Anton Suvorov

New Economic School (NES)

Associate Professor, Rector

Nobel Str., 3

Moscow, Skolkovo 121205

Russia

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Associate Professor

Shabolovka 26

Moscow, 119049

Russia

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

11

DOWNLOADS
Rank 34,989

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 34,989

in Total Papers Downloads

2,909

TOTAL CITATIONS
Rank 36,793

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 36,793

in Total Papers Citations

24

Scholarly Papers (11)

1.

Why Less Informed Managers May Be Better Leaders

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 29 Apr 2010 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2012
Sergei Guriev and Anton Suvorov
Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) and New Economic School (NES)
Downloads 811 (61,566)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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leadership, commitment, organizational structure, information

2.

Goal Setting as a Self-Regulation Mechanism

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 20 Oct 2008 Last Revised: 09 Jun 2009
Anton Suvorov and Jeroen van de Ven
New Economic School (NES) and University of Amsterdam
Downloads 570 (97,075)
Citation 11

Abstract:

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self-regulation, goals, time inconsistency, loss aversion, indulgence, compulsiveness, proximal and distal

3.

Addiction to Rewards

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 11 Aug 2013
Anton Suvorov
New Economic School (NES)
Downloads 474 (121,324)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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addiction, rewards, ratchet effect, self-con…fidence, informed principal

4.

Self-Rewards and Personal Motivation

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 06 Jul 2012
University of Aarhus - Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University - School of Business and Social Sciences, New Economic School (NES) and University of Amsterdam
Downloads 356 (168,988)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, reference-dependent preferences, loss aversion, self-control, self-rewards, goals

5.

Discretionary Bonuses as a Feedback Mechanism

Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics 2006-16
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 21 Mar 2006
Anton Suvorov and Jeroen van de Ven
New Economic School (NES) and University of Amsterdam
Downloads 233 (260,961)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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discretionary rewards, feedback, self confidence, subjective performance, moral hazard, monitoring system

6.

Agency Problem and Ownership Structure: Outside Blockholder as a Signal

Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP9/2015/02
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 23 Jul 2014 Last Revised: 10 Nov 2015
Sergey Stepanov and Anton Suvorov
National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) - International College of Economics and Finance and New Economic School (NES)
Downloads 172 (344,984)

Abstract:

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agency problem, blockholders, monitoring, ownership structure, asymmetric information

7.

Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 15 May 2024
New Economic School (NES), University of Amsterdam and GATE - CNRS
Downloads 103 (516,225)

Abstract:

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Group Delusion, Information Disclosure, Beliefs, Skepticism, Social Image, Experiment

8.

Doing Bad to Look Good: Negative Consequences of Image Concerns on Pro-social Behavior

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 18 Sep 2019
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics, New Economic School (NES), University of Amsterdam and GATE - CNRS
Downloads 90 (563,528)

Abstract:

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Social image; credence goods; prosocial behavior; reputation; experiment

9.

Doing Bad to Look Good: Negative Consequences of Image Concerns on Pro-Social Behavior

WP 1926 – September 2019
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 23 Sep 2019
University of Amsterdam - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making (CREED), New Economic School (NES), University of Amsterdam and GATE - CNRS
Downloads 51 (754,870)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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social image, credence goods, prosocial behavior, reputation, experiment

10.

Discretionary Acquisition of Firm-Specific Human Capital Under Non-Verifiable Performance

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 21 Nov 2011 Last Revised: 31 May 2013
Akhmed Akhmedov and Anton Suvorov
Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) and New Economic School (NES)
Downloads 49 (767,858)

Abstract:

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specific human capital, commitment, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts

11.

Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects of Rewards

Posted: 02 Sep 2011 Last Revised: 12 Oct 2013
New Economic School (NES), Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), New Economic School (NES) and University of Amsterdam

Abstract:

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reward, bonus, informational content, motivation, crowding-out, laboratory experiment