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ride-sharing, dynamic pricing, matching markets, queueing networks
Matching markets, decentralized, market design, operational interventions, stochastic model, mean field limit, search frictions, equilibrium, dynamics, contraction
mean field equilibrium, dynamic auction markets, conjoint valuation
Multiarmed Bandits
Network Games, Technology Adoption, Social Learning, Word-of-Mouth, Network Diffusion, Dynamic Pricing, Referral Incentives
dark pools, welfare, adverse selection, competitive markets
Mobile apps, market design, search ranking
pay-for-performance, Medicare, mechanism design, contracts, principal-agent problem, information asymmetry, healthcare
information aggregation, smooth markets, cost functions
higher education; course consideration; decision-making; mixed methods
competition, game theory, contracting, services, congestion, pricing
Competition, game theory, congestion, contracting, pricing
signaling, matching, market design, experimentation
information platform, higher education, dashboard, randomized field experiment, GPA
Two-sided markets, market design for platforms, information design, quality selection, price discrimination
Stochastic Games, Market Structure, Stationary Equilibrium
Large-scale batteries, multi-service multi-user battery operation, grid congestion management, cloud electricity storage
reputation mechanisms, ratings, online markets
Peer-to-peer systems, Markov chains, Economics
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