Tom Wilkening

University of Melbourne

Associate Professor

FBE Building, Level 4

111 Barry Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053

Melbourne, Carlton 3054

Australia

http://www.tomwilkening.com

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

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581

SSRN CITATIONS
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in Total Papers Citations

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CROSSREF CITATIONS

195

Scholarly Papers (5)

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 4, 2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 11 Sep 2013 Last Revised: 24 Mar 2014
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Fribourg - Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 203 (150,928)
Citation 3

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Organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4021
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 14 Dec 2012
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Fribourg - Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 89 (290,880)

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organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7030
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 15 Dec 2012
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Fribourg - Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 76 (320,751)
Citation 2

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organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

University of Zurich, UBS International Center of Economics in Society, Working Paper No. 2
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 01 Jun 2016
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich and University of Melbourne
Downloads 8 (627,007)
Citation 1

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Organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 189
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 02 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of New South Wales (UNSW) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 34 (469,221)

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Implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5300
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 24 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of New South Wales (UNSW) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 24 (525,760)

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implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8971
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 24 (525,760)

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implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4948
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 17 Sep 2014
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy and University of Melbourne
Downloads 46 (417,302)

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implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 171
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 15 Aug 2014
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy and University of Melbourne
Downloads 16 (578,030)
Citation 6

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Implementation Theory, Incomplete Contracts, Experiments

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8404
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 06 Sep 2014
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy and University of Melbourne
Downloads 12 (605,838)

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implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

4.

Regulatory Fog: The Informational Origins of Regulatory Persistence

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 15 May 2010 Last Revised: 30 Dec 2010
Patrick L. Warren and Tom Wilkening
Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 26 (492,548)

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Information, Regulation, Experimentation

Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6557
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 08 Aug 2017
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics, Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), University of Melbourne and University of Melbourne - Department of Finance
Downloads 22 (532,346)

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market design, field experiments, economic development, land trade

Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12136
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 18 Jul 2017
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics, Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), University of Melbourne and University of Melbourne - Department of Finance
Downloads 1 (690,384)
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