Aristotelis Boukouras

University of Leicester

Lecturer in Economics

University Road

Leicester, LE1 7RH

United Kingdom

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

16

DOWNLOADS
Rank 979

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 979

in Total Papers Downloads

51,703

TOTAL CITATIONS

3

Scholarly Papers (16)

1.

Political Competition, Ideology and Corruption

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 30 Jan 2008
Aristotelis Boukouras and Kostas Koufopoulos
University of Leicester and University of Warwick - Finance Group
Downloads 17,343 (486)

Abstract:

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corruption, political instability, voting behavior

2.

Existence and Efficiency of Nash Equilibria under Deterministic Voting

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 24 Jul 2008
Aristotelis Boukouras and Kostas Koufopoulos
University of Leicester and University of Warwick - Finance Group
Downloads 12,133 (879)

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Lindahl allocation, political competition, political rents, voting games

3.

Frictions to Political Competition and Financial Openness

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 11 Aug 2008
Kostas Koufopoulos and Aristotelis Boukouras
University of Warwick - Finance Group and University of Leicester
Downloads 11,676 (944)

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corruption, financial openness, ideology, politicians

4.

Separation of Powers, Political Competition and Efficient Provision of Public Goods

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 27 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 19 Dec 2010
Aristotelis Boukouras and Kostas Koufopoulos
University of Leicester and University of Warwick - Finance Group
Downloads 7,504 (1,964)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Lindahl allocation, political competition, voting games

5.

Efficient Allocations in Economies with Asymmetric Information When the Realized Frequency of Types Is Common Knowledge

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 24 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 06 Jan 2016
Aristotelis Boukouras and Kostas Koufopoulos
University of Leicester and University of Warwick - Finance Group
Downloads 1,182 (39,057)

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adverse selection, first-best, full implementation, mechanism design, single-crossing property

6.

Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a Commitment Device

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 20 May 2011 Last Revised: 15 Mar 2023
Aristotelis Boukouras
University of Leicester
Downloads 758 (72,396)
Citation 1

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control structure, delegation, efficiency wage, entrepreneur, managerial contract, moral hazard, organizational hierarchy, private benefits

7.

The Expert and The Charlatan: an Experimental Study in Economic Advice

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 06 Aug 2020 Last Revised: 12 Oct 2020
Heidelberg University, University of Leicester, University of London - Royal Holloway College and University of Southampton
Downloads 279 (235,668)

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Democracy, Economic Literacy, Expert Advice, Populism

8.

Voting as a Signaling Device

CESifo Working Paper No. 3700
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 25 Jan 2012
R. Emre Aytimur, Aristotelis Boukouras and Robert Schwager
University of Göttingen, University of Leicester and Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)
Downloads 178 (363,162)

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electoral incentives, signaling, voting

9.

'Identify the Expert': an Experimental Study in Economic Advice

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 01 Mar 2023 Last Revised: 11 Apr 2023
Heidelberg University, University of Leicester, University of London and University of Southampton
Downloads 154 (411,842)

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Democracy, Economic Literacy, Expert Advice, Populism

10.

When do incomplete contracts matter?

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 22 Mar 2021
Aristotelis Boukouras, Kostas Koufopoulos, Xuyuanda Qi and Giulio Trigilia
University of Leicester, University of Sussex Business School, NYU Shanghai and University of Rochester - Simon Business School
Downloads 131 (469,512)

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Implementation, renegotiation-proofness, incomplete contracts, hold- up, contracting with third-parties.

The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 11 Apr 2015
R. Emre Aytimur, Aristotelis Boukouras and Robert Schwager
University of Göttingen, University of Leicester and Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)
Downloads 37 (984,474)

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elections, polarization, strategic delegation, bureaucracy, foreign influence

12.

A Game-Theoretic Model of Demand-Constrained Economies

Number of pages: 63 Posted: 13 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 15 Mar 2023
Aristotelis Boukouras
University of Leicester
Downloads 81 (656,098)

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capitalist spirit, general equilibrium, income distribution, income inequality, minimum wage, output gap, unemployment, wealth distribution, wealth inequality

13.

Can Biased Polls Distort Electoral Results? Evidence From The Lab

Discussion Papers in Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, 2020
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 03 Aug 2020
Aristotelis Boukouras, Will Jennings, Lunzheng Li and Zacharias Maniadis
University of Leicester, University of Southampton - Division of Politics & International Relations, affiliation not provided to SSRN and University of Southampton
Downloads 65 (741,038)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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biased polls, candidate valence, information aggregation

14.

Renegotiation-Blocking Through Financial Claims

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 24 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 22 Jan 2014
Aristotelis Boukouras
University of Leicester
Downloads 63 (753,261)

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ex-ante welfare, financial claims, renegotiation, renegotiation-proof contracts

15.

The Price Distribution and Technological Shocks in Markets with Endogenous Search Intensity

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 28 Sep 2015
Aristotelis Boukouras and Yu Zhu
University of Leicester and Government of Canada - Bank of Canada
Downloads 60 (772,346)

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price distribution, random-search models, real rigidities, search intensity, technological shocks

16.

Contract Law and Development

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 24 Jul 2013
Aristotelis Boukouras
University of Leicester
Downloads 59 (778,971)

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contract law, development, enforcement institutions, hold-up, institutional agent, regulation, social contract