Gabriel Y. Weintraub

Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

Stanford, CA 94305

United States

Columbia University - Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations

New York, NY

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

17

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44

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Scholarly Papers (17)

1.

Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design

NET Institute Working Paper No. 12-11, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 12/55
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 21 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 22 Jun 2014
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 861 (26,311)

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auction design, revenue management, ad exchange, display advertising, internet, budget constraints, dynamic games, mean field, fluid approximation

2.

Investment in Two Sided Markets and the Net Neutrality Debate

Columbia Business School DRO (Decision, Risk and Operations) Working Paper No. 2010-05
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 18 Jul 2010 Last Revised: 21 Apr 2013
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Facebook and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 402 (70,990)

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Two Sided Markets, Net Neutrality, Investments

3.

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 16-10
Number of pages: 89 Posted: 22 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 02 Nov 2018
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 395 (72,436)

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dynamic mechanism design, limited commitment, budget constraints, fluid approximation, display advertising, internet auctions, revenue management

4.

Framework Agreements in Procurement: An Auction Model and Design Recommendations

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 19 (4), 586-603, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 13-24
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 27 Apr 2013 Last Revised: 24 Nov 2017
Yonatan Gur, Lijian Lu and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Columbia University - Columbia Business School and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 278 (107,395)

Abstract:

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Framework agreement, procurement, Auction, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, mechanism design

5.
Downloads 181 (163,323)

Computational Methods for Oblivious Equilibrium

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1969
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 28 Jun 2007
C. Lanier Benkard, Gabriel Y. Weintraub and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 94 (273,158)

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Computational Methods for Oblivious Equilibrium

Operations Research, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 1247-1265, July-August 2010
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 20 Oct 2011
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 87 (287,174)

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Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 24 Jan 2007 Last Revised: 06 Sep 2011
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Ramesh Johari and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford University and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 120 (229,958)

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Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion

Operations Research, Vol. 58, No. 5, pp. 1303-1317, September-October 2010
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 20 Oct 2011
Ramesh Johari, Gabriel Y. Weintraub and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 34 (451,240)

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Downloads 149 (193,087)

Competition and Contracting in Service Industries

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 26 Jan 2008 Last Revised: 06 Sep 2011
Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford University and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 131 (214,936)

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competition, game theory, contracting, services, congestion, pricing

Competition and Contracting in Service Industries

Operations Research Letters, Vol. 39, pp. 390-396, 2011, Columbia Business School Research Paper
Number of pages: 7 Posted: 09 Nov 2011
Dominic DiPalantino, Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
affiliation not provided to SSRN, Stanford University and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 18 (542,058)

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Combinatorial Auctions for Procurement: An Empirical Study of the Chilean School Meals Auction

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 28 Jul 2010 Last Revised: 14 Aug 2011
Marcelo Olivares, Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Rafael Epstein and Daniel Yung
Columbia University - Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, University of Chile - Engineering Department and University of Chile - Engineering Department
Downloads 114 (238,963)

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combinatorial auctions, procurement, auction design, supply chain management, empirical, public sector applications

Combinatorial Auctions for Procurement: An Empirical Study of the Chilean School Meals Auction

Management Science, Forthcoming, Columbia Business School Research Paper
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 10 Nov 2011
Marcelo Olivares, Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Rafael Epstein and Daniel Yung
Columbia University - Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, University of Chile - Engineering Department and University of Chile - Engineering Department
Downloads 23 (510,468)

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combinatorial auctions, procurement, auction design, supply chain management, empirical, public sector applications

9.
Downloads 132 (212,930)

Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 16 Dec 2005
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 84 (293,666)

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economic theory, microeconomics

Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms

NBER Working Paper No. w11900
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 05 Feb 2006 Last Revised: 09 Jul 2010
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 35 (446,833)

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Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms

Econometrica, Vol. 76, No. 6, pp. 1375-1411, November 2008
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 Oct 2011
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 13 (574,432)

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10.

Competition in Prices and Service Level Guarantees

NET Institute Working Paper No. 07-21
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 15 Oct 2007
Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford University and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 129 (216,763)

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Competition, game theory, congestion, contracting, pricing

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-29
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 22 Feb 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 82 (297,978)

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Sequential Screening, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, Static Contract, Dynamic Contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-64
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 13 Jun 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 20 (529,295)

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Sequential Screening, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, Static Contract, Dynamic Contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R2, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-55
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 29 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 11 (587,643)

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Sequential screening, Ex-post participation constraints, Static contract, Sequential contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13018
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 03 Jul 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
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ex-post participation constraints, sequential contract., Sequential Screening, static contract

12.

Measuring the Performance of Large-Scale Combinatorial Auctions: A Structural Estimation Approach

Management Science 60(5):1180-1201
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 03 May 2012 Last Revised: 08 Oct 2016
Sang Won Kim, Marcelo Olivares and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
CUHK Business School - The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Columbia University - Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 99 (262,250)

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Combinatorial auctions, Procurement, Structural estimation, Econometrics, Public sector applications

13.

A Framework for Dynamic Oligopoly in Concentrated Industries

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 12/47
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 01 Sep 2012
Bar Ifrach and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Uber Technologies Inc. - Uber Freight and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 82 (295,271)

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14.

Equilibria of Dynamic Games with Many Players: Existence, Approximation, and Market Structure

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 13 Apr 2011 Last Revised: 19 Dec 2011
Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
California Institute of Technology, Stanford University and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 59 (353,141)

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Stochastic Games, Market Structure, Stationary Equilibrium

Industry Dynamics: Foundations for Models with an Infinite Number of Firms

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 146, p. 1965, 2011, Columbia Business School Research Paper
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 09 Nov 2011
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 20 (529,295)

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Industry Dynamics: Foundations for Models with an Infinite Number of Firms

NBER Working Paper No. w16286
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 Aug 2010 Last Revised: 25 Aug 2010
Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard and Benjamin Van Roy
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, affiliation not provided to SSRN and Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering
Downloads 14 (567,884)

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16.

Mean Field Equilibrium: Uniqueness, Existence, and Comparative Statics

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 19-1, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 19-3
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 13 Nov 2018
Bar Light and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford University, Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 28 (468,328)

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17.

Oblivious Equilibrium for Concentrated Industries

NBER Working Paper No. w19307
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 10 Aug 2013 Last Revised: 08 Oct 2014
C. Lanier Benkard, Przemyslaw Jeziorski and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 9 (576,449)

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