Author Page for Gregory M. Barron

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Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice

Psychological Science, Vol. 15, No. 8, 2004

Number of pages: 6 Posted: 17 Nov 2008 Last Revised: 31 Aug 2011

Ralph Hertwig, Gregory M. Barron, Gregory M. Barron, Elke U. Weber and Ido Erev

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets UnitLax Sebenius LLC, Princeton University - Department of Psychology and Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management

Downloads 166 (297,093)

Citation 67

Abstract:

The Internal Job Market of the Imf's Economist Program

IMF Working Paper No. 04/190

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 09 Feb 2006

Gregory M. Barron, Gregory M. Barron and Felix Várdy

Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets UnitLax Sebenius LLC and CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Downloads 90 (468,527)

Citation 1

Abstract:

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

Harvard Business School NOM Working Paper No. 08-064

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 06 Feb 2008

Katherine L. Milkman, Gregory M. Barron, Gregory M. Barron, James Burns, David C. Parkes and Kagan Tumer

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School, Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets UnitLax Sebenius LLC, affiliation not provided to SSRN, Harvard University - Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences and Oregon State University

Downloads 53 (622,815)

Citation 2

Gregory M. Barron

Lax Sebenius LLC

Director

Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit

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Scholarly Papers (3)

Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice

Abstract:

The Internal Job Market of the Imf's Economist Program

Abstract:

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

Abstract: