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Time inconsistency, hyperbolic discounting, investment policy, production chain, green technology
time inconsistency, hyperbolic discounting, commitment, investments, R&D, green technology, investment policy, environmental policy, climate change
deforestation, resource extraction, conservation, contracts, centralization, decentralization, externalities, participation constraints, incentive constraints, tropical forests, climate change, REDD, PES
Deforestation, resource extraction, conservation, contracts, crime displacement, centralization, decentralization, climate change, REDD, PES
environmental conservation, sovereign debt, sustainability-linked bonds, default, hyperbolic discounting, time inconsistency
Environmental conservation, sovereign debt, sustainability-linked bonds, default, hyperbolic discounting, time inconsistency.
climate change, environmental agreements, green technology, repeated games, imperfect monitoring
climate change, environmental agreements, green technology, imperfect monitoring, policy instruments, repeated games, self-enforcing treaties
dynamic games, bargaining games, Nash program, climate change, Paris Agreement, Kyoto Protocol
dynamic private provision of public goods, dynamic common pool problems, dynamic hold-up problems, incomplete contracts, contract-length, renegotiation design, climate change and climate agreements
Climate change, dynamic games, common pool problems, the hold-up problem, incomplete contracts, technological spillovers, intellectual property rights
dynamic games, exhaustible resources, deforestation, political economy, lobbying, conservation, PES, REDD+.
exhaustible resources, deforestation, international trade, trade agreements, environmental conservation, conservation goods, renegotiation
Certification, delegation, entry of firms, investments in quality, private politics
international trade, trade agreements, deforestation, environmental conservation
Policy Instrument, Dynamic Bargaining, Endogenous Status Quo, Fiscal Policy, Tax, Quota
Experimentation, federalism, decentralization, free-riding, tournament
Private politics, boycotts, war of attrition, activism, regulation, self-regulation, corporate social responsibility (CSR)
conservation, deforestation, dynamic games, sales v rental markets
Coase, climate change, carbon leakage, supply v demand side policies, trade policies, the green paradox, and environmental agreements
Contracts in the presence of externalities, decentralization, centralization, mergers, Cournot competition, induced institutional change, conservation, climate change, REDD, PES
Conservation, deforestation, dynamic games, time inconsistency
climate change, environmental agreements, green technology, policy instruments, repeated games, compliance, self-enforcing treaties
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Corruption, lobbying, development
elections, environmental agreements, international agreements, political economy, sanctions, technology.
Environmental agreements, political economics, present-bias, commitment strategies
international treaties, time inconsistency, self-commitment, environmental policy
climate change, compliance, environmental agreements, green technology, policy instruments, repeated games, self-enforcing treaties
Dynamic games, Incomplete contracts, Hold-up problems, Renegotiation design, Climate change, Environmental agreements
Corruption, lobbying, development, poverty trap
Collective action, side transfers, bargaining agenda, strategic delegation, issue linkages
Strategic delegation, collective decisions, voting rules, decentralization versus centralization
Tradable permits, time inconsistency, plan vs. market
