Bocconi University - Department of Economics
in Total Papers Citations
Optimal mechanism design, Ambiguity aversion, Incentive compatibility, Individual rationality
Rationalizability, Incomplete information, Higher-order beliefs, Strategic topology, Electronic mail game
Games with incomplete information, Rationalizability, Higher-order beliefs, Robustness
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Comparison of experiments, Dispersion, Persuasion, Strategic selection, welfare
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File name: ECOJ.pdf
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