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Top5itis; Counting Measure; Publishing; Perishing; Academic Economists
Nash program, cooperative games, non-cooperative games, bargaining, implementation
Arrow's theorem, single-profile
externalities, coalition formation, Shapley value
Implementation theory, mechanism design, asymmetric information, decentralization, game theory, dominance, Nash equilibrium, monotonicity
informativeness, information structures, entropy, decision under
consumer theory; rationality; Slutsky matrix; bounded rationality; almost implies near principle.
Strategic Externalities, Informational Externalities, Exchange Economies, Cooperative Games with Orthogonal Coalitions, Non-Cooperative Bayesian Games
asymmetric information, information revelation, dynamic trading, oligopolistic competition, clienteles
externalities, marginal contributions, Shapley value, Pigouvian transfers, coalition formation
Bargaining, competition, exchange, decentralization
mechanism design; bounded rationality; level k reasoning; revelation principle; incentive compatibility
Virtual monotonicity, virtual Bayesian implementation, incentive compatibility, type diversity, decentralization, incomplete information
decentralized trade, exchange economies, housing markets, stochastic stability, logit model, social welfare functions
journal rankings, invariant method, impossibility result, axiomatic method
Core Convergence, Information Transmission, Coalitional Voting
consumer theory; rationality; Slutsky matrix function; revealed preference approach; bounded rationality.
mechanism design; bounded rationality; level k reasoning; small modeling mistakes; incentive compatibility; continuity
stochastic stability, exchange economies, assignment problems, core, Walrasian equilibrium
Consumer Theory; Rationality; Revealed Preference Approach; Bounded Rationality
Correlated Equilibrium Distribution, Implementation, Monotonicity
contracts, renegotiation, mechanism design
Core, Incomplete Information, Coalitional Voting, Resilience, Mediation
digital revolution, digitalitis, top5itis, VAR-itis, scooteritis, digital populism, regulation, education
consumer choice, revealed preference, maximin rationalization, nonconvex preferences, reference-dependent utility, law of demand
Two-sided networks, pairwise stability, stochastic stability, herd externality, informational cascade, fragmentation, concentration, economy thinness, contagion asymmetry
Fixed and Random Matching, Incomplete Information, Ex-Post
Shapley value, Shapley distance, (un)fairness, horizontal equity, efficiency, marginality
robust mechanism design, ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity
Regret Matching, Nash Equilibria, Closed Sets under Same or Better Reply
Asymmetric Information; Large Quasilinear Economies; Small Group Effectiveness; Approximate Cores.
Information Disclosure, Generalized Prisoners' Dilemma, Uninformative Equilibria
Core w.r.t. Equilibrium Blocking, Core Convergence, Independent
Exact implementation, approximate implementation, incomplete information
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, Bayesian Monotonicity, Weak Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity, Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity, Implementation, Rationalizability
Nash program, bargaining, implementation
mechanism design, exact and approximate implementation, iteratively
mechanism design; bounded rationality; level-k reasoning; small modeling mistakes; incentive compatibility; continuity
rationalizable incentive compatibility, Bayesian incentive compatibility, uniform Bayesian monotonicity, interim rationalizable monotonicity, implementation, rationalizability
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Assignment, balancedness, convex games, core, deferred‐acceptance algorithm, fictitious play, market games, matching, potential games, repeated games, Shapley value, stochastic games, strategic market games, top‐trading cycles algorithm
