Kentaro Hatsumi

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research

Yoshida-Honmachi

Sakyo-ku

Kyoto 606-8501

JAPAN

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS

166

SSRN CITATIONS

0

CROSSREF CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (4)

1.

A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect

ISER Discussion Paper No. 736
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 21 May 2009 Last Revised: 01 Jun 2011
Kentaro Hatsumi
Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 74 (400,879)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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charitable fund-raising, global game, leadership giving, philanthropy

2.

Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 30 May 2007 Last Revised: 02 Feb 2009
Kentaro Hatsumi and Shigehiro Serizawa
Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research and Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Downloads 39 (535,571)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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allotment problem, coalitional strategy-proofness, homogeneous indivisible goods, single-peaked preference, uniform probabilistic rule

3.

A Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof and No-Vetoer Rules in the Multi-Object Choice Model

ISER Discussion Paper No. 809
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 11 May 2011 Last Revised: 28 Feb 2013
Kentaro Hatsumi, Dolors Berga-Colom and Shigehiro Serizawa
Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research, University of Girona - Department of Economics and Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Downloads 30 (583,785)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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social choice, public decision making, voting by committees, generalized median voter scheme, separable prefernce

4.

Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings

ISER Discussion Paper No. 735
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 15 May 2009
Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research and Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Downloads 23 (629,064)

Abstract:

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multiple-winner election, strategic candidacy, separable preference, voting by committees