Tom Wilkening

University of Melbourne

Associate Professor

FBE Building, Level 4

111 Barry Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053

Melbourne, Carlton 3054

Australia

http://www.tomwilkening.com

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

7

DOWNLOADS

1,031

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 4,843

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 4,843

in Total Papers Citations

197

CROSSREF CITATIONS

180

Scholarly Papers (7)

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 4, 2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 11 Sep 2013 Last Revised: 24 Mar 2014
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Fribourg - Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 237 (239,323)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4021
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 14 Dec 2012
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Fribourg - Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 110 (461,234)

Abstract:

Loading...

organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7030
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 15 Dec 2012
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Fribourg - Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 97 (504,551)
Citation 13

Abstract:

Loading...

organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

University of Zurich, UBS International Center of Economics in Society, Working Paper No. 2
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 01 Jun 2016
Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich and University of Melbourne
Downloads 33 (861,572)

Abstract:

Loading...

Organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts

Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 171, Revised version
Number of pages: 88 Posted: 15 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 16 Nov 2020
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy and University of Melbourne
Downloads 72 (607,455)
Citation 15

Abstract:

Loading...

Implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4948
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 17 Sep 2014
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy and University of Melbourne
Downloads 70 (617,288)

Abstract:

Loading...

implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8404
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 06 Sep 2014
Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell and Tom Wilkening
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy and University of Melbourne
Downloads 24 (946,138)

Abstract:

Loading...

implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 189
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 02 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of New South Wales (UNSW) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 47 (752,185)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8971
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 41 (796,242)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5300
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 24 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of New South Wales (UNSW) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 34 (852,884)

Abstract:

Loading...

implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

4.

Preventing Search with Wicked Defaults

UNSW Business School Research Paper Forthcoming
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 15 Dec 2022 Last Revised: 23 Aug 2023
UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University, University of Melbourne and Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University
Downloads 84 (547,857)

Abstract:

Loading...

wicked defaults, costly search, theory, experiment

5.

Defaults and Cognitive Effort

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 24 Feb 2022 Last Revised: 30 Nov 2022
UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University, University of Melbourne and Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University
Downloads 67 (622,220)

Abstract:

Loading...

default effect, cognitive costs, cognitive-effort channel, insurance, experiment

Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6557
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 08 Aug 2017
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics, Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), University of Melbourne and University of Melbourne - Department of Finance
Downloads 64 (648,236)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

market design, field experiments, economic development, land trade

Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12136
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 18 Jul 2017
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics, Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), University of Melbourne and University of Melbourne - Department of Finance
Downloads 1 (1,182,095)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

7.

Regulatory Fog: The Informational Origins of Regulatory Persistence

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 15 May 2010 Last Revised: 30 Dec 2010
Patrick L. Warren and Tom Wilkening
Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics and University of Melbourne
Downloads 50 (715,884)

Abstract:

Loading...

Information, Regulation, Experimentation