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Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business
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Corporate investment, executive compensation, managerial incentives, agency conflicts
Auction, Sniping, Ending Rules
Uncertainty, Corporate Investment, Agency Conflicts, Moral Hazard
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Corporate inversions; Shareholder conflicts; Taxes; Tax-clientele effects; Mergers and acquisitions
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