Cristina Caffarra

Lexecon Ltd.

Orion House

5 Upper St Martin's Lane

London WC2H 9EA

United Kingdom

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

2

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1,039

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Scholarly Papers (2)

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1.

Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case

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Citation 5

Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 15 Nov 2004
Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Robert Stillman and Cristina Caffarra
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy, Lexecon Ltd. and Lexecon Ltd.
Downloads 981 (50,138)
Citation 4

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Bundling, antitrust, foreclosure, software industries, Microsoft

Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 08 Feb 2005
Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Robert Stillman and Cristina Caffarra
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy, Lexecon Ltd. and Lexecon Ltd.
Downloads 58 (800,507)
Citation 1
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Bundling, efficiency defenses, foreclosure, policy rules

2.

Intel: The Long Awaited ECJ Ruling

Laurence Idot, Cristina Caffarra, David Sevy, Marixenia Davilla, Paul Lugard, Damien Neven, Miguel Rato, Intel: The long awaited ECJ ruling, February 2018, Concurrences N° 1-2018, Art. N° 86055, pp. 14-41, https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2018/on-topic/intel-the-long-awaited-ecj-ru
Posted: 21 Jun 2021
Cristina Caffarra, Paul Lugard, Damien J Neven, Miguel Rato, Marixenia Davilla, David Sevy and Laurence Idot
Lexecon Ltd., Baker Botts, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Independent, Independent and Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas

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European Union, Unilateral Practices, Dominance, Rebates, Judicial review, Rule of reason, Effect on competition, Anticompetitive object / effect, As efficient competitor, Information technology