Yotam Gafni

Weizmann Institute of Science

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SCHOLARLY PAPERS

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Scholarly Papers (2)

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1.

Transaction Fee Mechanisms Robust to Welfare-Increasing Collusion

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 04 Mar 2025 Last Revised: 06 Mar 2025

Yotam Gafni and Aviv Yaish

Weizmann Institute of Science and Yale University

Downloads 33 (1,005,071)

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2.

From Monopoly to Competition: When Do Optimal Contests Prevail?

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 04 Mar 2024

Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin and Hongyi Ling

Peking University, Weizmann Institute of Science, University of Bath, Harvard University and affiliation not provided to SSRN

Downloads 33 (1,005,071)

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