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Price, concentration, common ownership, partial ownership, mergers
Common Ownership, Antitrust, Mergers, Partial Acquisitions, Corporate Governance
Online privacy, merger analysis
Nash Bargaining, Nash-in-Nash, Shapley Value, Myerson Value
Bidding, Auction, Merger, Concentration
Mechanism Design, Joint Venture, Team Production
Auctions, antitrust
auctions, compeititve bidding, mergers
merger effect, antitrust policy, bidding markets
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bundling, contracts, rollover, switching costs, telecommunications, telephone
