Eitan Goldman

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

1309 E. 10th St.

Bloomington, IN 47405

United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium

Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat

1000 Brussels

Belgium

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

25

DOWNLOADS
Rank 5,667

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 5,667

in Total Papers Downloads

8,142

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 4,167

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 4,167

in Total Papers Citations

156

CROSSREF CITATIONS

136

Scholarly Papers (25)

1.
Downloads 1,671 ( 10,938)
Citation 85

Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?

AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, Seventeenth Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference, Forthcoming, EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 17 Mar 2006
Eitan Goldman, Jongil So and Jörg Rocholl
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, affiliation not provided to SSRN and ESMT European School of Management and Technology
Downloads 1,671 (10,750)
Citation 85

Abstract:

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Politics, Boards, Corporate Governance

Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?

The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 6, pp. 2331-2360, 2009
Posted: 01 Jun 2009
Eitan Goldman, Jörg Rocholl and Jongil So
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, ESMT European School of Management and Technology and affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract:

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G30, G34, G38

2.

Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts

Forthcoming Review of Finance
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 25 Mar 2008 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Eitan Goldman, Jongil So and Jörg Rocholl
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, affiliation not provided to SSRN and ESMT European School of Management and Technology
Downloads 1,268 (16,801)
Citation 63

Abstract:

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Politics, Corporate Governance, Boards, Procurement Contracts

3.

An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence Of Information Manipulation

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 10 Dec 2003
Eitan Goldman and Steve L. Slezak
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of Cincinnati - Department of Finance - Real Estate
Downloads 837 (30,948)
Citation 18

Abstract:

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Fraud, earnings manipulation, optimal contract

4.

The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 423/2014
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 31 May 2014 Last Revised: 20 Nov 2014
Alexander Borisov, Eitan Goldman and Nandini Gupta
University of Cincinnati - Department of Finance - Real Estate, Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 723 (37,771)
Citation 20

Abstract:

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Lobbying, shareholder value, corporate social responsibility, corruption, political connections

5.

Financial Misrepresentation and its Impact on Rivals

Forthcoming, Financial Management
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 13 Aug 2005 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Eitan Goldman, Irina Stefanescu and Urs Peyer
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C. and INSEAD - Finance
Downloads 477 (64,756)

Abstract:

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Fraud, iearnings manipulation, industry competition

6.

Firms Markets and Efficiency

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 20 Jul 2002
Eitan Goldman and Gary B. Gorton
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Yale School of Management
Downloads 463 (67,128)

Abstract:

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theory of the firm, information, coordination

7.

The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Mar 2012 Last Revised: 23 Mar 2018
Alexander Borisov, Eitan Goldman and Nandini Gupta
University of Cincinnati - Department of Finance - Real Estate, Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 455 (68,546)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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corruption, event study, lobbying, political connections, shareholder value

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Turnover

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 20 Mar 2011
Eitan Goldman and Peggy Huang
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission - Division of Economic and Risk Analysis
Downloads 280 (118,379)
Citation 4

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Executive compensation, Severance, Separation pay, Managerial incentives, CEO turnover, Bargaining

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Turnover

Midwest Finance Association 2012 Annual Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Aug 2011
Peggy Huang and Eitan Goldman
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission - Division of Economic and Risk Analysis and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 132 (236,877)
Citation 1

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Executive Compensation, Severance, Separation Pay, Managerial Incentives, CEO Turnover, Bargaining

9.

Weak Governance by Informed Active Shareholders

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 469/2016
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 23 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 18 Jun 2018
Eitan Goldman and Wenyu Wang
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 303 (109,400)
Citation 1

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informed shareholders, trading, influencing, corporate governance, takeovers

10.
Downloads 279 (119,462)
Citation 17

Optimal Toeholds in Takeover Contests

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 03 Aug 2003
Eitan Goldman and Jun Qian
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Fanhai International School of Finance, Fudan University
Downloads 279 (118,836)
Citation 17

Abstract:

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Toehold, entrenchment, free-rider problem, takeover, tender offer

Optimal Toeholds in Takeover Contests

Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 321-346, August 2005
Posted: 02 Aug 2005
Eitan Goldman and Jun Qian
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Fanhai International School of Finance, Fudan University

Abstract:

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Toehold, entrenchment, free-rider problem, takeover, tender offer

11.

