A. Mitchell Polinsky

Stanford Law School

Josephine Scott Crocker Professor of Law and Economics

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305-8610

United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

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SCHOLARLY PAPERS

48

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14,056

CITATIONS
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1,427

Scholarly Papers (48)

1.

Economic Analysis of Law

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 316, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 536
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 29 Nov 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 2,990 (2,473)
Citation 257

Abstract:

law and economics, property law, liability for accidents, contract law, litigation, public enforcement, criminal law

2.
Downloads 1,615 ( 8,002)
Citation 205

The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 159
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 30 May 1998
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,558 (8,308)
Citation 205

Abstract:

The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

NBER Working Paper No. w6993
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 26 Jun 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 57 (311,407)
Citation 205

Abstract:

3.
Downloads 1,017 ( 16,625)
Citation 46

Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

Journal of Public Economics
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 28 Aug 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 974 (17,448)
Citation 46

Abstract:

Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

NBER Working Paper No. w6945
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 14 Jul 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 43 (354,530)
Citation 46

Abstract:

4.

The Uneasy Case for Product Liability

Harvard Law Review, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 381, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 647, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-46
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 07 Sep 2009 Last Revised: 03 Dec 2009
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 973 (14,443)
Citation 12

Abstract:

5.

Principal-Agent Liability

AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, Third Edition, 2003
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 02 Jun 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 893 (19,310)
Citation 3

Abstract:

principal-agent liability, optimal liability

6.
Downloads 886 ( 20,489)
Citation 203

The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, eds., Vol. 1, 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 529, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 313, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 115, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 119
Number of pages: 82 Posted: 17 Nov 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 836 (21,906)
Citation 203

Abstract:

public enforcement of law, fines, imprisonment, strict liability, fault-based liability, probability of detection, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, fairness of sanctions, norms

The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

NBER Working Paper No. w11780
Number of pages: 82 Posted: 19 Feb 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 50 (331,986)
Citation 203

Abstract:

Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 327, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 564
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 23 Oct 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 592 (35,490)
Citation 5

Abstract:

product risk, information, mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure, negligence, strict liability

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks

NBER Working Paper No. w12776
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 23 Dec 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 41 (361,379)
Citation 5

Abstract:

8.

Public Enforcement of Law

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 322
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 16 May 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 555 (36,547)
Citation 205

Abstract:

9.
Downloads 533 ( 41,341)
Citation 20

Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 223
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 533 (40,805)
Citation 20

Abstract:

Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 165-188, Spring 2003
Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

Abstract:

litigation, conflict of interest between lawyers and clients, trial versus settlement, hourly fee, contingent fee, compensation of lawyers

10.

Law Enforcement Using Imprisonment

AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, Third Edition, 2003
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 09 Jun 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 417 (52,613)

Abstract:

law enforcement, imprisonment, sanctions, crime, jail term

The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy

Stanford Law School, Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 167; and Harvard Law School, Olin Discussion Paper No. 247
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 08 Mar 1999
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 347 (69,287)
Citation 16

Abstract:

The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy

American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 223-237, 2000; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 167; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 247
Posted: 07 Jul 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

Abstract:

A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 224; and UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 67
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 293 (84,114)
Citation 10

Abstract:

A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers

International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 217-225, August 2002
Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

Abstract:

litigation, contingent fee, lawyer compensation, trial versus settlement, conflict of interest between lawyer and client

Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 271
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 05 Dec 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 253 (98,727)
Citation 2

Abstract:

price fixing, antitrust remedies, coupons, discounts, deadweight loss

Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

NBER Working Paper No. w10162
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Dec 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 27 (419,819)
Citation 2

Abstract:

14.
Downloads 252 ( 99,666)

Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 436, Harvard Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 739 , Harvard Law School Program on Risk Regulation Research Paper No. 13-06
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 18 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 12 Feb 2013
Steven Shavell and A. Mitchell Polinsky
Harvard Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 244 (102,638)

Abstract:

Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages

NBER Working Paper No. w18594
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 07 Dec 2012
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 8 (527,321)

Abstract:

Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 289
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 30 Aug 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 192 (130,155)
Citation 6

Abstract:

fines, auditing, public enforcement, penalties, misrepresentation of wealth

Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe

NBER Working Paper No. w10760
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 27 Sep 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 23 (441,625)
Citation 6

Abstract:

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 90, Nos. 4-5, pp. 823-835, 2006, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 290
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 30 Aug 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 188 (132,791)
Citation 24

Abstract:

Fines, Imprisonment, Public enforcement, Penalties, Unobservable wealth

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable

NBER Working Paper No. w10761
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 29 Sep 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 19 (464,797)
Citation 24

Abstract:

Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 01 Feb 1997
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 184 (135,584)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

NBER Working Paper No. w4507
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 04 Apr 2002
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 22 (447,372)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer 1996.
Posted: 04 Mar 1996
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

Abstract:

18.
Downloads 150 (162,395)
Citation 4

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 302
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 17 Mar 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 128 (185,233)
Citation 4

Abstract:

class action remedies, coupons, damage revelation, accuracy

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

NBER Working Paper No. w11227
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 04 May 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 22 (447,372)
Citation 4

