Nicolas Querou

Queen's University Belfast - School of Management and Economics

Lecturer in Economics

25 University Square

Belfast, Northern Ireland BT7 1NN

Northern Ireland

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS

183

CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (5)

1.

Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

FEEM Working Paper No. 74.2006
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 07 Jun 2006
Nicolas Querou and Sylvain Beal
Queen's University Belfast - School of Management and Economics and University of Saint Etienne - Centre de Recherches Économiques de l'Université de Saint-Étienne (CREUSET)
Downloads 69 (305,570)

Abstract:

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Repeated Network Formation Game, Two-sided Link Formation Costs, Bounded Rationality, Automata

2.

Ordinal Games

Center of Economic Research Working Paper No. 07/74
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 23 Oct 2007
University of Saint Etienne, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Economics, Queen's University Belfast - School of Management and Economics and University of Saint Etienne
Downloads 47 (367,413)

Abstract:

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Ordinal Games, Potential Games, Quasi-Supermodularity, Rationalizable Sets, Sets Closed under Behavior Correspondences

3.

Group Bargaining and Conflict

FEEM Working Paper No. 125.2010
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 14 Nov 2010
Nicolas Querou
Queen's University Belfast - School of Management and Economics
Downloads 43 (380,739)

Abstract:

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Bargaining, Conflict, Agency Problem

4.

Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3394
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 04 Apr 2011
David Pérez Castrillo and Nicolas Querou
Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona and Queen's University Belfast - School of Management and Economics
Downloads 24 (460,592)

Abstract:

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mechanism design, NIMBY

5.

An Interative Procedure for Optimal Pollution Control under Incomplete Information

International Game Theory Review, Vol. 10, Issue 3, pp. 279-302, 2008
Posted: 30 Oct 2009
Nicolas Querou
Queen's University Belfast - School of Management and Economics

Abstract:

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Regulation, asymmetric information, oligopoly, iterative procedure, conjectures