Leonardo Felli

University of Cambridge

Professor

Trinity Ln

Cambridge, CB2 1TN

United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5

Munich, DE-81679

Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fellow

London

United Kingdom

  • University of Cambridge

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

39

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7,211

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126

Scholarly Papers (39)

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1.

Ex-Ante Efficiency of Bankruptcy Procedures

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 08 Jan 1997
Francesca Cornelli and Leonardo Felli
London Business School and University of Cambridge
Downloads 710 (78,119)
Citation 8

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2.

Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption

Downloads 681 (82,392)

Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2921
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 02 Feb 2010
Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, Leonardo Felli and Leeat Yariv
Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University, University of Cambridge and Princeton University
Downloads 676 (82,021)

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child adoption, gender bias, racial bias, search, matching

Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7647
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 08 Feb 2010
Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, Leonardo Felli and Leeat Yariv
Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University, University of Cambridge and Princeton University
Downloads 5 (1,353,831)
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Child Adoption, Gender Bias, Matching, Racial Bias, Search

3.

Statute Law or Case Law?

Downloads 527 (114,315)
Citation 14

Statute Law or Case Law?

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2358
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 30 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and École Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 226 (287,845)

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statute law, case law, flexibility, rigidity, time-inconsistency, precedents

Statute Law or Case Law?

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 22 Jul 2008 Last Revised: 22 Sep 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and École Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 200 (322,213)
Citation 13

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Statute Law or Case Law?

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE528
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 13 May 2009
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and École Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 99 (579,129)

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Statute Law or Case Law?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6912
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 20 Aug 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and École Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 2 (1,371,305)
Citation 1
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Case Law, Flexibility, Incomplete Laws, Precedents, Rigidity, Statute Law, Time-Inconsistency

4.

Costly Contingent Contracts

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 13 Nov 1996
Leonardo Felli and Luca Anderlini
University of Cambridge and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 479 (128,001)

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5.

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

Downloads 423 (148,348)
Citation 14

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

CESifo Working Paper No. 1847, PIER Working Paper No. 03-026, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 03-30
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 11 Nov 2003
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 332 (192,461)
Citation 7

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optimal courts, informational externalities, ex-ante welfare

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

PIER Working Paper No. 09-004
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 26 Jan 2009
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 65 (746,115)
Citation 6

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Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-Ante Welfare

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 11 Feb 2004
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 26 (1,099,060)
Citation 1
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Optimal courts, informational externalities, parties' ex-ante welfare

6.

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (Second Version)

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C02-4, PIER Working Paper No. 06-001 , Univ. of Pennsylvania, Institue for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-15, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Acces, September 2006
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 23 Jun 2006
Leonardo Felli, Luca Anderlini and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Cambridge, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 404 (156,344)
Citation 1

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courts of law, unforeseen contingencies, precedents, incentives, insurance

7.

Endogenous Lobbying

Downloads 347 (185,111)
Citation 4

Endogenous Lobbying

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 19 Apr 2000
Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 220 (294,144)

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Lobbying, citizen-candidate, representative democracy, electoral competition

Endogenous Lobbying

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE448
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 108 (542,816)

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Endogenous Lobbying

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 14 Feb 2002
Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 19 (1,192,144)
Citation 4
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Endogenous lobbying, citizen-candidate model, representative democracy

8.

Trust, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5229
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 12 Mar 2015
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH, University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 315 (205,401)
Citation 2

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trust, hold-up problem, competition, innovation, specific investment, procurement, relational contracts, management practices, suppliers, car manufacturers, German automotive industry

9.

Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Downloads 265 (246,075)
Citation 35

Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

CARESS Working Paper No. 00-04
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 02 Jun 2000
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 163 (388,344)
Citation 30

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Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE414
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 65 (746,115)

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Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Number of pages: 63 Posted: 13 Oct 2002
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 37 (973,041)
Citation 5
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Hold-up problem, competition, matching, specific investments

10.