Abstract:

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 3, pp. 653-661, 2007
Posted: 23 Jun 2008
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

Abstract:

Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 506, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 17-04
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 29 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 05 Apr 2017
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 71 (276,838)

Abstract:

insurance, subrogation, accidents, torts, litigation, loading costs, moral hazard, non-monetary losses

Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered

NBER Working Paper No. w23303
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 05 Apr 2017
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 5 (542,737)

Abstract:

Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 507
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 16 May 2017
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Paul N. Riskind
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 69 (281,454)

Abstract:

Crime, Imprisonment, Parole, Probation, Prison Costs, Deterrence, Sanctions

Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation

NBER Working Paper No. w23436
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 24 May 2017
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Paul N. Riskind
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 2 (560,836)

Abstract:

21.

A Skeptical Attitude about Product Liability is Justified: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 399
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 09 Oct 2010
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 71 (255,570)

Abstract:

product liability, public policy, benefit-cost analysis

22.

On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence

NBER Working Paper No. w6259
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Jul 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 61 (296,970)
Citation 15

Abstract:

23.

Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines

NBER Working Paper No. w3429
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 27 Feb 2001
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 58 (285,150)
Citation 28

Abstract:

24.

The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines

NBER Working Paper No. R0136
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 25 Aug 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 54 (273,929)
Citation 71

Abstract:

Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?

NBER Working Paper No. w4586
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 05 Sep 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 47 (341,365)
Citation 21

Abstract:

Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?

JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION, Vol 10 No 2, 1994
Posted: 04 May 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

Abstract:

26.

Detrebling Versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement

NBER Working Paper No. w1846
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 11 Apr 2004 Last Revised: 20 Jul 2010
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 45 (341,688)
Citation 2

Abstract:

27.

Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies

NBER Working Paper No. w0714
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 18 Aug 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 44 (299,429)
Citation 16

Abstract:

28.

Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: a Study in Risk Allocation

NBER Working Paper No. w1817
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 03 May 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 44 (329,611)
Citation 3

Abstract:

29.

A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders

NBER Working Paper No. w3739
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 07 Oct 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 43 (332,628)
Citation 14

Abstract:

30.

Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good Behavior

International Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 478
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 21 Jun 2015
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 42 (261,420)

Abstract:

imprisonment, parole, prison costs, prisoner behavior, deterrence, sanctions

31.

Strict Liability Versus Negligence in a Market Setting

NBER Working Paper No. w0420
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 04 Jul 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 40 (357,794)
Citation 19

Abstract:

32.

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment

NBER Working Paper No. w0932
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 25 Aug 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 39 (361,202)
Citation 46

Abstract:

33.

Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs

NBER Working Paper No. w0742
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 18 Aug 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 38 (364,713)
Citation 7

Abstract:

34.

The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation in the Theory of Liability

NBER Working Paper No. w1834
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 28 Jan 2002
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 35 (364,713)

Abstract:

35.

Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies

NBER Working Paper No. w0463
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 28 Jun 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 32 (368,240)
Citation 22

Abstract:

36.

Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power

NBER Working Paper No. w0937
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 27 Jun 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson
Stanford Law School and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 31 (391,056)
Citation 18

Abstract:

Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 500
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 10 Jan 2017
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 30 (405,369)

Abstract:

deterrence, imprisonment, prison work programs, prison costs, prison labor

Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence

NBER Working Paper No. w23026
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 11 Jan 2017
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 0

Abstract:

38.

On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules

NBER Working Paper No. w0286
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 19 Jun 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 30 (371,776)
Citation 6

Abstract:

39.

Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation

NBER Working Paper No. w3634
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 25 Aug 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che
Stanford Law School and Columbia University
Downloads 28 (383,139)
Citation 43

Abstract:

40.

Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines

NBER Working Paper No. w0338
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 25 Jun 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 27 (408,527)
Citation 29

Abstract:

41.

A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs

NBER Working Paper No. w2114
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 27 Dec 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 21 (418,033)
Citation 3

Abstract:

42.

A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals

NBER Working Paper No. w3232
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 28 Dec 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 20 (418,033)
Citation 23

Abstract:

43.

Optimal Liability When the Injurer's Information About the Victim's Loss is Imperfect

NBER Working Paper No. w2174
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 10 Jul 2007
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 13 (459,296)

Abstract:

44.

Optimal Cleanup and Liability after Environmentally Harmful Discharges

NBER Working Paper No. w4176
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 01 Jun 2011
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 9 (474,829)
Citation 4

Abstract:

45.

The Deadweight Loss of Coupon Remedies for Price Overcharges

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 402-417, June 2008
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 14 Jul 2008
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 3 (527,560)
Citation 2

Abstract:

46.

Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis

111 Harvard Law Review, 1998.
Posted: 15 Sep 1997
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

Abstract:

47.

Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg Et Al.

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1997).
Posted: 09 May 1997
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School

Abstract:

48.

Repeat Offenders and the Theory of Deterrence

John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 134
Posted: 16 Dec 1996
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

Abstract: