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Alan J. Meese

William & Mary Law School

Ball Professor of Law

South Henry Street

P.O. Box 8795

Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795

United States

  • William & Mary Law School

    • Email
    • Tel: 757-221-1609
    • Fax: 757-221-3261
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

37

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CITATIONS
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34

Scholarly Papers (37)

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1.

The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment

William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 43, p. 1629, 2002
Number of pages: 87 Posted: 17 Feb 2003
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 1,014 (14,577)
Citation 12

Abstract:

2.

A Careful Examination of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster Merger

William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-41
Number of pages: 130 Posted: 27 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 28 Dec 2014
Alan J. Meese and Barak D. Richman
William & Mary Law School and Duke University - School of Law
Downloads 561 (35,960)

Abstract:

3.

Exclusive Dealing, the Theory of the Firm, and Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward a New Synthesis

Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 50, p. 371, 2005
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 09 Aug 2006
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 330 (70,434)

Abstract:

Exclusive Dealing, Price Theory, Transaction Costs Economics, Raising Rivals' Costs

4.

Brief of Amici Curiae Antitrust Law Professors in O'Bannon v. NCAA

University of Illinois College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-24
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 22 Nov 2014 Last Revised: 22 Sep 2015
Thomas C. Arthur, Amitai Aviram, Edward D. Cavanagh, Jorge L. Contreras, Daniel A. Crane, Susan Beth Farmer, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Keith N. Hylton, Michael S. Jacobs, Alan J. Meese, Salil K. Mehra, William H. Page, Gary R. Roberts, D. Daniel Sokol and Alexander Volokh
Emory University School of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, St. John's University - School of Law, University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, University of Iowa - College of Law, Boston University - School of Law, DePaul University - College of Law, William & Mary Law School, Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law, University of Florida - Levin College of Law, Indiana Univ. Robert H. McKinney School of Law, University of Florida - Levin College of Law and Emory University School of Law
Downloads 272 (63,560)

Abstract:

NCAA, antitrust, rule of reason, sports

5.

Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason

Illinois Law Review, Vol. 77, 2003
Number of pages: 94 Posted: 19 Jun 2006
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 259 (86,855)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Price Theory, Transaction Cost Economics, Contractual Integration, Rule of Reason, Antitrust

6.

Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 21-95, 2005
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 08 May 2006 Last Revised: 04 Jun 2012
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 251 (93,706)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Antitrust, Market Failure, Perfect Competition, Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, Transaction Costs, Transaction Cost Economics, Rule of Reason

7.

Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA Persons

Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 127, p. 273, 2014, William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-279
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 May 2014 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2014
Alan J. Meese and Nathan B. Oman
William & Mary Law School and William & Mary Law School
Downloads 237 (60,091)

Abstract:

Hobby Lobby, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, RFRA, Corporations, Corporate Law, Theory of the Firm, Closely Held Corporation, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Contraception Mandate

8.

Property, Aspen, and Refusals to Deal

Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 73, p. 81, 2005
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 26 Jan 2006
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 231 (102,690)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Property, Monopolization, Transaction Costs, Refusal to Deal

9.

The Externality of Victim Care

Downloads 206 (120,572)
Citation 1

The Externality of Victim Care

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 12 Oct 2000
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 206 (120,219)
Citation 1

Abstract:

The Externality of Victim Care

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, 2001
Posted: 23 Oct 2001
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School

Abstract:

10.

Comments on the HHS' Flawed Post-Hobby Lobby Rules

UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 14-18, Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-23
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 22 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 18 Dec 2014
Lyman Johnson, David Millon, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Ronald J. Colombo, Brett McDonnell, Alan J. Meese and Nathan B. Oman
Washington and Lee University - School of Law, Washington and Lee University - School of Law, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law, Hofstra University - Maurice A. Deane School of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, William & Mary Law School and William & Mary Law School
Downloads 193 (128,113)

Abstract:

corporate law, corporate governance, law, religion

11.

Monopoly Bundling in Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?

Downloads 186 (132,579)

Monopoly Bundling in Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?

Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 44, p. 65, 1999
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 08 Aug 2006
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 186 (132,468)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Microsoft, tying, separate products, price theory, transaction costs

Monopoly Bundling in Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?

Posted: 06 Jan 1999
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School

Abstract:

12.

Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation

UCLA Law Review, Vol. 45, p. 143, 1997
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 19 Aug 2006 Last Revised: 26 Jun 2015
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 183 (123,987)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Vertical Restraints, Price Theory, Chicago School, New Institutional Economics, Transaction Costs, Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson

13.

Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the States?

Downloads 165 (147,708)

Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the States?

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 21 Mar 2000
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 165 (147,769)

Abstract:

Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the States?

Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
Posted: 18 Nov 1999
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School

Abstract:

14.

Competition and Market Failure in the Antitrust Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens

Fordham Law Review, Vol. 74, p. 1775, 2006
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 04 Aug 2006
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 158 (141,679)

Abstract:

Stevens, Market Failure, Partial Integration, Competition, Rule of Reason

15.

Monopolization, Exclusion and the Theory of the Firm

Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 89, 2005
Number of pages: 105 Posted: 16 Jul 2006
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 154 (150,151)

Abstract:

Monopoly, Price Theory, Competition on the Merits, Transaction Cost Economics, Partial Integration, Vertical Integration

16.

Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet)

George Mason Law Review, Vol. 9, 2001
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 26 Nov 2001
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 152 (154,203)

Abstract:

17.

Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep it

New York University Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 3, p. 659, 2010, William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-55
Number of pages: 80 Posted: 04 Oct 2010
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 135 (158,559)

Abstract:

Sherman Act, Monopolization, Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare, Purchaser Welfare, Harvard School, Chicago School

18.

Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm

North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 83, p. 5, 2004
Number of pages: 82 Posted: 15 Nov 2005 Last Revised: 02 Apr 2012
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 133 (169,847)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Antitrust, Transaction Costs, Vertical Integration, Intrabrand Restraints

19.

Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason

Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 68, p. 461, 2000
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 11 Sep 2006
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 118 (185,776)

Abstract:

Rule of Reason, Quick Look, Transaction Cost Economics

20.

Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution: Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis

Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2010, William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-93
Number of pages: 75 Posted: 30 Mar 2011 Last Revised: 14 Apr 2011
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 114 (190,473)

Abstract:

Transaction Costs, Rule of Reason, Technological Transaction Costs, Non-Technological Transaction Costs, Partial Equilibrium Trade-off Paradigm, Oliver Williamson, Ronald Coase, Harvard School

21.

The Market Power Model of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine

Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, 2013, William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-250
Number of pages: 80 Posted: 01 Aug 2013
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 96 (194,173)

Abstract:

Market Power, Monopolization, Tying, In Pari Delicto, Ronald Coase, Transaction Cost Economics, Voluntary Integration

22.

Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints

Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89, p. 553, 2004
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 14 Jan 2007
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 91 (212,816)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Intrabrand Restraints, Property Rights, Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Transaction Costs

23.

Robert Bork's Forgotten Role in the Transaction Cost Revolution

Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 79, No. 3, 2014
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 03 Dec 2014
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 87 (207,183)

Abstract:

Robert Bork, Transaction Cost Economics, Rule of Reason

24.

Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and a New Way Forward

Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2013, William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-281
Number of pages: 82 Posted: 13 Aug 2014
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 75 (239,609)

Abstract:

Competition Policy, Great Depression, Sherman Act, Liberty of Contract, Dormant Commerce Clause, National Industrial Recovery Act, National Labor Relations Act, Nebbia v. New York, Parker v. Brown

25.

Limitiations on Corporate Speech: Protection for Shareholders, or Abridgement of Expression?

William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Vol. 2, p. 305, 1993
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 01 May 2007
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 71 (250,500)

Abstract:

Corporations, Corporate Political Speech

26.

Reframing the (False?) Choice between Purchaser Welfare and Total Welfare

Fordham Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5, 2013 , William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-243
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 06 Apr 2013
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 69 (244,980)

Abstract:

Antitrust, Consumer Welfare, Purchaser Welfare, Total Welfare, Partial Equilibrium Trade-off Model, Sherman Act, Clayton Act

27.

Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts

Michigan Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, p. 111, 1996
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 08 Jan 2011 Last Revised: 09 Apr 2011
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 63 (250,500)

Abstract:

Franchising, Business Format Franchising, Franchise Tying Contract, Antitrust, Less Restrictive Alternative, Trademarks, Ronald Coase, Transaction Cost Economics, Partial Equilibrium Trade-Off Model

28.

Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing

Downloads 59 (298,199)

Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 146, No. 1, 1997
Number of pages: 100 Posted: 28 Jan 2009
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 59 (302,208)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Tying, Transaction Costs, Market Failure, Antitrust, New Institutional Economics

Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing

Posted: 14 Nov 1996
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School

Abstract:

29.

Section 2 Enforcement and the Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (GDP)

Fordham Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 2012, William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-221
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 25 Jun 2012 Last Revised: 03 Jul 2012
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 52 (303,305)

Abstract:

Monopolization, Monopoly, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare, Obama Administration, National Industrial Recovery Act, National Labor Relations Act, New Deal, Great Depression, Great Recession, Aggregate Demand, Aggregate Supply, Potential Output

30.

Antitrust, Regulatory Harm and Economic Liberty

99 Iowa Law Review Bulletin 115 (2014)
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 18 Jan 2015
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 42 (288,567)

Abstract:

Sherman Act, Liberty of Contract, Due Process of Law, Contractual Integration

31.

Standard Oil as Lochner's Trojan Horse

Southern California Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 3, 2012, William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-242
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 30 Mar 2013
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 40 (314,043)

Abstract:

Sherman Act, Rule of Reason, Standard Oil v. United States, Lochner v. New York, Liberty of Contract, Due Process Clause, Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare, Purchaser Welfare

32.

Will, Judgment and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the Mistranslation of the Due Proces Clause

William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1999
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 26 Oct 2009
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 38 (334,365)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Justice Souter, Liberty of Contract, Great Depression, Translation, Lochner v. New York

33.

Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An Economic Analysis

Creighton Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1990, William & Mary Law School Research Paper
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 17 Jan 2012 Last Revised: 02 Jun 2014
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 35 (356,794)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Attorney-Client Privilege, Information. Property Rights, Liability Rules, Waiver, Strict Liability, Negligence

34.

Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An Essay for Professor Hovenkamp

Iowa Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 5, 2015
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 07 Aug 2015
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 30 (308,526)

Abstract:

Sherman Act, Dormant Commerce Clause, Parker v. Brown, Antitrust Federalism, Preemption

35.

Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era

Boston University Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 1, 1999
Number of pages: 92 Posted: 02 Sep 2013 Last Revised: 03 Sep 2013
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 14 (390,381)

Abstract:

Sherman Act, liberty of contract, antitrust, formative era, Rufus Peckham

36.

Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance Is Misguided and Futile

Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2013
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 07 May 2016
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 0 (469,448)

Abstract:

Dr. Miles, Leegin, Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Transaction Cost Economics, Oliver Williamson

37.

In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look

Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 104, 4, 2016
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 27 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 24 Oct 2016
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School
Downloads 0 (413,101)

Abstract:

Sherman Act, Rule of Reason, Quick Look, Per Se Rule

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