Jack Robles

Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

P.O. Box 600

Wellington 6001

New Zealand

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

12

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Scholarly Papers (12)

Issue Linking in Trade Negotiations: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain

The Review of International Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 195-204, 2005
Posted: 27 Jan 2010
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management, University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics and Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Trade negotiations, Firms, Activist groups, Investment, Environment, Labour, Human rights, Comparative interest, Ricardian

2.

Product Innovation and Parallel Trade

Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Innovation, Trade, incentives, Parallel trade, Transportation costs, Substitutes

3.

Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 39, pp. 28-53, 2002
Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Tore Ellingsen and Jack Robles
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Evolution, Hold-Up problem, Agent, Investment, Contract, Barganing, Nash demand, Ultimatum game

4.

Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games

Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 34, pp. 312-330, 2001
Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Evolution, Finite repetition, Coordination Games, Path beliefs, Repetition, Efficiency

5.

Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 79, 1998
Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Evolution, Long run equilibria, Mutation rates, Ergodic, Population size

6.

Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 75, 1997
Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Evolution, Dynamic, Class coordination games, Population, Strategy profile, Long run equilibria

7.

Order Independence of Conditional Dominance

Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Order Independence, Conditional Dominace, Iterated deletion, Strategies, Games

8.

Evolution, Bargaining, and Time Preferences

Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Time preference, Evolution, Barganining, Nash Bargaining Solution, Agents, Discount factor

9.

Investment and Stochastically Stable Division

Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Investment, Stable division, Contracting, Surplus sharing, Transfer

10.

Demand Growth and Strategically Useful Idle Capacity

Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Demand Growth, Idle Capacity, Firm, Entrant, Cournot, Strategy

11.

Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games

Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Stability, Repeated games, Finite repetition, Games, Folk Theorem, Nash equilibria, Pareto efficiency

12.

Paternal Altruism or Smart Parent Altruism?

Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Jack Robles
Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

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Altruism, Paternalism, Efficiency, Utility, Beneficiary, Money, Consumption, Strategic behaviour