142)
Citation 6

Abstract:

corporate governance, director liability, fiduciary duty, securities law, securities class actions, law and finance, director duties

11.

Institutional Shareholders' Split Personality on Corporate Governance: Active in Proxies, Passive in IPOs

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 225
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 28 Nov 2001
Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School
Downloads 907 (18,844)
Citation 4

Abstract:

12.

Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance

Stanford Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 6, 2013, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 449
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 24 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 31 Aug 2013
Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School
Downloads 733 (19,950)

Abstract:

Corporate Governance, Governance Theory, Governance Indices

13.

Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 28 Oct 2003
Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School
Downloads 646 (30,609)
Citation 6

Abstract:

IPO, private equity, venture capital, takeover defenses

14.

When Time Isn't Money: Foundation Payouts and the Time Value of Money

As published in Stanford Social Innovation Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 51-59, Spring 2003; Exempt Organization Tax Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 421-428, September 2003
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 26 Sep 2003
Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School
Downloads 602 (29,180)
Citation 1

Abstract:

private foundation, payout, distributions, nonprofits, charity

15.

The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 31, p. 779, 2006, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 334
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 16 Jan 2007
Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School
Downloads 590 (31,025)
Citation 4

Abstract:

corporate law, corporate governance, contract, contractarian

16.

Agents Protecting Agents: An Empirical Study of Takeover Defenses in Spinoffs

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 299
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 17 Mar 2005
Robert Daines and Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 551 (35,549)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Corporate Governance, spinoff, takeover defenses, takeovers

17.

Outside Directors, Liability Risk and Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis (German Version)

ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 48, U of Texas law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 31
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 09 Sep 2005
Brian R. Cheffins, Bernard S. Black and Michael Klausner
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and Stanford Law School
Downloads 496 (41,965)

Abstract:

outside directors, corporate governance, Germany, supervisory board, director liability, securities law, corporate law

18.

When are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How Much? — An Update

PLUS Journal, April 2013, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 445, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 145
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 05 May 2013 Last Revised: 23 Jul 2013
Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland and Matthew Goforth
Stanford Law School, Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 371 (55,153)

Abstract:

Securities, Securities Litigation, Securities Enforcement, Settlement

19.

How Protective is D&O Insurance in Securities Class Actions? — An Update

PLUS Journal, May 2013, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 446, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 144
Number of pages: 8 Posted: 05 May 2013 Last Revised: 26 Jul 2013
Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland and Matthew Goforth
Stanford Law School, Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 367 (51,579)

Abstract:

Securities litigation, Securities enforcement, Settlement, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, Insurance

20.

How Protective is D&O Insurance in Securities Class Actions?

PLUS Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2, February 2010, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 425
Number of pages: 4 Posted: 29 Mar 2012 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2012
Michael Klausner and Jason Hegland
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 231 (92,846)

Abstract:

Director and Officer Liability Insurance, Director and Officer Liability, Securities, Securities Class Actions, Shareholder Litigation, Settlement

21.

Liquidation Rights and Incentive Misalignment in Start-Up Financing

Cornell Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 6, 2013, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 454
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 23 Oct 2013 Last Revised: 12 Mar 2014
Michael Klausner and Stephen Venuto
Stanford Law School and Orrick Herrington Sutcliffe LLP
Downloads 83 (211,401)

Abstract:

Venture Capital, Liquidation Rights, Entrepreneurship, Start-up

22.

When are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How Much?

PLUS Journal, Vol. 23, No. 3, March 2010
Number of pages: 5 Posted: 26 Nov 2012
Michael Klausner and Jason Hegland
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 45 (302,802)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Securities class action, settlement

23.

A Tradable Obligation Approach to the Community Reinvestment Act

Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, February 2009, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 375
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 23 May 2009 Last Revised: 16 Nov 2009
Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School
Downloads 45 (333,721)

Abstract:

CRA, Community Reinvestment Act, Community Development

24.

A U.S. View of the European Model Company Act

European Company and Financial Law Review, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 494
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 03 Jul 2016 Last Revised: 24 Sep 2016
Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School
Downloads 0 (229,558)

Abstract:

Company law, corporate law, Comparative

25.

The 'Corporate Contract' Today

Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance, 2016, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 490
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 13 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2016
Michael Klausner
Stanford Law School
Downloads 0 (84,096)

Abstract:

Corporate governance, contractarian theory, IPO stage, midstream stage, managers, shareholders, public company, corporate law, corporate charters, corporate contract

26.

Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 19 Corporate Law Professors, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, No. 14-915

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 08 Nov 2015
John C. Coates, IV, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee Jr., James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Henry Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian JM Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe and Helen S. Scott
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, Columbia Law School, Duke University School of Law, Stanford Law School, Columbia Law School, Widener University Delaware Law School, Yale Law School, Columbia Law School, New York University School of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Stanford Law School, Harvard Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, BC Law School, New York University School of Law, Harvard Law School and New York University (NYU)
Downloads 0 (52,583)

Abstract:

corporate politics, union politics, First Amendment, shareholder rights, corporate speech

27.

Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control

Stanford Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, 1996.
Posted: 26 Jun 1998
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner
New York University School of Law and Stanford Law School

Abstract:

28.

Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases

Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 74, Issue 2 (1996).
Posted: 03 Jun 1998
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner
New York University School of Law and Stanford Law School

Abstract:

29.

Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or 'The Economics of Boilerplate')

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 4, 1997
Posted: 18 Jul 1997
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner
New York University School of Law and Stanford Law School

Abstract:

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