François Salanié

National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)

21, Allee de Brienne

31000 Toulouse

France

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Place Anatole-France

Toulouse Cedex, F-31042

France

  • National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)

  • University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

11

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11

Scholarly Papers (11)

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1.

A Theory of Fraud and Over-Consumption in Experts Markets

Boston College Economics Department Working Paper No. 495
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 20 Jul 2002
Ingela Alger and François Salanié
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 313 (166,961)

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Experts, fraud, over-consumption

2.

Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons

CEIS Working Paper No. 159
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 18 Dec 2009
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 127 (378,384)
Citation 23

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Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Non-Exclusivity

3.

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

Downloads 116 (407,226)
Citation 6

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

CEIS Working Paper No. 314
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Apr 2014
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 116 (409,216)
Citation 1

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Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Limit-Order Book.

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10850
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 29 Sep 2015
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Citation 2
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adverse selection, competing mechanisms, limit-order book

4.

Non-Exclusive Competition Under Adverse Selection

CEIS Working Paper No. 192
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 11 Apr 2011
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 114 (409,833)
Citation 14

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Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Non-Exclusivity

5.

Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment

CEIS Working Paper No. 403
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 03 May 2017
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 104 (437,815)

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Adverse Selection, Entry Proofness, Market Breakdown, Nonexclusivity

6.

The Social Costs of Side Trading

Downloads 63 (589,383)
Citation 2

The Social Costs of Side Trading

CEIS Working Paper No. 463
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 10 Jul 2019
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 63 (598,828)
Citation 1

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Adverse Selection, Side Trading, Second-Best Allocations

The Social Costs of Side Trading

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13872
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 02 Aug 2019
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Adverse Selection, Second-Best Allocations, Side Trading

7.

Advantageous Selection Without Moral Hazard (with an Application to Life Care Annuities)

Downloads 39 (726,458)

Advantageous Selection Without Moral Hazard (with an Application to Life Care Annuities)

CESifo Working Paper No. 9764
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 31 May 2022
Philippe De Donder, M.‐L. Leroux and François Salanié
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 28 (833,823)

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propitious selection, positive or negative correlation property, contract bundling, long-term care insurance, annuity

Advantageous Selection Without Moral Hazard (with an Application to Life Care Annuities)

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 06 Mar 2023
Philippe De Donder, Marie-Louise Leroux and François Salanié
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), University of Québec at Montréal and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 11 (1,004,296)

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Propitious selection, positive or negative correlation property, contract bundling, long term care insurance, annuity Sélection propice, propriété de corrélation positive ou négative, regroupement de contrats, assurance soins de longue durée, rente

8.

Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 11 Dec 2001
Bruno Jullien, Bernard Salanie and François Salanié
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 30 (793,505)
Citation 3
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Contracts, insurance

9.

Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16531
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 22 Sep 2021
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Adverse Selection, Insurance Markets, Multiple Contracting, Regulation

10.

Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11631
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 14 Nov 2016
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Adverse Selection, Insurance Markets, Multiple Contracting

11.

Implicit Collusion on Wide Spreads

Posted: 26 Apr 1998
Bruno Biais, Thierry Foucault and François Salanié
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), HEC Paris - Finance Department and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)

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