Philip Reny

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

1126 East 59th Street

Chicago, IL 60637

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

11

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CITATIONS
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8

Scholarly Papers (11)

1.

Tax Incidence Under Imperfect Competition

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 29 Jun 2011
University of Chicago - Department of Economics, University of Southern California Law School and Competition Economics LLC
Downloads 265 (94,065)

Abstract:

Tax Incidence, Market Power, Conjectural Variations, Conduct Parameter

2.

Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 15 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 08 Jun 2014
New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, American University - Washington College of Law, The Brattle Group, University of Maryland, Baltimore County - Department of Public Policy, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford University, Columbia University, University of Maryland - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder - College of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, University of Michigan, Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Zurich, University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business, Harvard University - Technology & Operations Management Unit, University of Oxford, Smith School, Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, affiliation not provided to SSRN, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group, University of North Texas, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, Clemson University, University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration, Public Utility Research Center, Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics, National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) (Deceased), Independent, Penn State University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL), Technology Policy Institute, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST), Georgetown University - Department of Strategy/Economics/Ethics/Public Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA), Stanford University, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford University, California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics, Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Georgetown University, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business, Chapman University - Economic Science Institute, University of Maryland - Department of Economics, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management, Technology Policy Institute, Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS), University of Nevada, Las Vegas - College of Business - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics, Charles River Associates (CRA) and Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Downloads 252 (88,355)
Citation 1

Abstract:

3.

The Role of Excess Capacity in Determining Market Power in Natural Gas Transportation Markets

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 23 Sep 2004
R. Preston McAfee and Philip Reny
Yahoo! Research Labs and University of Chicago - Department of Economics
Downloads 224 (109,140)
Citation 2

Abstract:

4.

On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games

Milton Friedman Institute Working Paper No. 2009-09
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 08 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 23 Feb 2012
Philip Reny
University of Chicago - Department of Economics
Downloads 65 (277,284)
Citation 4

Abstract:

5.

Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization

Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2011-013
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 23 Dec 2011
Sergiu Hart and Philip Reny
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality and University of Chicago - Department of Economics
Downloads 53 (305,350)

Abstract:

6.

A Characterization of Rationalizable Consumer Behavior

Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2014-04
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 07 Mar 2014
Philip Reny
University of Chicago - Department of Economics
Downloads 47 (313,165)

Abstract:

7.

Strategic Approximations of Discontinuous Games

MFI Working Paper No. 2009-10
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 08 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 14 Jan 2010
Philip Reny
University of Chicago - Department of Economics
Downloads 32 (378,985)
Citation 1

Abstract:

discontinuous games, finite approximation

8.

A Simple Proof of the Nonconcavifiability of Functions with Linear Not-All-Parallel Contour Sets

MFI Working Paper No. 2011-001
Number of pages: 6 Posted: 07 Jan 2011
Philip Reny
University of Chicago - Department of Economics
Downloads 28 (375,293)

Abstract:

9.

Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games

Posted: 05 Sep 2013
Philip Reny
University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Abstract:

discontinuous games, Nash equilibrium, pure strategies, ordinal

10.

Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems

MFI Working Paper No. 2011-002, Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2011-002
Posted: 29 Jan 2011 Last Revised: 10 Jul 2012
Ohad Kadan, Philip Reny and Jeroen Swinkels
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and Northwestern University

Abstract:

11.

An Efficient Auction

Econometrica, Vol. 70, Pp. 1199-1212, 2002
Posted: 10 Sep 2002
Motty Perry and Philip Reny
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality and University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Abstract: