David Martimort

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)

Manufacture des Tabacs

21 Allee de Brienne bat. F

Toulouse Cedex, F-31000

France

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5

Munich, DE-81679

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

31

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289

Scholarly Papers (31)

1.

The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

CEIS Working Paper No. 139
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 20 Sep 2008 Last Revised: 25 Feb 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 1,669 (9,658)
Citation 44

Abstract:

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Public-private partnerships, public-service provision

2.

Transaction Costs of Collusion and Organizational Design

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C01-17
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 11 Aug 2001
London School of Economics, University of Southern California - Department of Economics (Deceased) and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 666 (37,926)
Citation 2

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Supervision, collusion, stake-dependent transaction costs

3.

Politics, Transaction Costs, and the Design of Regulatory Institutions

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2073
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 20 Apr 2016
Antonio Estache and David Martimort
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 531 (51,012)

Abstract:

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Government Organization, Regulation, Multiprincipal, Collusion

4.

Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C02-9
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 11 Aug 2001
London School of Economics, University of Southern California - Department of Economics (Deceased) and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 406 (71,141)
Citation 6

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Supervision, soft information, collusion, delegation.

5.

The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 20 Feb 2009
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 344 (86,201)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Contracting out, public-private partnerships, public-service provision

6.

The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 575
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Oct 2001
David Martimort and Lars Stole
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 343 (86,485)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Revelation Principle, Delegation Principle, Taxation Principle, Common Agency, Adverse Selection

7.

Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 581
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 30 Oct 2001
David Martimort and Lars Stole
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 244 (124,596)

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Common Agency, Externality, Adverse Selection, Equilibrium Selection

8.

Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation: Implications for Public-Private Partnerships

CEIS Working Paper No. 195
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 20 May 2011 Last Revised: 02 Mar 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 226 (134,447)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Corruption, Public Private Partnerships and Risk transfer

9.

Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 572
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 23 Oct 2001
David Martimort and Lars Stole
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 195 (154,627)

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10.

Monitoring a Common Agent

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 07 May 2003
Fahad Khalil, David Martimort and Bruno Parigi
University of Washington - Department of Economics, University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and Università degli Studi di Padova
Downloads 146 (198,755)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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monitoring, common agency, costly state verification

11.

Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1514
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 02 Sep 2005
Bruno Maria Parigi, Fahad Khalil and David Martimort
University of Padua - Department of Economics, University of Washington - Department of Economics and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 114 (240,692)
Citation 2

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monitoring, common agency, costly state verification

The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 15 Apr 2005
Jérôme Pouyet, Yolande Hiriart and David Martimort
Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS), Universite de Toulouse I and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 94 (276,629)
Citation 1

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Environmental risk, regulation, liability, ex ante and ex post investigations, integration and separation

The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4992
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 09 Aug 2005
Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort and Jérôme Pouyet
Universite de Toulouse I, University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS)
Downloads 16 (563,052)
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Environmental risk, regulation, liability, exante and ex post investigations, integration and separation

A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE356
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
London School of Economics, affiliation not provided to SSRN and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 87 (290,867)

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14.

The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors

FEEM Working Paper No. 144.2010
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Dec 2010
Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort and Jérôme Pouyet
Universite de Toulouse I, University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS)
Downloads 57 (363,887)

Abstract:

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Risk Regulation, Monitoring, Capture, Integration, Separation

15.

The Organization of Delegated Expertise

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4572
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 07 Oct 2004
Denis Gromb and David Martimort
HEC Paris and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 35 (442,653)
Citation 3
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Expertise, organization, collusion

16.

'Build it or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5610
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 09 Aug 2006
Jérôme Pouyet and David Martimort
Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 34 (446,831)
Citation 4
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Public-private partnership, bundling/unbundling, agency costs, capture

An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision

Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 149-180, April 2005
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 21 Mar 2005
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI), CNRS, Toulouse School of Economics and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 27 (493,701)
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An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision

Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 149-180, April 2005
Posted: 17 Sep 2007 Last Revised: 01 Sep 2016
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI), CNRS, Toulouse School of Economics and University of Lille I - EQUIPPE

Abstract:

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Asymmetric information, Incomplete contracts, Public goods

18.

Optimal Domestic Regulation and the Pattern of Trade

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4700
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 28 Dec 2004
David Martimort and Thierry Verdier
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
Downloads 16 (542,564)
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19.

Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers

NBER Working Paper No. w4069
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 25 Jul 2007 Last Revised: 16 Aug 2010
S. Lael Brainard and David Martimort
Deputy National Economic Advisor, The White House and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 14 (554,523)
Citation 3

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20.

The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8042
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 22 Nov 2010
Philippe Gagnepain, Marc Ivaldi and David Martimort
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 3 (626,533)
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Contract, Public transit, Renegotiation

21.

Contracting for an Innovation Under Bilateral Asymmetric Information

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 58, Issue 2, pp. 324-348, June 2010
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 04 Jun 2010
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI), Université Montpellier I and University of Toulouse 1
Downloads 2 (636,413)
Citation 1
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22.

Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 61, Issue 1, pp. 84-107, 2013
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 26 Mar 2013
Jakub Kastl, David Martimort and Salvatore Piccolo
Stanford University, University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan
Downloads 1 (649,034)
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23.

'When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?': New Insights from Asymmetric Information When Supply Chains Compete

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 20, Issue 3, pp. 649-677, 2011
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 24 Jul 2011
Jakub Kastl, David Martimort and Salvatore Piccolo
Stanford University, University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan
Downloads 1 (649,034)
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24.

Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. Spring, 2009
Posted: 15 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and David Martimort
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)

Abstract:

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common agency, nonlinear pricing, market participation

25.

Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9552
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 17 Jul 2013
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 0 (666,984)
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hidden action, hidden information, Incentive mechanisms, information gathering

26.

Solving the Global Warming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help!

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, Vol. 46, Issue 2, pp. 361-378, 2013
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 18 May 2013
David Martimort and Wilfried Sand‐Zantman
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 0 (666,984)
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27.

The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 89, No. 2-3, February 2005
Posted: 10 Jun 2005
Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort
University of Southern California - Department of Economics (Deceased) and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)

Abstract:

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Transnational public goods, incentive mechanisms

28.

Regulatory Inertia

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 3
Posted: 18 Aug 2003
Antoine Faure-Grimaud and David Martimort
London School of Economics and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)

Abstract:

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29.

Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, No. 2
Posted: 18 May 1999
Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort
University of Southern California - Department of Economics (Deceased) and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)

Abstract:

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30.

Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory

RAND J. OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 26 No. 1
Posted: 13 Jul 1998
David Martimort
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)

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31.

Collusion and Delegation

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 2
Posted: 08 Jul 1998
Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort
University of Southern California - Department of Economics (Deceased) and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)

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