Cagatay Kayi

Universidad del Rosario

Calle 12 No. 6-25

Bogota, DC

Colombia

  • Universidad del Rosario

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS

170

SSRN CITATIONS

0

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (5)

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1.

On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

Documento CEDE No. 2012-36
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 14 Dec 2012
Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics, Universidad del Rosario and Instituto de Análisis Económic (IAE) Barcelona
Downloads 41 (692,350)
Citation 1

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matching, many-to-many, stability, manipulability, truncation strategies, dropping strategies

2.

Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

Documento CEDE No. 2012-05
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 13 Jul 2012
Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics, Universidad del Rosario and Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History
Downloads 40 (698,865)
Citation 1

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fairness, strategy-proofness, indivisible good, land restitution

3.

School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms

Documento CEDE No. 2017-37
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 27 May 2017
Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics, Universidad del Rosario and Instituto de Análisis Económic (IAE) Barcelona
Downloads 37 (719,033)

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School Choice; Rank-Priority Mechanisms; Stability; Nash Implementation

4.

Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems

Documento CEDE No. 2017-36
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 01 Jun 2017
Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics, Universidad del Rosario and Instituto de Análisis Económic (IAE) Barcelona
Downloads 26 (801,676)

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matching, roommate problem, stability, core, rank gap, bound

5.

Equilibria Under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare (Equilibrios bajo el mecanismo de aceptaci´on diferida: Estrategias de eliminaci´on, posiciones ocupadas y bienestar)

Documento CEDE No. 2013-23
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 09 May 2013
Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics, Universidad del Rosario and Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History
Downloads 26 (801,676)

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many- to-one matching, deferred acceptance, Nash equilibrium, dropping strategies, filled positions, welfare