Tom Wilkening

University of Melbourne

Associate Professor

FBE Building, Level 4

111 Barry Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053

Melbourne, Carlton 3054

Australia

http://www.tomwilkening.com

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

DOWNLOADS

701

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 5,199

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 5,199

in Total Papers Citations

68

CROSSREF CITATIONS

188

Scholarly Papers (6)

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 4, 2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 11 Sep 2013 Last Revised: 24 Mar 2014
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Fribourg - Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 211 (196,474)
Citation 3

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Organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4021
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 14 Dec 2012
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Fribourg - Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 97 (364,415)

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organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7030
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 15 Dec 2012
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Fribourg - Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 81 (407,664)
Citation 13

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organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

University of Zurich, UBS International Center of Economics in Society, Working Paper No. 2
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 01 Jun 2016
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich and University of Melbourne
Downloads 17 (732,546)
Citation 2

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Organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4948
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 17 Sep 2014
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy and University of Melbourne
Downloads 58 (488,258)

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implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 171, Revised version
Number of pages: 88 Posted: 15 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 16 Nov 2020
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy and University of Melbourne
Downloads 41 (567,138)
Citation 8

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Implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8404
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 06 Sep 2014
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy and University of Melbourne
Downloads 13 (768,168)

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implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 189
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 02 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of New South Wales (UNSW) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 35 (600,798)
Citation 1

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Implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8971
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 29 (638,793)
Citation 3

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implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5300
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 24 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of New South Wales (UNSW) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 25 (667,632)

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implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6557
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 08 Aug 2017
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics, Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), University of Melbourne and University of Melbourne - Department of Finance
Downloads 36 (594,885)

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market design, field experiments, economic development, land trade

Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12136
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 18 Jul 2017
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics, Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), University of Melbourne and University of Melbourne - Department of Finance
Downloads 1 (896,405)
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Regulatory Fog: The Informational Origins of Regulatory Persistence

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 15 May 2010 Last Revised: 30 Dec 2010
Patrick L. Warren and Tom Wilkening
Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 30 (615,759)

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Information, Regulation, Experimentation

6.

Defaults with Misaligned Incentives: The Role of Cognitive Effort

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 24 Feb 2022
UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics, Florida State University, University of Melbourne and University of Technology Sydney
Downloads 27 (634,801)

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default effect, cognitive costs, cognitive-effort channel, insurance, experiment