A. Mitchell Polinsky

Stanford Law School

Josephine Scott Crocker Professor of Law and Economics

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305-8610

United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

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SCHOLARLY PAPERS

48

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19,461

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342

Scholarly Papers (48)

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1.

Economic Analysis of Law

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 316, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 536
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 29 Nov 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 4,136 (5,513)
Citation 1

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law and economics, property law, liability for accidents, contract law, litigation, public enforcement, criminal law

2.

The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Downloads 2,028 (17,311)
Citation 86

The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 159
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 30 May 1998
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,844 (19,813)
Citation 86

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The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

NBER Working Paper No. w6993
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 26 Jun 2000 Last Revised: 12 Aug 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 184 (353,409)

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3.

The Uneasy Case for Product Liability

Harvard Law Review, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 381, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 647, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-46
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 07 Sep 2009 Last Revised: 03 Dec 2009
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,404 (30,536)
Citation 13

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4.

Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

Downloads 1,174 (39,592)
Citation 14

Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

Journal of Public Economics
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 28 Aug 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,088 (43,528)
Citation 14

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Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

NBER Working Paper No. w6945
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 14 Jul 2000 Last Revised: 25 Dec 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 86 (644,176)

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5.

The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Downloads 1,138 (41,489)
Citation 21

The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, eds., Vol. 1, 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 529, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 313, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 115, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 119
Number of pages: 82 Posted: 17 Nov 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 941 (53,323)

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public enforcement of law, fines, imprisonment, strict liability, fault-based liability, probability of detection, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, fairness of sanctions, norms

The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

NBER Working Paper No. w11780
Number of pages: 82 Posted: 19 Feb 2006 Last Revised: 26 Dec 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 197 (331,480)
Citation 21

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6.

Principal-Agent Liability

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 02 Jun 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 1,040 (47,097)
Citation 4

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principal-agent liability, optimal liability

7.

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks

Downloads 737 (75,427)
Citation 4

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 327, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 564
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 23 Oct 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 664 (84,922)

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product risk, information, mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure, negligence, strict liability

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks

NBER Working Paper No. w12776
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 23 Dec 2006 Last Revised: 30 Nov 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 73 (710,271)
Citation 4

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8.

Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

Downloads 722 (77,427)
Citation 5

Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 722 (76,242)
Citation 5

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Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

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litigation, conflict of interest between lawyers and clients, trial versus settlement, hourly fee, contingent fee, compensation of lawyers

9.

Public Enforcement of Law

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 322
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 16 May 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 721 (77,570)
Citation 20

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10.

Law Enforcement Using Imprisonment

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 09 Jun 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 560 (106,982)

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law enforcement, imprisonment, sanctions, crime, jail term

11.

The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy

Downloads 488 (126,752)
Citation 3

The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy

Stanford Law School, Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 167; and Harvard Law School, Olin Discussion Paper No. 247
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 08 Mar 1999
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 488 (125,163)
Citation 3

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The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy

American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 223-237, 2000; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 167; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 247
Posted: 07 Jul 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

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12.

Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages

Downloads 370 (174,716)

Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 436, Harvard Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 739 , Harvard Law School Program on Risk Regulation Research Paper No. 13-06
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 18 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 12 Feb 2013
Steven Shavell and A. Mitchell Polinsky
Harvard Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 337 (191,746)

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Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages

NBER Working Paper No. w18594
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 07 Dec 2012 Last Revised: 23 Apr 2023
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 33 (1,033,534)

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13.

A Note on Settlements Under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers

Downloads 352 (185,682)
Citation 1

A Note on Settlements Under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 352 (184,017)
Citation 1

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A Note on Settlements Under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers

Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

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litigation, contingent fee, lawyer compensation, trial versus settlement, conflict of interest between lawyer and client

14.

Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

Downloads 350 (185,682)
Citation 1

Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 05 Dec 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 286 (228,977)

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price fixing, antitrust remedies, coupons, discounts, deadweight loss

Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

NBER Working Paper No. w10162
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Dec 2003 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 64 (764,410)
Citation 1

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15.

Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered

Downloads 302 (217,844)

Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered

Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 506, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 17-04
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 29 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 05 Apr 2018
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 198 (329,885)

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insurance, subrogation, accidents, torts, litigation, loading costs, moral hazard, non-monetary losses

Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered

NBER Working Paper No. w23303
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 05 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 05 Mar 2023
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 104 (567,162)

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16.

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable

Downloads 296 (222,529)
Citation 13

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 90, Nos. 4-5, pp. 823-835, 2006, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 290
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 30 Aug 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 245 (268,264)

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Fines, Imprisonment, Public enforcement, Penalties, Unobservable wealth

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable

NBER Working Paper No. w10761
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 29 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 29 May 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 51 (859,261)
Citation 13

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17.

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

Downloads 286 (230,697)
Citation 1

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 17 Mar 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 232 (283,211)

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class action remedies, coupons, damage revelation, accuracy

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

NBER Working Paper No. w11227
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 04 May 2005 Last Revised: 05 Sep 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 54 (835,223)
Citation 1

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A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 3, pp. 653-661, 2007
Posted: 23 Jun 2008
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

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18.

Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

Downloads 281 (235,849)
Citation 2

Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 01 Feb 1997
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 231 (285,619)
Citation 2

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Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

NBER Working Paper No. w4507
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 04 Apr 2002 Last Revised: 27 Oct 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 50 (867,545)

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Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer 1996.
Posted: 04 Mar 1996
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

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19.

Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe

Downloads 277 (239,344)
Citation 3

Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 30 Aug 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 221 (298,238)

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fines, auditing, public enforcement, penalties, misrepresentation of wealth

Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe

NBER Working Paper No. w10760
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 27 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 27 Nov 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 56 (820,029)
Citation 3

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20.

Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good Behavior

International Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 478
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 21 Jun 2015
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 248 (267,778)
Citation 3

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imprisonment, parole, prison costs, prisoner behavior, deterrence, sanctions

21.

The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 25 Aug 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 224 (294,579)
Citation 20

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22.

Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation

Downloads 204 (322,136)
Citation 1

Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 507
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 16 May 2017 Last Revised: 12 Dec 2018
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Paul N. Riskind
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 172 (375,573)

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Crime, Imprisonment, Parole, Probation, Prison Costs, Deterrence, Sanctions

Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation

NBER Working Paper No. w23436
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 May 2017 Last Revised: 16 Jul 2023
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Paul N. Riskind
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 32 (1,044,771)
Citation 1

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23.

Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment

Downloads 169 (382,039)
Citation 1

Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 535, American Law and Economics Review, forthcoming
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 26 Jul 2019 Last Revised: 01 Sep 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 148 (427,979)

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Deterrence, imprisonment, sentence adjustment, sanctions, parole, recidivism

Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment

NBER Working Paper No. w26083
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 23 Jul 2019 Last Revised: 09 Apr 2023
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 21 (1,182,753)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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24.

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment

NBER Working Paper No. w0932
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 25 Aug 2000 Last Revised: 21 Jul 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 161 (398,493)

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25.

Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies

NBER Working Paper No. w0714
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 18 Aug 2004 Last Revised: 16 Dec 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 134 (463,242)

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26.

A Skeptical Attitude about Product Liability is Justified: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 399
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 09 Oct 2010
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 120 (505,192)
Citation 2

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product liability, public policy, benefit-cost analysis

27.

Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence

Downloads 119 (508,395)
Citation 1

Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 500
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 10 Jan 2017
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 84 (653,683)

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deterrence, imprisonment, prison work programs, prison costs, prison labor

Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence

NBER Working Paper No. w23026
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 11 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 02 Jun 2023
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 35 (1,011,476)
Citation 1

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28.

Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines

NBER Working Paper No. w3429
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 27 Feb 2001 Last Revised: 16 Nov 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 111 (535,908)
Citation 7

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29.

A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders

NBER Working Paper No. w3739
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 07 Oct 2000 Last Revised: 21 Sep 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 108 (546,794)
Citation 2

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30.

Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies

NBER Working Paper No. w0463
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 28 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 100 (578,417)
Citation 1

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31.

Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?

Downloads 99 (582,459)
Citation 2

Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?

NBER Working Paper No. w4586
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 05 Sep 2000 Last Revised: 15 Jul 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 99 (587,918)
Citation 2

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Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?

Posted: 04 May 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

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32.

On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules

NBER Working Paper No. w0286
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 19 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 15 Oct 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 95 (602,237)
Citation 1

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33.

Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: a Study in Risk Allocation

NBER Working Paper No. w1817
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 03 May 2004 Last Revised: 21 Dec 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 94 (602,237)
Citation 2

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34.

On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence

NBER Working Paper No. w6259
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Jul 2000 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 92 (610,411)
Citation 9

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35.

Strict Liability Versus Negligence in a Market Setting

NBER Working Paper No. w0420
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 04 Jul 2004 Last Revised: 27 Aug 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 79 (668,986)
Citation 6

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36.

Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs

NBER Working Paper No. w0742
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 18 Aug 2004 Last Revised: 14 Jul 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 77 (678,853)

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37.

Detrebling Versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement

NBER Working Paper No. w1846
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 11 Apr 2004 Last Revised: 20 Jul 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 76 (683,938)
Citation 1

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38.

A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals

NBER Working Paper No. w3232
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 28 Dec 2006 Last Revised: 02 Nov 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 75 (688,972)
Citation 1

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39.

Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines

NBER Working Paper No. w0338
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 25 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 05 Dec 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 75 (694,227)
Citation 9

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40.

The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation in the Theory of Liability

NBER Working Paper No. w1834
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 28 Jan 2002 Last Revised: 08 Jul 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 63 (757,295)
Citation 1

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41.

Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation

NBER Working Paper No. w3634
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 25 Aug 2000 Last Revised: 08 Dec 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che
Stanford Law School and Columbia University
Downloads 62 (763,609)
Citation 69

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42.

Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power

NBER Working Paper No. w0937
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 27 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 25 Jul 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson
Stanford Law School and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 60 (776,561)
Citation 11

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43.

A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs

NBER Working Paper No. w2114
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 27 Dec 2006 Last Revised: 13 Oct 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 54 (818,339)

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44.

Optimal Cleanup and Liability after Environmentally Harmful Discharges

NBER Working Paper No. w4176
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 01 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 01 Dec 2022
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 53 (825,871)

Abstract:

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45.

Optimal Liability When the Injurer's Information About the Victim's Loss is Imperfect

NBER Working Paper No. w2174
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 10 Jul 2007 Last Revised: 09 Sep 2008
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 47 (873,401)

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46.

Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis

111 Harvard Law Review, 1998.
Posted: 15 Sep 1997
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

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47.

Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg Et Al.

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1997).
Posted: 09 May 1997
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School

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48.

Repeat Offenders and the Theory of Deterrence

John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 134
Posted: 16 Dec 1996
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

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