Zvika Neeman

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

P.O. Box 39040

Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978

Israel

http://www.tau.ac.il/~zvika/

Boston University - Department of Economics

Assistant Professor

270 Bay State Road

Boston, MA 02215

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

22

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CITATIONS
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in Total Papers Citations

52

Scholarly Papers (22)

1.
Downloads 1,929 ( 7,543)
Citation 14

Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics

Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23. No. 3, pp. 1089-1119, 2010, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 603
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 15 Nov 2007 Last Revised: 28 Mar 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Zvika Neeman
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 1,886 (7,684)
Citation 11

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Investor protection, corporate governance, corporate law, interest groups, political economy, law and finance, insiders, institutional investors, entrepreneurs, equity capital, agency costs, private benefits of control

Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics

NBER Working Paper No. w13702
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 31 Dec 2007 Last Revised: 03 Sep 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Zvika Neeman
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 43 (416,169)
Citation 14

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2.
Downloads 449 ( 62,702)
Citation 1

Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital, and Poverty

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 04 Jun 2008 Last Revised: 09 Mar 2009
Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman
University of Warwick - Department of Economics and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 443 (63,086)
Citation 1

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Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital, Poverty

Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital and Poverty

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6864
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 17 Jun 2008
Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman
University of Warwick - Department of Economics and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 6 (626,458)
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Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital, Poverty

3.
Downloads 410 ( 69,772)
Citation 6

Corruption and Openness

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 20 Aug 2003
Zvika Neeman, M. Daniele Paserman and Avi Simhon
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics and Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Downloads 389 (73,543)
Citation 6

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Corruption, Openness, Growth

Corruption and Openness

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4057
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 07 Nov 2003
Zvika Neeman, M. Daniele Paserman and Avi Simhon
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics and Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Downloads 21 (526,745)
Citation 5
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Corruption, growth, openness

Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 329
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 21 Jul 2001
Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman
Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 235 (128,078)
Citation 14

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Class action, attorney fees, lodestar, percentage fees, contingent fees, litigation

Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 20, No.1, pp. 102-124, 2004
Posted: 17 Nov 2003
Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman
Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

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class action, attorney fees, lodestar, percentage fees, contingent fees, litigation

5.

Termination and Coordination in Partnerships

Paper #83
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 27 May 1998
Deborah Minehart and Zvika Neeman
University of Maryland - Department of Economics and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 222 (135,901)
Citation 3

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6.

Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State

CEPR DP No. 8548
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 02 Sep 2011
Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - Department of Economics and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 191 (156,509)
Citation 26

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Transparency, Appropriability, The Early State, Institutions, Land Tenure

7.
Downloads 185 (161,069)
Citation 7

The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort

Hebrew University Working Paper No. 2005-01
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 20 Jan 2005
Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman
University of Warwick - Department of Economics and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 183 (162,696)
Citation 3

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Reputation, incentives, precision of information, experience good, credence good

The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 58, Issue 3, pp. 642-660, September 2010
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 07 Sep 2010
Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman
University of Warwick - Department of Economics and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 2 (661,313)
Citation 7
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8.

Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 164, 2008
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 03 Jul 2007
Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman
Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 181 (164,332)
Citation 2

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civil justice, litigation, settlement, mechanism design, mediation, arbitration, discovery, fee shifting

9.

Markets Versus Negotiations: The Emergence of Centralized Markets

Hebrew University, CRIDT Working Paper No. 239
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 19 Feb 2001
Zvika Neeman and Nir Vulkan
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and University of Oxford - Said Business School
Downloads 179 (165,989)
Citation 8

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centralized markets, decentralized markets, decentralized bargaining, market microstructure

10.
Downloads 145 (198,619)
Citation 7

Geography, Transparency and Institutions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9625, September 2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 12 Oct 2013
Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - Department of Economics and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 145 (199,126)
Citation 5

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geography, institutions, land tenure, state capacity, state concentration and transparency

Geography, Transparency and Institutions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9625
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 03 Sep 2013
Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - Department of Economics and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
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Citation 1
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Geography, Institutions, Land Tenure, State Capacity, State Concentration, Transparency

11.

Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 44, No. S1, pp.133-159 (2014), Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 803
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 03 Feb 2015 Last Revised: 25 May 2017
Alma Cohen, Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 122 (227,461)
Citation 3

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Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach

Boston U, Center For Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory Discussion Paper No. 290
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 11 Jul 2002
Zvika Neeman and Alon Klement
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University
Downloads 117 (235,780)

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Litigation, settlement, fee-shifting, pleadings, deterrence

Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 285-314, 2005
Posted: 12 Jul 2005
Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman
Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

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Litigation, settlement, fee-shifting, pleadings, deterrence, discovery

13.
Downloads 113 (240,663)
Citation 1

The Benefit of Collective Reputation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2068R
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 06 Apr 2018
Zvika Neeman, Aniko Oery and Jungju Yu
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and City University of Hong Kong College of Business
Downloads 70 (329,114)

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Branding, Collective reputation, Commitment, Country of origin

The Benefit of Collective Reputation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2068
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 10 Jan 2017
Zvika Neeman, Aniko Oery and Jungju Yu
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and City University of Hong Kong College of Business
Downloads 43 (416,169)
Citation 1

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Branding, Collective Reputation, Commitment, Country of Origin

14.

Optimal Design Settlement Devices for Cases of Disputed Liability: Fee-Shifting Rules and Pleadings Mechanisms

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C02-10
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 29 Apr 2002
Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman
Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 105 (253,477)

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Litigation, settlement, fee-shifting, pleadings

15.

Private Selection and Arbitrator Impartiality

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 07 Apr 2011
Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman
Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 101 (260,248)
Citation 1

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litigation, arbitration

16.

Rise to the Challenge or Not Give a Damn: Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5693
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 17 May 2011
Yigal Attali, Zvika Neeman and Analia Schlosser
Independent, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics
Downloads 47 (393,878)

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gender, competition, incentives, GRE, high stakes, low stakes, test score gap

Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests: Evidence from the GRE Test

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13360
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 11 Dec 2018
Analia Schlosser, Zvika Neeman and Yigal Attali
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Independent
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Experiment, Gender Gap, GRE, high stakes, incentives, low stakes, Performance, race gap

18.

The Microfinance Disappointment: An Explanation Based on Risk Aversion

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12659
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 29 Jan 2018
Boston College, University of Warwick - Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and New Economic School (NES)
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19.

Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12199
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 11 Aug 2017 Last Revised: 11 Feb 2019
Saul Lach, Zvika Neeman and Mark A. Schankerman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and London School of Economics and Political Science
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additionality, entrepreneurship, government finance, Innovation, mechanism design, R&D, start-ups

20.

Does Information About Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?

Journal of Legal Studies, Forthcoming
Posted: 23 Nov 2012
Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman
Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

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Arbitration, Bad Reputation

21.

The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, No. 2, 2000
Posted: 26 Dec 2000
Zvika Neeman and Ehud Lehrer
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences

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22.

The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 3, Fall 1999
Posted: 15 Nov 1999
Zvika Neeman
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

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