Wieland Müller

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

P.O. Box 90153

Tilburg, 5000 LE

Netherlands

  • Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

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541

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14

Scholarly Papers (3)

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1.

The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases

Downloads 307 (208,178)
Citation 4

The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-68, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2008-030
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 03 Sep 2008 Last Revised: 14 Sep 2008
Jan Boone and Wieland Müller
Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) and Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management
Downloads 307 (208,760)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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cartel, abuse of a dominant position, pass on defence, apportionment of harm, supply curve, tax incidence

2.

Taxation and Market Power

Downloads 69 (263,152)

Taxation and Market Power

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-03
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 02 Feb 2010
Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath and Wieland Müller
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck and Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management
Downloads 69 (718,100)

Abstract:

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tax incidence, monopoly, Bertrand competition, experiment

3.

Collusion in Experimental Bertrand Duopolies with Convex Costs: The Role of Information and Cost Asymmetry

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-87
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 09 Nov 2009
Cédric Argenton, Cédric Argenton and Wieland Müller
Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and ManagementTilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) and Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management
Downloads 165 (382,910)
Citation 10

Abstract:

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Bertrand competition, convex costs, collusion, coordination, experimental economics