Lars Stole

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue

Chicago, IL 60637

United States

  • University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

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SCHOLARLY PAPERS

33

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Scholarly Papers (33)

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1.

The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 575
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Oct 2001
David Martimort and Lars Stole
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 348 (90,035)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Revelation Principle, Delegation Principle, Taxation Principle, Common Agency, Adverse Selection

2.

Barter, Liquidity and Market Segmentation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 586
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 13 Nov 2001
Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 257 (124,972)

Abstract:

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Barter, Exchange

3.

Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 581
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 30 Oct 2001
David Martimort and Lars Stole
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 248 (129,603)
Citation 1

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Common Agency, Externality, Adverse Selection, Equilibrium Selection

4.

Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 572
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 23 Oct 2001
David Martimort and Lars Stole
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 198 (160,884)

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5.

Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects

Downloads 151 (203,960)
Citation 65

Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects

NBER Working Paper No. t0098
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 05 Jan 2007 Last Revised: 07 Jan 2007
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Lars Stole
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 124 (239,323)

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Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects

Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 719-729 (1993), Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 87
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 05 Dec 2018
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Lars Stole
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 27 (519,548)
Citation 51

Abstract:

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Corporate governance, short-termism, myopia, long-term investments

6.

A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement

Number of pages: 69 Posted: 14 Feb 2014
David Martimort, Aggey Semenov and Lars Stole
Paris School of Economics (PSE), University of Ottawa and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 136 (222,004)
Citation 1

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contract theory, incentives, asymmetric information, enforcement, breach of contracts, dynamic contracts

7.

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Optimal Control Problems with Linear State, Semicontinuous Lagrangians

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 14 Feb 2014
David Martimort and Lars Stole
Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 103 (272,211)
Citation 2

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optimal control, non-smooth optimization, convex analysis

8.

Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 15 Feb 2014
Jean-Charles Rochet and Lars Stole
Swiss Finance Institute and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 102 (274,062)
Citation 8

Abstract:

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contract theory, incentives

9.

Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 27 Feb 2015
David Martimort and Lars Stole
Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 99 (279,726)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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menu auctions, influence games, common agency, screening contracts, public goods games, lobbying games

10.

Representing Equilibrium Aggregates in Aggregate Games with Applications to Common Agency

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 76, No. 2, 2012
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 15 Feb 2014 Last Revised: 03 Mar 2015
David Martimort and Lars Stole
Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 77 (326,691)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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game theory, aggregate games, common agency

11.

Non-Monetary Exchange within Firms and Industry

NBER Working Paper No. w5765
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 09 Jul 1997 Last Revised: 12 May 2000
Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 67 (353,053)

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12.

Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 15 Feb 2014
David Martimort and Lars Stole
Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 60 (373,524)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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common agency, asymmetric information, menu auctions, delegated contracting games, public goods, lobbying

13.

Mergers, Employee Hold-Up and the Scope of the Firm: An Intrafirm Bargaining Approach to Mergers

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Jeffrey Zwiebel
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 52 (399,453)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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contract theory, incentives

14.

Monetizing Social Exchange

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 15 Feb 2014
Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 47 (417,048)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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contract theory, incentives

15.

Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13842
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 30 Jul 2019
David Martimort and Lars Stole
Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 0 (698,441)
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average-price bias, curvature rents, Nonlinear Pricing, price discrimination

16.

The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, October 1992, 8(3)
Posted: 21 Feb 2014
Lars Stole
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

17.

Licensing and Technology Transfer

Pew Studies in Economics and Security, Incentives in Procurement Contracting, Jim Leitzel and Jean Tirole, Eds., Westview Press, 1993
Posted: 21 Feb 2014
Lars Stole
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

18.

Fixed-Equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1990
Posted: 19 Feb 2014
Lars Stole, Joel Sobel and Inigo Zapater
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, University of California at San Diego and Independent

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

19.

Information Expropriation and Moral Hazard in Optimal Second-Source Auctions

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 54, 1994
Posted: 19 Feb 2014
Lars Stole
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

20.

Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Winter 1995, 4(4)
Posted: 19 Feb 2014
Lars Stole
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

21.

Mandated Countertrade as a Strategic Commitment

Journal of International Economics, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1996
Posted: 19 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Tore Ellingsen
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

Abstract:

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Mandated countertrade, Trade policy, Asymmetric information

22.

Organizational Design and Technology Choice Under Intrafirm Bargaining

American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, 1996
Posted: 19 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Jeffrey Zwiebel
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract:

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contract theory, incentives

23.

Price Discrimination in Competitive Environments

Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, 2007
Posted: 18 Feb 2014
Lars Stole
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

24.

The Economics of Multidimensional Screening

Advances in Economic Theory, 7th World Congress, Mathias Dewatripont and Lars Hansen, editors, Cambridge University Press, 2003
Posted: 18 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Jean-Charles Rochet
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

25.

Involuntary Unemployment and Intrafirm Bargaining with Replacement Workers: Reply

American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 1, 2003
Posted: 18 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Jeffrey Zwiebel
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

26.

Barter Relationships

The Vanishing Rouble, Barter Networks and Non-Monetary Transactions in Post-Soviet Societies, Paul Seabright, Ed., Cambridge University Press, 2000
Posted: 18 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Canice Prendergast
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

27.

The Non-Monetary Nature of Gifts

European Economic Review, Vol. 45, 2001
Posted: 16 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Canice Prendergast
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

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Gifts, Non-monetary exchange, Signaling

28.

Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation

Review of Economic Studies, January 2002, 69(1)
Posted: 16 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Jean-Charles Rochet
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

29.

Selecting Equilibria in Common Agency Games

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 144, 2009
Posted: 16 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and David Martimort
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Abstract:

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Common agency, Complete information, Asymmetric information, Common screening device, Equilibrium selection, Public good

30.

Intrafirm Bargaining Under Nonbinding Contracts

Review of Economic Studies, July 1996, 63(3)
Posted: 16 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Jeffrey Zwiebel
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract:

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Contract theory, Incentives

31.

Restricting the Means of Exchange within Organizations

European Economic Review, Vol. 43, 1999
Posted: 16 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Canice Prendergast
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

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Non-monetary exchange, Rent seeking, Surplus enhancing sanctions

32.

Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. Spring, 2009
Posted: 15 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and David Martimort
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)

Abstract:

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common agency, nonlinear pricing, market participation

33.

Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 104, No. 6, December 1996
Posted: 11 Nov 1996
Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Abstract:

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