Colette Friedrich

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

100 Main Street

E62-416

Cambridge, MA 02142

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

DOWNLOADS

381

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 43,547

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 43,547

in Total Papers Citations

4

CROSSREF CITATIONS

12

Scholarly Papers (3)

1.
Downloads 166 (248,119)
Citation 6

Gender Sorting at the Application Interface

Industrial Relations, Forthcoming, MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4781-10
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 09 Jun 2010 Last Revised: 25 Jun 2014
Roberto M. Fernandez and Colette Friedrich
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 163 (252,443)

Abstract:

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Labor markets, labor supply, race, gender, hiring process

Gender Sorting at the Application Interface

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 50, Issue 4, pp. 591-609, 2011
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 29 Sep 2011
Roberto M. Fernandez and Colette Friedrich
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 3 (897,702)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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2.

Incentive Design and Trust: Comparing the Effects of Tournament and Team-Based Incentives on Trust

IZA Working Paper No. 3424
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 23 May 2008
Robert J. Oxoby and Colette Friedrich
University of Calgary - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 122 (315,963)

Abstract:

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trust, incentives, experiments, tournaments

3.

Fair Wages and Multiple Fairness Standards - A Lab Study of Co-Employment of Hired and Rented Hands

Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 59, January 2007
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 13 Jul 2007
Dorothea Alewell, Colette Friedrich and Werner Güth
Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Downloads 93 (379,041)

Abstract:

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Fairness, Principal-agent Problem, Temporary Agency Work, Wage Discrimination