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Departure

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 11 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Peggy Huang and Eitan Goldman
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission - Division of Economic and Risk Analysis and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 262 (127,619)

Abstract:

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Executive compensation, Severance, Separation pay, CEO turnover

12.

Large Shareholders and the Value of Takeover Defenses

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 01 Sep 2008 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Eitan Goldman and Merih Sevilir
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 241 (138,823)

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Takeover defenses, large shareholders, monitoring

13.

A Theory of Financial Media

European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 657/2020
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 02 Oct 2019 Last Revised: 22 Feb 2020
Eitan Goldman, Jordan Martel and Jan Schneemeier
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, Indiana University Bloomington, Kelley School of Business and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 162 (199,772)

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financial journalism, disclosure, obfuscation, price quality

14.

Political Polarization in Financial News

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 24 Feb 2020
Eitan Goldman, Nandini Gupta and Ryan D. Israelsen
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Michigan State University - Department of Finance
Downloads 154 (208,537)

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Media slant, Financial news, Finance and politics, Trading volume

15.

Large Shareholder Trading and Investment Complexity

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 26 Jun 2010
Eitan Goldman and Günter Strobl
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of Vienna - Department of Finance
Downloads 134 (233,368)

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Large Shareholder, Information Collection, Investment Horizon, Mutual Fund

16.

Delegated Portfolios and Scope Characteristics

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 15 Jun 2005
Eitan Goldman and Xiyu (Thomas) Zhou
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of Alaska Fairbanks - School of Management (SOM)
Downloads 110 (270,055)

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Performance, mutual-fund, information

17.

Endogenously Informed Boards and the Optimality of Board Power

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 22 Mar 2012 Last Revised: 12 May 2014
Eitan Goldman
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 82 (326,781)

Abstract:

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board, information, power

18.

The Visible Hand, the Invisible Hand and Efficiency

NBER Working Paper No. w7587
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 11 Jun 2000 Last Revised: 17 Oct 2010
Eitan Goldman and Gary B. Gorton
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Yale School of Management
Downloads 65 (371,842)

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19.

Regulating A Firm With Agency Problems

Kelley School of Business Research Paper No. 2020-64
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 07 Apr 2020
Sheran Deng, Eitan Goldman and Matthias Kahl
Indiana University Bloomington - Kelley School of Business, Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management
Downloads 25 (535,066)

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optimal regulation, externalities, agency conflict, corporate governance

20.

The Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Mar 2011 Last Revised: 23 Mar 2018
Alexander Borisov, Eitan Goldman and Nandini Gupta
University of Cincinnati - Department of Finance - Real Estate, Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 19 (572,556)
Citation 1

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Politics, Lobbying, Corporate Governance, Corruption, Financial Regulation

21.

Organizational Form, Information Collection, and the Value of the Firm

Journal of Business, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2005
Posted: 03 Jun 2008
Eitan Goldman
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Abstract:

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Information, spin-off, divisions

22.

An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 3206
Posted: 30 Mar 2006
Eitan Goldman and Steve L. Slezak
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of Cincinnati - Department of Finance - Real Estate

Abstract:

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Fraud, earnings manipulation, optimal contract

23.

The Impact of Stock Market Information Production on Internal Resource Allocation

Posted: 18 Apr 2003
Eitan Goldman
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

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24.

Delegated Portfolio Management and Rational Prolonged Mispricing

Posted: 15 Jul 2002
Eitan Goldman and Steve L. Slezak
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance and University of Cincinnati - Department of Finance - Real Estate

Abstract:

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mispricing, fund managers, bubbles

25.

Free Cash Flow, Optimal Contracting, and Takeovers

Rodney L. White Center Working Paper No. 3-97
Posted: 21 Apr 1997
Eitan Goldman, Christopher S. Jones and Ron Kaniel
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance, University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department and University of Rochester - Simon Business School

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