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

Downloads 260 (250,966)
Citation 1

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3358
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 Feb 2011
Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen and Konrad O. Stahl
University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 152 (412,609)

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trust, hold-up problem, competition, specific investment, suppliers, car manufacturers, German automotive industry

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 11-072
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 18 Jan 2012
Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen and Konrad O. Stahl
University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 106 (550,667)
Citation 1

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Trust, Hold-up problem, Competition, Specifi c investment, Suppliers, Car manufacturers, German automotive industry

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8265
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 14 Mar 2011
Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen and Konrad O. Stahl
University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
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Car manufacturers, Competition, German automotive industry, Hold-up problem, Specific investment, Suppliers, Trust

11.

Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation

Downloads 256 (254,889)
Citation 11

Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 213
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 02 Nov 1999
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge
Downloads 211 (306,368)
Citation 11

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Optional bargaining costs, inefficient bargaining outcomes, renegotiation, imperfect recall

Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE361
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge
Downloads 45 (895,822)

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12.

Competition and Hold-Ups

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 12 Aug 1999
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 217 (299,557)

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13.

Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5343
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 19 May 2015
Leonardo Felli and Rafael Hortala-Vallve
University of Cambridge and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government
Downloads 197 (327,974)
Citation 6

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collusion, blackmail, whistle-blowing and communication

14.

Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth

Downloads 193 (334,309)
Citation 3

Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3489
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 15 Jun 2011
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Giovanni Immordino and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, CSEF - University of Naples Federico II and École Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 184 (348,496)
Citation 1

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legal system, commitment, flexibility, innovation, growth

Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8433
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 16 Jun 2011
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Giovanni Immordino and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, CSEF - University of Naples Federico II and École Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 9 (1,320,289)
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Commitment, Flexibility, Growth, Innovation, Legal System

15.

Undescribable Events

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 28 Jan 2004
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge
Downloads 164 (386,611)
Citation 1

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undescribable events, incomplete contracts, finite invariance, fine variability.

16.

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 06-024, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-24
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 20 Oct 2006
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 161 (392,776)
Citation 2

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Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-Ante Welfare

17.

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

Downloads 156 (403,466)
Citation 10

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

PIER Working Paper No. 06-025, CESifo Working Paper No. 1852
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 20 Oct 2006
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 104 (558,629)
Citation 10

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Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-ante Welfare, Informed Principal, Menu Contracts

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE511
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 52 (836,884)

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18.

Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE409
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge
Downloads 144 (430,776)

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19.

Firm-Specific Training

Downloads 143 (433,208)

Firm-Specific Training

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE473
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris
University of Cambridge and University of Cambridge - Department of Applied Economics
Downloads 116 (513,764)

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Firm-Specific Training

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 19 Oct 2004
Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris
University of Cambridge and University of Cambridge - Department of Applied Economics
Downloads 25 (1,111,825)
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Firm-specific training, productivity-enhancement, employee evaluation, firm-specific human capital

Firm-Specific Training

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12748
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 26 Feb 2018
Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris
University of Cambridge and University of Cambridge - Department of Applied Economics
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Specific human capital; Training; Learning-by-doing; Turnover; Productivity enhancement; Employee evaluation

20.

Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 19 Feb 2001
Leonardo Felli and Kevin W.S. Roberts
University of Cambridge and Nuffield College, Oxford
Downloads 128 (473,353)

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21.

Why Stare Decisis?

Downloads 124 (485,312)
Citation 4

Why Stare Decisis?

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 28 May 2010
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and École Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 110 (535,301)
Citation 3

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C79, D74, D89, K40, L14.

Why Stare Decisis?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8266
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 14 Mar 2011
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and École Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 14 (1,260,212)
Citation 1
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Case Law, Precedents, Stare Decisis, Time-Inconsistency

22.

Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE407
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge
Downloads 121 (494,703)

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23.

Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 12 Apr 1998
Leonardo Felli and François Ortalo-Magné
University of Cambridge and Wisconsin School of Business
Downloads 118 (504,211)
Citation 1

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24.

Endogenous Lobbying, Second Version

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 08 Dec 2004
Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 104 (554,068)
Citation 1

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Lobbying, citizen-candidate, representative democracy, electoral competition

25.

Unforeseen Contingencies

Downloads 95 (589,374)

Unforeseen Contingencies

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE431
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge
Downloads 66 (740,049)

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Unforeseen Contingencies

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 18 Apr 2002
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge
Downloads 29 (1,062,093)
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Unforeseen contingencies, incomplete contracts, finite invariance, fine variability

26.

Costly Coasian Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE362
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge
Downloads 78 (663,892)

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27.

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Downloads 78 (663,892)
Citation 1

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE447
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (785,256)

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Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 14 Jun 2001
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 19 (1,192,144)
Citation 1
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Optimal courts, unforeseen contingencies, risk, incentives

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 3, pp. 662-684, 2007
Posted: 23 Jun 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

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28.

Child-Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race

NBER Working Paper No. w16444
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 12 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 08 Jun 2023
Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, Leonardo Felli and Leeat Yariv
Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University, University of Cambridge and Princeton University
Downloads 76 (673,615)
Citation 2

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29.

Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry

Downloads 67 (721,466)
Citation 2

Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry

CESifo Working Paper No. 9362
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 28 Oct 2021
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH, University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 63 (758,701)
Citation 2

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relational contracts, hold-up, buyer-supplier contracts, bargaining power

Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16653
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 09 Nov 2021
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH, University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 4 (1,359,792)
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bargaining power, Buyer-Supplier Contracts, hold-up, Relational Contracts

30.

Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

Downloads 65 (733,182)
Citation 2

Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CESifo Working Paper No. 7680
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 25 Jul 2019
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH, University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 63 (758,701)
Citation 2

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relational contracts, hold-up, buyer-supplier contracts, bargaining power

Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13750
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 30 May 2019
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH, University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 2 (1,371,305)
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bargaining power, Buyer-Supplier Contracts, hold-up, Relational Contracts

31.

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? this Paper Replaces Te/2003/464

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE510
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 46 (875,227)

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32.

Trust and Complexity in Vertical Relationships

CESifo Working Paper No. 11170
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 26 Jun 2024
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH, University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 32 (1,000,146)

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relational contracts, complexity, bargaining power, trust, high-tech industries

33.

How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 31 Jul 2001
Francesca Cornelli and Leonardo Felli
London Business School and University of Cambridge
Downloads 28 (1,044,760)
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Bankruptcy, auctions, transfer of control, private benefits

34.

Preventing Collusion Through Discretion

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8302
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 28 Mar 2011
Leonardo Felli and Rafael Hortala-Vallve
University of Cambridge and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government
Downloads 4 (1,303,379)
Citation 1
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Collusion, Communication, Delegation, Hierarchies

35.

Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12267
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 11 Sep 2017
Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad O. Stahl
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), University of Cambridge, ARC Econ GmbH, University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
Downloads 3 (1,307,772)
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Competition, Hold-up Problem, Innovation, Management Practices, Procurement, Relational Contracts, Specific Investment, Supply Chains, Trust

36.

Costly Pretrial Agreements

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13074
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 31 Jul 2018
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Giovanni Immordino
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge and CSEF - University of Naples Federico II
Downloads 2 (1,312,634)
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Costly Negotiations, Court Litigation, Pretrial Agreements

37.

Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy

Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, Working Paper No. 018-98
Posted: 19 Aug 1998
Francesca Cornelli and Leonardo Felli
London Business School and University of Cambridge

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38.

Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 104, No. 4, August 1996
Posted: 21 May 1998
Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris
University of Cambridge and University of Cambridge - Department of Applied Economics

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39.

'Friendships' in Vertical Relations

Posted: 06 Nov 1996
Leonardo Felli and J. Miguel Villas-Boas
University of Cambridge and University of California, Berkeley

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