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Brown University - Department of Economics
in Total Papers Citations
externalities, coalition formation, Shapley value
Bounded rationality, Limited datasets
externalities, marginal contributions, Shapley value, Pigouvian transfers, coalition formation
mechanism design; bounded rationality; level k reasoning; revelation principle; incentive compatibility
limited attention, price competition, multiple markets
mechanism design; bounded rationality; level k reasoning; small modeling mistakes; incentive compatibility; continuity
Cooperative Games, Core, Additivity, Issue Linkage, Multi Issue Bargaining.
dynamic allocation, mechanism design without transfers, mechanism design without commitment
mechanism design; bounded rationality; level-k reasoning; small modeling mistakes; incentive compatibility; continuity
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Common Interest, Discursive Dilemma, Doctrinal Paradox, Information Aggregation, Voting
Attraction Effect, Bounded Rationality, Compromise Effect, Cooperative Bargaining, Fallback Bargaining, Reason-based-choice
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