New York, NY 10003
New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics
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financial incentives, motivations, experiments
imperfect information, equilibrium selection, passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs, vertical contracting, multiple equilibria
Equilibrium selection, passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs, vertical contracting, multiple equilibria, imperfect information
voter turnout, separation of powers
elections, voting, administration, delegation, local, state
voter information, turnout, participation in elections, campaign finance, campaign expenditures
disenfranchisment laws, delegation
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: SSRN-id872750.
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Committees, costly voting, information aggregation, sequential voting
File name: SSRN-id899365.
Swing voter's curse, voting behaviour, information aggregation
Information aggregation, Voting, Asymmetric information, Swing voterʼs curse
File name: DP9098.
biased voters, information aggregation, majority voting
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $38.00 .
File name: ECOJ.
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