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Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics
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public sector labour markets, incentive contracts, work ethics, public service motivation
Public Sector Labour Markets, Incentive Contracts, Work Ethics, Public Service Motivation
employee motivation, recognition, reciprocity, conformity, field experiment
Employee motivation, recognition, reciprocity, conformity, field experiment
signaling and screening models, intrinsic motivation, monetary incentive schemes, minimum wages
fiscal rules; budget deficits; public investment
public service motivation, altruism, laziness, sorting, public sector employment, personality characteristics
Public Management, Public Service Motivation, Managerial Ability, Self-Selection
public management, public service motivation, managerial ability, self-selection
public service motivation, risk aversion, revealed preferences data
littering, public services, free-riding, field experiment
social interaction, altruism, incentive contracts, co-worker satisfaction
field experiment, gender differences, competition, sales contests, awards
sales contests, field experiment, gender differences, competition, awards
liberalisation, monopsony power, incentive wages, intrinsic motivation
status concerns, street crime, subcultures, penalties, zero-tolerance, broken windows policing
public service motivation, altruism, mission preferences, sorting, World Values Survey
reciprocity, social exchange, incentive contracts, double moral hazard, GSOEP
manager-employee relationships, wages, extra-role behavior, sabotage, gift exchange, social-exchange, conditional altruism, reciprocity, signaling game
manager-employee relationships, wages, extra-role behavior, sabotage, gift exchange, social exchange, conditional altruism, reciprocity, signaling game
principal-agent, envy, moral hazard, compensation, incentives, contracts, profitsharing, stock options, public vs. private production
Politicians' motivation, politicians' pay, political culture, electoral competition, coalition governments, reputation bashing
income inequality, optimal taxation, education
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $38.00 .
File name: ecoj.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
Principal-agent, Envy, moral hazard, compensation, incentives, contracts, profit-sharing, stock options, public vs. private production
product market competition, trade union structure, wage dispersion
street-level bureaucracy, sorting, altruism, personnel policy, pay-for-performance
File name: j-9442.
Altruism, pay‐for‐performance, personnel policy, sorting, street‐level bureaucracy
intrinsic motivation, commitment, self-selection, wage compensation, exit bonus, transparency
elimination tournaments, incentives, prize spread, performance measurement, field experiment
Dynamic incentives, Relative performance pay, Field experiment
dynamic incentives, relative performance pay, field experiment
altruism, spite, social relations, incentives, relational contracts, efficiency wages, subjective performance evaluation, Nash bargaining
Altruism, spite, social relations, incentives, relational contracts, efficiency wages, subjective performance evaluation, Nash bargaining
Tuition policy, education subsidies, self-selection
Centralised decision making, strategic delegation, financing rules
local public goods, municipal consolidation, voting, intergovernmental transfers, tax discrimination
social exchange, reciprocity, incentive contracts, common agency, organizational design
not-for-profits, management, impure altruism
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: DP8498.
impure altruism, management, not-for-profits
Information collection, advocates, sequential, budgetary process
Impact, monopsonistic behavior, wage differentials, hold-up problem, contracts, autonomy
altruism, charitable donations, public service motivation, public sector employment, self-selection
local public goods, municipal consolidation, voting, intergovernmental transfers
altruism, spite, incentives, relational contracts, efficiency wages, subjective performance evaluation, Nash bargaining
File name: JEMS.
law enforcement, deterrence, perception, salience, disorder
Law Enforcement, Deterrence, Perception, Salience, Disorder
status concerns, violence, subcultures, penalties, zero-tolerance, broken windows policing
lobbying, voting, special interests, credibility
File name: ecoj.
Lobbying, voting, special interests, influence
Team incentives, Task assignment, Field experiment
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