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Airlines, Communication, Collusion, Capacity Discipline, Text Data
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Airlines, Capacity Discipline, Collusion, communication, Text Data
first-price auction, identification, ambiguity aversion, maxmin expected utility, Bayesian estimation
Auctions, Structural Approach, Semiparametric Estimator, Local Polynomial, GMM
Competitive Nonlinear Pricing, Asymmetric Information.
Insurance, Identification, Adverse Selection, Multidimensional Screening.
Insurance, Identification, Nonparametric Estimation, Multivariate Adverse Selection
Asymmetric Auctions, Collusion, Nonparametric Testing
identification, multidimensional private information, consumer heterogeneity, rationalizability
Cournot oligopoly, private information, monotonic strategies, testable implications, identification
Extensive games, Ambiguity, Maxmin
First-Price Procurements, Asymmetric Risk-Aversion, Asymmetric Cost Densities, Identification And Estimation, Unobserved Heterogeneity
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signaling, human capital, employer learning, instruments
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