Fahad Khalil

University of Washington - Department of Economics

Box 353330

Seattle, WA 98195-3330

United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5

Munich, DE-81679

Germany

  • University of Washington - Department of Economics

  • CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

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Top 16,489

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6

CROSSREF CITATIONS

44

Scholarly Papers (9)

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1.

Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4497
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 05 May 2011 Last Revised: 14 Apr 2015
Fahad Khalil, Jacques P. Lawarree and Troy J. Scott
University of Washington - Department of Economics, University of Washington - Department of Economics and RTI International
Downloads 442 (65,125)
Citation 4

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Monitoring, Unverifiable signal, Private communication, Timing of information, Collusion

2.

Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4511
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 29 Jun 2013
Fahad Khalil, Doyoung Kim and Jacques P. Lawarree
University of Washington - Department of Economics, Sogang University - Department of Economics and University of Washington - Department of Economics
Downloads 229 (134,626)
Citation 1

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Bureaucracy, policy drift, motivated agents, contracts, delegation, collusion

3.

Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of Two Evils

CESifo Working Paper No. 1993
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 30 Apr 2007
Fahad Khalil, Jacques P. Lawarree and Sungho Yun
University of Washington - Department of Economics, University of Washington - Department of Economics and Hanyang University - Economics
Downloads 190 (160,611)

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Monitoring, Corruption, Collusion, Bribery, Extortion, Framing

4.

Monitoring a Common Agent

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 07 May 2003
Fahad Khalil, David Martimort and Bruno Parigi
University of Washington - Department of Economics, University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) and Università degli Studi di Padova
Downloads 147 (200,426)
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monitoring, common agency, costly state verification

5.

Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production

Stevens Institute of Technology School of Business Research Paper
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 03 Sep 2018
Fahad Khalil, Jacques P. Lawarree and Alexander Rodivilov
University of Washington - Department of Economics, University of Washington - Department of Economics and Stevens Institute of Technology - School of Business
Downloads 131 (219,994)
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Information Gathering, Optimal Contracts, Strategic Experimentation

6.

Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1514
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 02 Sep 2005
Bruno Maria Parigi, Fahad Khalil and David Martimort
University of Padua - Department of Economics, University of Washington - Department of Economics and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 115 (242,573)
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monitoring, common agency, costly state verification

7.

Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5843
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 17 Mar 2016
Tanjim Hossain, Fahad Khalil and Matthew Shum
University of Toronto, University of Washington - Department of Economics and California Institute of Technology
Downloads 55 (375,312)

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8.

Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation?

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 15, pp. 457-478, Summer 2006
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 08 May 2006
Fahad Khalil, Doyoung Kim and Dongsoo Shin
University of Washington - Department of Economics, Sogang University - Department of Economics and Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business
Downloads 25 (497,587)
Citation 1
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9.

Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment

Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 269-291, June 2006
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 12 Jun 2006
Fahad Khalil and Jacques P. Lawarree
University of Washington - Department of Economics and University of Washington - Department of Economics
Downloads 20 (526,580)
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