Melbourne, 3010
Australia
University of Melbourne - Department of Economics
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
Vertical Integration, Market Structure, Downstream Oligopsony, Competition Policy
partnership dissolution, mechanism design, property rights, interdependent values, asymmetric type distributions
events industry, ticket pricing, secondary markets, rationing, underpricing, conflation, opaque pricing
brokers, applied mechanism design, linear commission fees, optimal indirect mechanisms, auction houses
Experts, Policy Advice, Information Distortion, Costly Signalling
COVID-19, SIR models, capacity constraints, managing an epidemic
bilateral trade, Walrasian markets, thick market monopoly, competing exchanges
Bayesian learning, learning traps, information cascades, dynamic programming, stochastic optimal control
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Coordinated effects, sustainability and initiation of collusion, synchronized vs staggered purchasing
