Luca Anderlini

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Professor

Washington, DC 20057

United States

http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/la2/

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

21

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3,038

SSRN CITATIONS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 6,051

in Total Papers Citations

50

CROSSREF CITATIONS

151

Scholarly Papers (21)

1.

Costly Contingent Contracts

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 13 Nov 1996
Leonardo Felli and Luca Anderlini
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 439 (72,715)

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2.

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (Second Version)

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C02-4, PIER Working Paper No. 06-001 , Univ. of Pennsylvania, Institue for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-15, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Acces, September 2006
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 23 Jun 2006
Leonardo Felli, Luca Anderlini and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 360 (91,718)
Citation 1

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courts of law, unforeseen contingencies, precedents, incentives, insurance

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

CESifo Working Paper No. 1847, PIER Working Paper No. 03-026, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 03-30
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 11 Nov 2003
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 291 (115,383)
Citation 7

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optimal courts, informational externalities, ex-ante welfare

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

PIER Working Paper No. 09-004
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 26 Jan 2009
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 40 (476,584)
Citation 4

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Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-Ante Welfare

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 11 Feb 2004
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 24 (565,257)
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Optimal courts, informational externalities, parties' ex-ante welfare

4.
Downloads 347 ( 95,640)
Citation 10

Statute Law or Case Law?

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 22 Jul 2008 Last Revised: 22 Sep 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 158 (207,201)
Citation 12

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Statute Law or Case Law?

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2358
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 30 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 130 (243,032)

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statute law, case law, flexibility, rigidity, time-inconsistency, precedents

Statute Law or Case Law?

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE528
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 13 May 2009
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 58 (404,836)

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Statute Law or Case Law?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6912
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 20 Aug 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 1 (750,114)
Citation 1
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Case Law, Flexibility, Incomplete Laws, Precedents, Rigidity, Statute Law, Time-Inconsistency

5.
Downloads 198 (169,713)
Citation 11

Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 213
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 02 Nov 1999
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 177 (187,699)
Citation 1

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Optional bargaining costs, inefficient bargaining outcomes, renegotiation, imperfect recall

Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE361
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 21 (586,006)

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6.

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1601
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 29 Jan 2007
Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 168 (196,436)

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Social memory, Private communication, Dynastic games, Physical evidence

7.

Communication and Learning

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1639, Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 37
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Feb 2008 Last Revised: 20 Mar 2008
Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 147 (219,676)

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Communication, Learning, Dynamic strategic information transmission

8.
Downloads 143 (224,620)
Citation 6

Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3489
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 15 Jun 2011
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 141 (227,711)
Citation 1

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legal system, commitment, flexibility, innovation, growth

Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8433
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 16 Jun 2011
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 1 (750,114)
Citation 1
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Commitment, Flexibility, Growth, Innovation, Legal System

Legal Institutions, Innovation, and Growth

International Economic Review, Vol. 54, Issue 3, pp. 937-956, 2013
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 18 Jul 2013
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 1 (750,114)
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9.

Undescribable Events

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 28 Jan 2004
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 132 (239,348)
Citation 1

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undescribable events, incomplete contracts, finite invariance, fine variability.

10.

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 06-024, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-24
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 20 Oct 2006
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 124 (251,015)
Citation 2

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Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-Ante Welfare

11.
Downloads 101 (290,407)
Citation 10

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

PIER Working Paper No. 06-025, CESifo Working Paper No. 1852
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 20 Oct 2006
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 75 (352,554)
Citation 10

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Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-ante Welfare, Informed Principal, Menu Contracts

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE511
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 26 (551,794)

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12.
Downloads 77 (343,576)
Citation 7

Why Stare Decisis?

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 28 May 2010
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 72 (360,967)
Citation 3

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C79, D74, D89, K40, L14.

Why Stare Decisis?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8266
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 14 Mar 2011
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie
Downloads 5 (707,360)
Citation 1
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Case Law, Precedents, Stare Decisis, Time-Inconsistency

13.

Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE407
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 76 (346,189)

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Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE409
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 56 (411,992)

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Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem

Economic Journal, Vol. 116, No. 508, pp. 223-245, January 2006
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 08 May 2006
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 12 (652,416)
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15.
Downloads 68 (368,132)

Unforeseen Contingencies

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE431
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 40 (476,584)

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Unforeseen Contingencies

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 18 Apr 2002
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 28 (539,177)
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Unforeseen contingencies, incomplete contracts, finite invariance, fine variability

16.

The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games

Number of pages: 78 Posted: 24 Nov 2004
Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 63 (383,028)

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Dynastic Repeated Games, Private Communication, Folk Theorem

17.

Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups'

Georgetown University, Economics Working Paper No. 01-03
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 28 Jul 2001
Luca Anderlini and Roger Lagunoff
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (395,623)
Citation 4

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Dynastic Repeated Games, Communication, Whitewashing, Coverups

18.
Downloads 50 (426,845)
Citation 11

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE447
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 33 (510,828)

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Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 14 Jun 2001
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 17 (614,701)
Citation 1
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Optimal courts, unforeseen contingencies, risk, incentives

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 3, pp. 662-684, 2007
Posted: 23 Jun 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

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19.

Costly Coasian Contracts

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE362
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Georgetown University - Department of Economics and University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Downloads 46 (441,937)

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20.

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? this Paper Replaces Te/2003/464

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE510
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 16 Jul 2008
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 17 (593,304)

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21.

Costly Pretrial Agreements

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13074
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 31 Jul 2018
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Giovanni Immordino
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)
Downloads 0 (733,773)
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Costly Negotiations, Court Litigation, Pretrial Agreements