François Salanié

National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)

21, Allee de Brienne

31000 Toulouse

France

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Place Anatole-France

Toulouse Cedex, F-31042

France

  • National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)

  • University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

12

DOWNLOADS

769

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 19,668

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 19,668

in Total Papers Citations

29

CROSSREF CITATIONS

23

Scholarly Papers (12)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

A Theory of Fraud and Over-Consumption in Experts Markets

Boston College Economics Department Working Paper No. 495
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 20 Jul 2002
Ingela Alger and François Salanié
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 284 (149,357)

Abstract:

Loading...

Experts, fraud, over-consumption

2.

Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons

CEIS Working Paper No. 159
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 18 Dec 2009
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 107 (343,155)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Non-Exclusivity

3.

Non-Exclusive Competition Under Adverse Selection

CEIS Working Paper No. 192
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 11 Apr 2011
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 98 (363,695)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Non-Exclusivity

4.

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

Downloads 95 (370,739)
Citation 4

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

CEIS Working Paper No. 314
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Apr 2014
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 95 (373,725)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Limit-Order Book.

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10850
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 29 Sep 2015
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 0
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

adverse selection, competing mechanisms, limit-order book

5.

Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment

CEIS Working Paper No. 403
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 03 May 2017
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 76 (423,554)

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse Selection, Entry Proofness, Market Breakdown, Nonexclusivity

6.

The Social Costs of Side Trading

Downloads 51 (515,042)
Citation 1

The Social Costs of Side Trading

CEIS Working Paper No. 463
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 10 Jul 2019
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 51 (524,121)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse Selection, Side Trading, Second-Best Allocations

The Social Costs of Side Trading

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13872
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 02 Aug 2019
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse Selection, Second-Best Allocations, Side Trading

7.

Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 11 Dec 2001
Bruno Jullien, Bernard Salanie and François Salanié
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 30 (623,371)
Citation 3
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Contracts, insurance

8.

A Theory of Fraud and Overtreatment in Experts Markets

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 853-881, Winter 2006
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 26 Oct 2006
Ingela Alger and François Salanié
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 21 (686,307)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

9.

Advantageous Selection Without Moral Hazard (with an Application to Life Care Annuities)

CESifo Working Paper No. 9764
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 31 May 2022
Philippe De Donder, M.‐L. Leroux and François Salanié
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 7 (807,996)

Abstract:

Loading...

propitious selection, positive or negative correlation property, contract bundling, long-term care insurance, annuity

10.

Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16531
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 22 Sep 2021
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 0 (892,524)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse Selection, Insurance Markets, Multiple Contracting, Regulation

11.

Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11631
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 14 Nov 2016
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 0 (892,524)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse Selection, Insurance Markets, Multiple Contracting

12.

Implicit Collusion on Wide Spreads

Posted: 26 Apr 1998
Bruno Biais, Thierry Foucault and François Salanié
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), HEC Paris - Finance Department and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)

Abstract:

Loading...