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Giuseppe De Feo

University of Strathclyde, Glasgow - Strathclyde Business School - Department of Economics

Lecturer

Sir William Duncan Building

130 Rottenrow

Glasgow, G4 0GE

United Kingdom

http://www.strath.ac.uk/economics/staff/defeogiuseppedr/

University of Pavia - Department of Political Economy and Quantitative Methods

27100 Pavia

Italy

  • University of Strathclyde, Glasgow - Strathclyde Business School - Department of Economics

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    • Tel: +44 (0)141 548 4075

  • University of Pavia - Department of Political Economy and Quantitative Methods

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

7

DOWNLOADS

617

CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (7)

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1.

Mafia in the Ballot Box

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 09 Nov 2013 Last Revised: 04 Apr 2014
Giuseppe De Feo and Giacomo De Luca
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow - Strathclyde Business School - Department of Economics and University of York - Department of Economics and Related Studies
Downloads 281 (69,610)

Abstract:

electoral competition, mafia, Cosa Nostra, electoral fraud

2.

Efficiency of Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2005/54
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 30 Jun 2006
Giuseppe De Feo and Jean Hindriks
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow - Strathclyde Business School - Department of Economics and University of London - School of Economics and Finance
Downloads 178 (134,920)

Abstract:

monopoly, competition, non-expected utility, insurance, adverse selection

3.

Competition for FDI and Profit Shifting: On the Effects of Subsidies and Tax Breaks

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 11 Nov 2013
Oscar Amerighi and Giuseppe De Feo
ENEA - Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development and University of Strathclyde, Glasgow - Strathclyde Business School - Department of Economics
Downloads 26 (362,737)

Abstract:

Policy competition for FDI, Profit shifting, Tax discrimination

4.

Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and the Shadow Cost of Public Funds

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2008/19
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 24 Nov 2013
Carlo Capuano and Giuseppe De Feo
University of Naples Federico II - Dipartimento di Teoria e Storia dell' Economia Pubblica and University of Strathclyde, Glasgow - Strathclyde Business School - Department of Economics
Downloads 13 (439,073)
Citation 1

Abstract:

mixed oligopoly, privatization, endogenous timing, distortionary taxes

5.

Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly

University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods - Quaderni di Dipartimento No. 162
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 24 Nov 2013
Rabah Amir and Giuseppe De Feo
University of Arizona - Department of Economics and University of Strathclyde, Glasgow - Strathclyde Business School - Department of Economics
Downloads 6 (480,781)

Abstract:

Mixed markets, endogenous timing, Cournot equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium, privatization

6.

Emission Permits Trading and Downstream Strategic Market Interaction

The Manchester School, Vol. 81, Issue 5, pp. 780-802, 2013
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 14 Aug 2013
Giuseppe De Feo, Joana Resende and María Eugenia Sanin
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow - Strathclyde Business School - Department of Economics, Universidade do Porto and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris
Downloads 0 (565,950)
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Abstract:

7.

Privatization in Oligopoly: The Impact of the Shadow Cost of Public Funds

Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, Vol. 2, 2010
Posted: 31 Jul 2010
Carlo Capuano and Giuseppe De Feo
University of Naples Federico II - Dipartimento di Teoria e Storia dell' Economia Pubblica and University of Strathclyde, Glasgow - Strathclyde Business School - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization, Endogenous Timing, Distortionary Taxes

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