Gisèle Umbhauer

University of Strasbourg - Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée

University of Strasbourg

61 Avenue de la Forêt Noire

Strasbourg, 67085

France

  • University of Strasbourg - Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS

321

SSRN CITATIONS

0

CROSSREF CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (5)

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1.

How Does Bankruptcy Punishment Impact on Renegotiable Debt Contracts?

Downloads 128 (338,010)

How Does Bankruptcy Punishment Impact on Renegotiable Debt Contracts?

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 15 Mar 2009
Régis Blazy, Gisèle Umbhauer and Laurent Weill
University of Strasbourg, University of Strasbourg - Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée and University of Strasbourg - LaRGE Research Center (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie)
Downloads 84 (453,628)

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Corporate Bankruptcy, Credit Lending, Interest Rate, Moral Hazard, Legal Sanctions

How Does Bankruptcy Punishment Impact on Renegotiable Debt Contracts?

CREFI-LSF Working Paper No. 0804
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Jan 2012
Régis Blazy, Gisèle Umbhauer and Laurent Weill
University of Strasbourg, University of Strasbourg - Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée and University of Strasbourg - LaRGE Research Center (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie)
Downloads 44 (630,266)

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Corporate Bankruptcy, Credit Lending, Interest Rate, Moral Hazard, Legal Sanctions

2.

Plea-Bargaining, An Ethical Procedure

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 11 Jul 2010
Gisèle Umbhauer
University of Strasbourg - Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée
Downloads 87 (439,868)

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Plea-Bargaining, Trial, Signaling Game, Sequential Equilibrium, Ethics

3.

Best-Reply Matching in an Experience Good Model

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 01 May 2007
Gisèle Umbhauer
University of Strasbourg - Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée
Downloads 58 (547,633)

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best-reply matching, experience good, signaling game, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

4.

Matching Best Replies in the Centipede Game

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 18 Jul 2008
Gisèle Umbhauer
University of Strasbourg - Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée
Downloads 48 (595,580)

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Best-reply matching, centipede game, reduced normal form, normal form

5.

Almost Common Value Auctions and Discontinuous Equilibria

Posted: 14 Jul 2011
Gisèle Umbhauer
University of Strasbourg - Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée

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common value auctions, second-price sealed-bid auctions, nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, level-k reasoning