Fuhito Kojima

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Littauer Center

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

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SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 9,736

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20

CROSSREF CITATIONS

83

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.

Strategy-Proofness, Investment Efficiency, and Marginal Returns: An Equivalence

Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper
Number of pages: 93 Posted: 05 Jan 2015 Last Revised: 05 May 2018
University of Texas at Austin, Harvard University - Department of Economics and Harvard University
Downloads 969 (23,474)
Citation 13

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Strategy-proofness, Investment efficiency, Providing marginal rewards, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, Mechanism design

2.

Improving Schools Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach

Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 82 Posted: 14 Jan 2012 Last Revised: 28 Jul 2016
University of Texas at Austin, Harvard University - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 348 (88,387)
Citation 14

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Matching, School Choice, School Competition, Stability, Efficiency

3.

Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 09 Mar 2006
Fuhito Kojima and M. Utku Ünver
Harvard University - Department of Economics and Boston College, Department of Economics
Downloads 293 (106,815)
Citation 6

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Many-to-many matching, pairwise stability, stability, random paths

4.

Many-to-Many Matching with Max-Min Preferences

Number of pages: 8 Posted: 18 Jan 2012 Last Revised: 19 Jan 2012
University of Texas at Austin, Harvard University - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 132 (223,672)
Citation 1

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many-to-many two-sided matching, stability, pareto efficiency, monotonicity, strategy-proofness, max-min preferences

5.

Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1677
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 06 Oct 2008
Yeon-Koo Che and Fuhito Kojima
Columbia University and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 32 (472,192)
Citation 2

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Random assignment, Random priority, Probabilistic serial, Ordinal efficiency, Asymptotic equivalence

6.

Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 10 Jan 2019
Isa Emin Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima and M. Bumin Yenmez
Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business, Harvard University - Department of Economics and Boston College
Downloads 25 (508,551)
Citation 1

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interdistrict school choice, student assignment, stability, efficiency

7.

Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets

NBER Working Paper No. w16028
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 04 Jun 2010
Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Harvard University - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics and HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit
Downloads 19 (544,096)
Citation 9

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8.

Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics

Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 82-98, 2011
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 14 Mar 2011
Fuhito Kojima and Peter Troyan
Harvard University - Department of Economics and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 3 (649,130)
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C70, D61, D63, D78

9.

Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets

Posted: 30 Jan 2007
Fuhito Kojima and Parag A. Pathak
Harvard University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

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Large markets, stability, two-sided matching