Eitan Goldman

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

1309 E. 10th St.

Bloomington, IN 47405

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

20

DOWNLOADS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 5,386

in Total Papers Downloads

6,527

CITATIONS
Rank 3,271

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 3,271

in Total Papers Citations

168

Scholarly Papers (20)

1.
Downloads 1,447 ( 9,633)
Citation 63

Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?

AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, Seventeenth Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference, Forthcoming, EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 17 Mar 2006
Eitan Goldman, Jongil So and Jörg Rocholl
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, affiliation not provided to SSRN and ESMT European School of Management and Technology
Downloads 1,447 (9,438)
Citation 63

Abstract:

Politics, Boards, Corporate Governance

Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?

The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 6, pp. 2331-2360, 2009
Posted: 01 Jun 2009
Eitan Goldman, Jörg Rocholl and Jongil So
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, ESMT European School of Management and Technology and affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract:

G30, G34, G38

2.

Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts

Forthcoming Review of Finance
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 25 Mar 2008 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Eitan Goldman, Jongil So and Jörg Rocholl
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, affiliation not provided to SSRN and ESMT European School of Management and Technology
Downloads 1,046 (14,101)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Politics, Corporate Governance, Boards, Procurement Contracts

3.

An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation

EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 3206
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 10 Dec 2003
Eitan Goldman and Steve L. Slezak
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of Cincinnati - Department of Finance - Real Estate
Downloads 757 (24,019)
Citation 66

Abstract:

Fraud, earnings manipulation, optimal contract

4.

Firms Markets and Efficiency

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 20 Jul 2002
Eitan Goldman and Gary B. Gorton
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Yale School of Management
Downloads 458 (50,151)

Abstract:

theory of the firm, information, coordination

5.

Financial Misrepresentation and its Impact on Rivals

Forthcoming, Financial Management
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 13 Aug 2005 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Eitan Goldman, Irina Stefanescu and Urs Peyer
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C. and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 425 (51,684)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Fraud, iearnings manipulation, industry competition

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Turnover

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 20 Mar 2011
Eitan Goldman and Peggy Huang
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission - Division of Economic and Risk Analysis
Downloads 251 (100,316)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Executive compensation, Severance, Separation pay, Managerial incentives, CEO turnover, Bargaining

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Turnover

Midwest Finance Association 2012 Annual Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Aug 2011
Peggy Huang and Eitan Goldman
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission - Division of Economic and Risk Analysis and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 123 (192,485)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Executive Compensation, Severance, Separation Pay, Managerial Incentives, CEO Turnover, Bargaining

7.

The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 423/2014
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 31 May 2014 Last Revised: 20 Nov 2014
Alexander Borisov, Eitan Goldman and Nandini Gupta
University of Cincinnati, Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 276 (41,287)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Lobbying, shareholder value, corporate social responsibility, corruption, political connections

8.
Downloads 261 ( 96,706)
Citation 15

Optimal Toeholds in Takeover Contests

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 03 Aug 2003
Eitan Goldman and Jun Qian
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Fanhai International School of Finance, Fudan University
Downloads 261 (96,240)
Citation 15

Abstract:

Toehold, entrenchment, free-rider problem, takeover, tender offer

Optimal Toeholds in Takeover Contests

Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 321-346, August 2005
Posted: 02 Aug 2005
Eitan Goldman and Jun Qian
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Fanhai International School of Finance, Fudan University

Abstract:

Toehold, entrenchment, free-rider problem, takeover, tender offer

9.

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Departure

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 11 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Peggy Huang and Eitan Goldman
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission - Division of Economic and Risk Analysis and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 256 (98,706)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Executive compensation, Severance, Separation pay, CEO turnover

10.

Large Shareholders and the Value of Takeover Defenses

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 01 Sep 2008 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Eitan Goldman and Merih Sevilir
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 213 (111,210)

Abstract:

Takeover defenses, large shareholders, monitoring

11.

Large Shareholder Trading and Investment Complexity

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 26 Jun 2010
Eitan Goldman and Günter Strobl
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 112 (196,691)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Large Shareholder, Information Collection, Investment Horizon, Mutual Fund

12.

Delegated Portfolios and Scope Characteristics

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 15 Jun 2005
Eitan Goldman and Xiyu (Thomas) Zhou
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of Alaska Fairbanks - School of Management (SOM)
Downloads 98 (216,968)

Abstract:

Performance, mutual-fund, information

13.

Endogenously Informed Boards and the Optimality of Board Power

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 22 Mar 2012 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Eitan Goldman
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 62 (265,301)

Abstract:

board, information, power

14.

The Visible Hand, the Invisible Hand and Efficiency

NBER Working Paper No. w7587
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 11 Jun 2000
Eitan Goldman and Gary B. Gorton
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Yale School of Management
Downloads 52 (298,884)
Citation 2

Abstract:

15.

Weak Governance by Informed Large Shareholders

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 469/2016
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 23 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 01 Aug 2017
Eitan Goldman and Wenyu Wang
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 0 (118,472)

Abstract:

Large shareholders, corporate governance, trading, influencing, takeovers.

16.

Organizational Form, Information Collection, and the Value of the Firm

Journal of Business, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2005
Posted: 03 Jun 2008
Eitan Goldman
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Abstract:

Information, spin-off, divisions

17.

An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 3206
Posted: 30 Mar 2006
Eitan Goldman and Steve L. Slezak
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of Cincinnati - Department of Finance - Real Estate

Abstract:

Fraud, earnings manipulation, optimal contract

18.

The Impact of Stock Market Information Production on Internal Resource Allocation

Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming
Posted: 18 Apr 2003
Eitan Goldman
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Abstract:

19.

Delegated Portfolio Management and Rational Prolonged Mispricing

Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, pp. 283-311, 2003
Posted: 15 Jul 2002
Eitan Goldman and Steve L. Slezak
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of Cincinnati - Department of Finance - Real Estate

Abstract:

mispricing, fund managers, bubbles

20.

Free Cash Flow, Optimal Contracting, and Takeovers

Rodney L. White Center Working Paper No. 3-97
Posted: 21 Apr 1997
Eitan Goldman, Christopher S. Jones and Ron Kaniel
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department and University of Rochester - Simon Business School

Abstract: