N-4036 Stavanger
Norway
University of Stavanger
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Asset Specificity, Vertical Integration, Relational Contracts
Relational Contracts, Endogenous Verifiability, Courts, Contract Law, Trust
relational contracts, multiagent moral hazard, indispensable human capital
Team Incentives, Relational Contracts, Relative Performance Evaluation
verbal motivation, performance pay, field experiment
leadership styles, incentives, motivation, wage-setting
relational contracts, teams, tournaments
Relational Contracts, team incentive scheme, tournament
non-monetary motivation, performance pay, field experiment
Relational contracts, balanced scorecards, multiple performance measures, index contracts, performance reward
Relational contracts, multiagent moral hazard, endogenous hold-up
Relational Contracts, Linear Contracts, Moral Hazard, Risk Aversion
risk-taking, other people’s money, beliefs, preferences, experiment
incentives to motivate
teams, performance feedback, performance pay, experiment
reputation, reciprocity, crowding out, experiment
Effort, performance pay, incentive contract
relational contracts, team incentive scheme
tournament, experiment, incentives
Antitrust enforcement leniency programs, economics of crime
social preferences, motivation, incentives, leadership styles, labor-market conditions, wage-setting
infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, negative externality, cooperation, collusion, experiment
Relational contracts, tournament incentives, team incentives
Decision making for others, Experimental Finance
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Myopic Loss Aversion, Experiment