34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
banking competition, transparency, deposit insurance, market discipline
Successive oligopolies, market games, entry, double marginalization
entry deterrence, foreclosure, overinvestment, bilateral monopoly
environmental innovation, tradable permits, interaction à la Cournot
Oligopoly, entry, horizontal collusion, foreclosure
successive oligopolies, vertical integration, technology, foreclosure
Regulation, commodity tax, strategic interactions
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institutional infrastructure competition, international banking centers, portfolio investments, tax competition
Tax/Infrastructure competition, Open-loop/Markovian strategies, Differential games
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