Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, Bologna 40126
University of Bologna - Department of Economics
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Antitrust, Collusion, Experiment, Leniency
folk theorem, prisoner's dilemma, backward induction, termination rule, infinite horizon
folk theorem, prisoner's dilemma, backward induction, termination rule, innite horizon
Cooperation, intertemporal trade, experiments, social norms, social dilemmas
Cooperation, intertemporal trade, experiments, social norms
Collusion, Leniency, Experiments, Risk Aversion, Availability Heuristic, Strategic Risk
contract damages, efficient breach, motives for breach, Contract-Breach game
Contract Damages, Efficient Breach, Motives for Breach, Contract-Breach Game
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $38.00 .
File name: JELS.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
Information, Learning, Imitation, Collusion, Experiment
information, imitation, Cournot oligopoly, EWA learning
Betrayal, Collusion, Corruption, Distrust, Fraud, Organized Crime, Whistleblowers
Antitrust, Betrayal, Cartels, Collusion, Distrust, Fines, Leniency, Whistleblowers
Cartels, Collusion, Coordination, Competition policy, Deterrence, Desistance, Law enforcement, Price-fixing, Punishment, Recidivism, Whistleblowers
trust, social norms, experiments, long-term persistence, conflicts, institutions
education, field experiments, incentives, competition, cooperation
coordination, cheap-talk, deception, indefinitely repeated game, social norms
bonuses, business-to-business, contract choice, experiment, framing, explicit incentives, incomplete contracts, loss aversion, motivation, penalties, procurement, multi-tasking, relational contracts, rewards
voluntary contributions, experiment, repeated interaction, feedback, imitation
Cognitive load theory, Comprehension, Distraction, Experimental instructions
trust game, coordination, inequality aversion, reciprocity, experiments
non-standard subject pools, prisoner’s dilemma, personal punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching
non-standard subject pools, prisoner's dilemma, peer punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: DP7417.
Cartels, Collusion, Competition policy, Coordination, Corporate crime, Desistance, Deterrence, Law enforcement, Organized crime, Price-fixing, Punishment, Whistleblowers
fiat money, repeated games, matching models
Folk theorem, repeated games, equilibrium selection, finite automata, social dilemma, random matching
File name: DP9002.
coordination, cheap-talk, deception, repeated game, social norms
File name: DP8877.
Collusion, Cooperation, Flexibility, Imperfect monitoring, Oligopoly, Repeated games.
Betrayal aversion, conditional cooperation, experiments, Italy
Enforcement, Free-Riding, Public Good, Risk Attitudes, Sanctions
File name: ECOJ.
Endogenous institutions, experiments, repeated games, strategic uncertainty
Coordination, Majority Voting, Social Sanctions, Trust Game
File name: joes12018.
Coordination, Cheap‐talk, Deception, Indefinitely repeated game, Social norms
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