Gabriel Y. Weintraub

Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

Stanford, CA 94305

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

20

DOWNLOADS
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Top 14,431

in Total Papers Downloads

3,455

SSRN CITATIONS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 3,549

in Total Papers Citations

79

CROSSREF CITATIONS

233

Scholarly Papers (20)

1.

Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design

NET Institute Working Paper No. 12-11, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 12/55
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 21 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 22 Jun 2014
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 880 (27,169)
Citation 14

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auction design, revenue management, ad exchange, display advertising, internet, budget constraints, dynamic games, mean field, fluid approximation

2.

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 16-10
Number of pages: 89 Posted: 22 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 02 Nov 2018
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 424 (70,737)
Citation 2

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dynamic mechanism design, limited commitment, budget constraints, fluid approximation, display advertising, internet auctions, revenue management

3.

Investment in Two Sided Markets and the Net Neutrality Debate

Columbia Business School DRO (Decision, Risk and Operations) Working Paper No. 2010-05
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 18 Jul 2010 Last Revised: 21 Apr 2013
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Facebook and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 410 (73,723)
Citation 12

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Two Sided Markets, Net Neutrality, Investments

4.

Framework Agreements in Procurement: An Auction Model and Design Recommendations

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 19 (4), 586-603, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 13-24
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 27 Apr 2013 Last Revised: 24 Nov 2017
Yonatan Gur, Lijian Lu and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Columbia University - Columbia Business School and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 279 (113,502)
Citation 6

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Framework agreement, procurement, Auction, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, mechanism design

5.
Downloads 196 (160,865)
Citation 5

Computational Methods for Oblivious Equilibrium

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1969
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 28 Jun 2007
C. Lanier Benkard, Gabriel Y. Weintraub and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 99 (279,035)

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Computational Methods for Oblivious Equilibrium

Operations Research, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 1247-1265, July-August 2010
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 20 Oct 2011
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 97 (282,804)

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Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 24 Jan 2007 Last Revised: 06 Sep 2011
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Ramesh Johari and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford University and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 122 (240,006)
Citation 10

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Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion

Operations Research, Vol. 58, No. 5, pp. 1303-1317, September-October 2010
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 20 Oct 2011
Ramesh Johari, Gabriel Y. Weintraub and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 38 (458,775)

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Downloads 151 (201,994)
Citation 2

Competition and Contracting in Service Industries

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 26 Jan 2008 Last Revised: 06 Sep 2011
Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford University and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 132 (225,930)
Citation 1

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competition, game theory, contracting, services, congestion, pricing

Competition and Contracting in Service Industries

Operations Research Letters, Vol. 39, pp. 390-396, 2011, Columbia Business School Research Paper
Number of pages: 7 Posted: 09 Nov 2011
Dominic DiPalantino, Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
affiliation not provided to SSRN, Stanford University and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 19 (567,003)

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The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-29
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 22 Feb 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 89 (299,030)
Citation 3

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Sequential Screening, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, Static Contract, Dynamic Contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-64
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 13 Jun 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 24 (533,896)
Citation 5

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Sequential Screening, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, Static Contract, Dynamic Contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R3
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 19 Jul 2019 Last Revised: 12 Nov 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 22 (546,965)

Abstract:

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Sequential screening, Ex-post participation constraints, Static contract, Sequential contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R2, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-55
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 29 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 14 (601,423)
Citation 5

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Sequential screening, Ex-post participation constraints, Static contract, Sequential contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13018
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 03 Jul 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 0
Citation 2
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ex-post participation constraints, sequential contract., Sequential Screening, static contract

Combinatorial Auctions for Procurement: An Empirical Study of the Chilean School Meals Auction

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 28 Jul 2010 Last Revised: 14 Aug 2011
Marcelo Olivares, Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Rafael Epstein and Daniel Yung
Columbia University - Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, University of Chile - Engineering Department and University of Chile - Engineering Department
Downloads 114 (252,458)
Citation 1

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combinatorial auctions, procurement, auction design, supply chain management, empirical, public sector applications

Combinatorial Auctions for Procurement: An Empirical Study of the Chilean School Meals Auction

Management Science, Forthcoming, Columbia Business School Research Paper
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 10 Nov 2011
Marcelo Olivares, Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Rafael Epstein and Daniel Yung
Columbia University - Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, University of Chile - Engineering Department and University of Chile - Engineering Department
Downloads 23 (540,373)
Citation 2

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combinatorial auctions, procurement, auction design, supply chain management, empirical, public sector applications

10.
Downloads 136 (219,944)
Citation 39

Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 16 Dec 2005
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 86 (305,738)
Citation 17

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economic theory, microeconomics

Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms

NBER Working Paper No. w11900
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 05 Feb 2006 Last Revised: 09 Jul 2010
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 36 (467,877)

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Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms

Econometrica, Vol. 76, No. 6, pp. 1375-1411, November 2008
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 Oct 2011
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 14 (601,423)
Citation 2

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11.

Competition in Prices and Service Level Guarantees

NET Institute Working Paper No. 07-21
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 15 Oct 2007
Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford University and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 131 (226,546)

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Competition, game theory, congestion, contracting, pricing

12.

Measuring the Performance of Large-Scale Combinatorial Auctions: A Structural Estimation Approach

Management Science 60(5):1180-1201
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 03 May 2012 Last Revised: 08 Oct 2016
Sang Won Kim, Marcelo Olivares and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
CUHK Business School - The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Columbia University - Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 103 (269,758)
Citation 4

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Combinatorial auctions, Procurement, Structural estimation, Econometrics, Public sector applications

13.

A Framework for Dynamic Oligopoly in Concentrated Industries

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 12/47
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 01 Sep 2012
Bar Ifrach and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Uber Technologies Inc. - Uber Freight and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 84 (307,560)
Citation 7

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14.

Equilibria of Dynamic Games with Many Players: Existence, Approximation, and Market Structure

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 13 Apr 2011 Last Revised: 19 Dec 2011
Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
California Institute of Technology, Stanford University and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 61 (367,224)
Citation 9

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Stochastic Games, Market Structure, Stationary Equilibrium

15.

Mean Field Equilibrium: Uniqueness, Existence, and Comparative Statics

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 19-1, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 19-3
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 13 Nov 2018 Last Revised: 31 Oct 2019
Bar Light and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford University, Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 48 (409,794)
Citation 2

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Industry Dynamics: Foundations for Models with an Infinite Number of Firms

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 146, p. 1965, 2011, Columbia Business School Research Paper
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 09 Nov 2011
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 21 (553,513)
Citation 1

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Industry Dynamics: Foundations for Models with an Infinite Number of Firms

NBER Working Paper No. w16286
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 Aug 2010 Last Revised: 25 Aug 2010
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, affiliation not provided to SSRN and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 14 (601,423)

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17.

Procurement Mechanisms for Assortments of Differentiated Products

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 3453144
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 20 Sep 2019
Daniela Saban and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 30 (485,124)

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procurement, mechanism design, auctions, assortments, market design

18.

Third-degree Price Discrimination versus Uniform Pricing

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2213
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 16 Dec 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 24 (529,506)

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First Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Uniform Price, Approximation, Concave Demand Function, Market Segmentation

19.

Oblivious Equilibrium for Concentrated Industries

NBER Working Paper No. w19307
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 10 Aug 2013 Last Revised: 08 Oct 2014
C. Lanier Benkard, Przemyslaw Jeziorski and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 10 (604,922)

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20.

Uniform Pricing Versus Third-Degree Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2213R
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 19 Feb 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 7 (624,951)

Abstract:

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First Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Uniform Price, Approximation, Concave Demand Function, Market Segmentation