Klaus M. Schmidt

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5

Munich, DE-81679

Germany

http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fellow

77 Bastwick Street

London, EC1V 3PZ

United Kingdom

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics

Professor

Ludwigstrasse 28

Munich, D-80539

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

35

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CITATIONS
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535

Scholarly Papers (35)

1.
Downloads 1,349 ( 10,890)
Citation 136

Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 217
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 18 Jun 2001
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 1,349 (10,675)
Citation 136

Abstract:

Convertible securities, venture capital, corporate finance, double moral hazard, incomplete contracts

Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance

Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, pp. 1139-1166, June 2003
Posted: 14 Sep 2003
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics

Abstract:

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 403; University of Zurich, IEER Working Paper No. 75
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 09 Feb 2001
Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 1,206 (12,790)
Citation 164

Abstract:

Behavioral Economics, Fairness, Reciprocity, Altruism, Experiments, Incentives, Contracts, Competition

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2703
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 26 Mar 2001
Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 81 (259,596)
Citation 164
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Abstract:

Altruism, behavioural economics, competition, contracts, experiments, fairness, incentives, reciprocity

Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 19 Nov 2012
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 569 (38,046)

Abstract:

theory of the firm, transaction cost economics, authority, power abuse, employment relation, fairness, reputation

Use and Abuse of Authority - A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4068
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 30 Jan 2013
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 43 (359,401)

Abstract:

theory of the firm, transaction cost economics, authority, power abuse, employment relation, fairness, reputation

Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7029
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 09 Dec 2012
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 14 (499,901)

Abstract:

theory of the firm, transaction cost economics, authority, power abuse, employment relation, fairness, reputation

Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9231
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 01 Feb 2013
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 6 (544,270)
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Abstract:

authority, employment relation, fairness, power abuse, reputation, theory of the firm, transaction cost economics

4.

Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1215
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 24 May 2004
Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 443 (46,127)
Citation 15

Abstract:

Moral hazard, incentives, bonus contract, fairness, inequity aversion

5.
Downloads 424 ( 55,939)
Citation 43

Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 445, Zurich IEER Working Paper No. 72
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 01 Mar 2001
Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 402 (59,150)
Citation 43

Abstract:

Incentive Contracts, Moral Hazard, Fairness, Reciprocity, Incomplete Contracts

Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2790
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 10 May 2001
Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 22 (453,268)
Citation 43
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Abstract:

Fairness, incentive contracts, incomplete contracts, moral hazard, reciprocity

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

Forthcoming in Management Science
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 21 Dec 2012 Last Revised: 03 Mar 2014
Klaus M. Schmidt, Martin Spann and Robert Zeithammer
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) and University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management
Downloads 293 (85,497)

Abstract:

customer-driven pricing mechanisms, pay what you want, revenue management, price discrimination, social preferences

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5069
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 02 Dec 2014
Klaus M. Schmidt, Martin Spann and Robert Zeithammer
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) and University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management
Downloads 88 (246,284)

Abstract:

customer-driven pricing mechanisms, pay what you want, price discrimination, revenue management, social preferences

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 18 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 10 Mar 2011
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 262 (96,662)
Citation 7

Abstract:

job design, high-performance work systems, screening, competition, work attitude, reputation, trust, control, complementarities

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

IZA Discussion Paper No. 4710
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 01 Feb 2010
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 104 (219,777)
Citation 7

Abstract:

job design, high-performance work systems, screening, reputation, competition, trust, control, social preferences, complementarities

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7658
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 08 Feb 2010
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 5 (549,373)
Citation 7
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Abstract:

competition, complementarities, control, high-performance work systems, job design, reputation, screening, social preferences, trust

Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 22 Aug 2002
Klaus M. Schmidt and Monika Schnitzer
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics and University of Munich - Department of Economics
Downloads 335 (73,453)
Citation 19

Abstract:

Software Market, Open Source, Public Goods, Innovation Incentives, Public Subsidies

Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3793
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 15 Apr 2003
Klaus M. Schmidt and Monika Schnitzer
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics and University of Munich - Department of Economics
Downloads 34 (393,471)
Citation 19
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Abstract:

Software market, open source, innovation incentives, public goods, public subsidies

9.

Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices

Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 20
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 20 Feb 2000
Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 342 (71,254)
Citation 42

Abstract:

Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1467; IEW Working Paper No. 224
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 27 Jan 2005
Ernst Fehr, Susanne Kremhelmer and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Munich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 303 (82,242)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Ownership rights, double moral hazard, fairness, reciprocity, incomplete contracts

Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5369
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 13 Feb 2006
Ernst Fehr, Susanne Kremhelmer and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Munich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 23 (447,523)
Citation 6
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Abstract:

Ownership rights, double moral hazard, fairness, reciprocity, incomplete contracts

Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

The Economic Journal, Vol. 118, No. 531, pp. 1262-1284, August 2008
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 15 Aug 2008
Ernst Fehr, Susanne Kremhelmer and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Munich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 3 (560,338)
Citation 6
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Abstract:

Licensing Complementary Patents and Vertical Integration

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 11 Nov 2006
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 262 (96,662)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Complementary patents, licensing, IP rights, vertical integration

Licensing Complementary Patents and Vertical Integration

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5987
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 01 Feb 2007
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 15 (493,946)
Citation 5
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Abstract:

Complementary patents, licensing, IP rights, vertical integration

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 24 May 2004
Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 253 (100,339)
Citation 30

Abstract:

Incentives, moral hazard, multiple tasks, fairness, experiments

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-agent Model

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 3, pp. 453-474, September 2004
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 08 Dec 2004
Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 19 (470,751)
Citation 30
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Abstract:

13.

Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 30 Jun 2006
Georg Gebhardt and Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Seminar for Theoretical Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 212 (112,179)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Corporate Finance, Venture Capital, Control Rights, Convertible Securities

14.

Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 16 Aug 2001
Martin F. Hellwig and Klaus M. Schmidt
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 205 (114,212)
Citation 18

Abstract:

Principal-agent problems, linear incentive schemes, intertemporal incentive provision, Brownian motion

15.

Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations

Forthcoming: Journal of the European Economic Association
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 03 Aug 2012 Last Revised: 18 Mar 2014
Björn Bartling and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 202 (111,218)
Citation 1

Abstract:

renegotiation, bargaining, reference points, contracts, competition

16.

The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel

Zurich IEER Working Paper No. 179
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Jul 2004
Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 201 (111,218)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Social Preferences, Inequity Aversion, Efficiency preferences

17.
Downloads 113 (205,948)
Citation 4

Complementary Patents and Market Structure

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 06 Oct 2008
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 101 (224,486)
Citation 4

Abstract:

IP rights, complementary patents, standards, licensing, patent pool, vertical integration

Complementary Patents and Market Structure

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7005
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 18 Dec 2008
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 12 (511,563)
Citation 4
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Abstract:

complementary patents, IP rights, licensing, patent pool, standards, vertical integration

18.
Downloads 90 (240,841)
Citation 4

Two Tales on Resale

MPI Collective Goods Preprint Paper No. 2007/16
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 17 Dec 2007
Felix Höffler and Klaus M. Schmidt
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 89 (244,439)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Resale regulation, wholesale, spatial product differentiation, non-spatial product

Two Tales on Resale

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6248
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 22 May 2008
Felix Höffler and Klaus M. Schmidt
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 1 (580,002)
Citation 4
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Abstract:

non-spatial product differentiation, resale regulation, spatial product differentiation, vertical restraints, wholesale

19.
Downloads 87 (246,090)
Citation 3

You Owe Me

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4007
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 05 Dec 2012
Ulrike Malmendier and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 72 (278,540)
Citation 3

Abstract:

gift exchange, externalities, lobbyism, corruption, reciprocity, social preferences

You Owe Me

NBER Working Paper No. w18543
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 20 Nov 2012
Ulrike Malmendier and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 12 (511,563)
Citation 3

Abstract:

You Owe Me

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9230
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 01 Feb 2013
Ulrike Malmendier and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 3 (560,338)
Citation 3
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Abstract:

corruption, externalities, gift exchange, lobbyism, reciprocity, social preferences

20.

Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 30 Jun 2012
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 85 (235,819)

Abstract:

high-performance work systems, wages, discretion, gift exchange, job satisfaction

21.

Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4031
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 03 Jan 2013
Fabian Herweg and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Bayreuth - Faculty of Law, Business and Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 71 (257,298)
Citation 2

Abstract:

renegotiation, incomplete contracts, reference points, employment contracts, behavioral contract theory

22.

Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 09 May 2015 Last Revised: 21 Jan 2017
Florentin Krämer, Klaus M. Schmidt, Martin Spann and Lucas Stich
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management)
Downloads 45 (195,697)

Abstract:

Customer-driven pricing mechanisms, Pay What You Want, Name Your Own Price, Competitive Strategies, Marketing, Laboratory Experiment

Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5268
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 09 Apr 2015
Fabian Herweg and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Bayreuth - Faculty of Law, Business and Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 36 (385,355)

Abstract:

auctions, negotiations, procurement, renegotiation, adaptation costs, loss aversion, behavioral contract theory

Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10284
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 08 Dec 2014
Fabian Herweg and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Bayreuth - Faculty of Law, Business and Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 0
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Abstract:

adaptation costs, auctions, behavioral contract theory, loss aversion, negotiations, procurement, renegotiations

24.

Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5758
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 17 Aug 2006
Klaus M. Schmidt and Georg Gebhardt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Seminar for Theoretical Economics
Downloads 28 (405,015)
Citation 2
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Abstract:

Corporate finance, venture capital, control rights, convertible securities

25.

The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 26 Jan 2009
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 27 (409,402)

Abstract:

Economic experiments, economic theories, falsification, confirmation, phenomena, models

26.

The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5368
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 13 Feb 2006
Ernst Fehr, Michael Naef and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics, University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 21 (444,252)
Citation 4
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Abstract:

Social preferences, inequity aversion, preferences for efficiency

27.

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4464
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 05 Aug 2004
Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 15 (475,501)
Citation 26
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Abstract:

Incentives, moral hazard, multiple tasks, fairness, experiments

28.

Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, Issue 3, pp. 489-511, 2017
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 30 Jun 2017
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 0 (565,950)
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Abstract:

Contract theory, incomplete contracts, Nobel prize, optimal incentive schemes

29.

Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10605
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 19 May 2015
Florentin Krämer, Klaus M. Schmidt, Martin Spann and Lucas Stich
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management)
Downloads 0 (565,950)
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Abstract:

competitive strategies, consumer-driven pricing mechanisms, name your own price, pay what you want

30.

On Inequity Aversion: A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

Posted: 10 Mar 2009
Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Zurich - Department of Economics and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics

Abstract:

Experiments, other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion

31.

The Economics of Covenants as a Means of Efficient Creditor Protection

European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), Vol. 7, 2006
Posted: 19 Feb 2007
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics

Abstract:

covenants, creditor protection, agency costs of debt, renegotiation

32.

Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 163-179, Summer 1995
Posted: 22 Sep 2004
Georg Nöldeke and Klaus M. Schmidt
University of Basel and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics

Abstract:

Incomplete contracts, hold-up problem

33.

Sequential Investments and Options to Own

Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, Winter 1998
Posted: 13 Aug 1998
Klaus M. Schmidt and Georg Nöldeke
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics and University of Basel

Abstract:

34.

Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining, and Give-Aways

CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 1541
Posted: 02 Apr 1997
Klaus M. Schmidt and Monika Schnitzer
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics and University of Munich - Department of Economics

Abstract:

The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1542
Posted: 19 Mar 1997
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics

Abstract:

The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation

European Economic Review, Vol. 44, No. 2, December 17, 1999
Posted: 02 Feb 2000
Klaus M. Schmidt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics

Abstract: